Delaney v. Flood

• Decision Date: 09 January 1906
• Citation: 76 N.E. 209,183 N.Y. 323
• Parties: DELANEY v. FLOOD.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

183 N.Y. 323

76 N.E. 209

DELANEY

v.FLOOD.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 9, 1906.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by Timothy J. Delaney against John F. Flood. From an order of the Appellate Division (94 N. Y. Supp. 1143,105 App. Div. 642), affirming an order of the Special Term granting in part a motion for a temporary injunction, defendant appeals. Reversed.

The plaintiff is in possession of premises at 54 Rivington street, in the city of New York, at which place he conducts what is commonly known as a ‘Raines Law Hotel.’ In connection therewith and upon the first floor of the premises he maintains a saloon wherein liquors are sold under a liquor tax certificate duly issued to him. The defendant is a police captain in charge of the Twelfth police precinct in said city. As such captain he caused police officers under his command to be stationed in front of plaintiff's premises, who informed persons about to enter that the place was a disorderly house, that it was likely to be raided by the police department, and that persons entering would be liable to arrest if found therein. This action was commenced to restrain the defendant from stationing police officers in front of said premises and from interfering in any way with persons about to enter the same, and also to recover damages against him personally upon the ground that such action on his part constituted an unlawful interference with plaintiff's rights and a trespass thereon. Before the trial of the action an application was made at Special Term for an injunction pendente lite restraining the defendant from doing the acts complained of. Upon the hearing of that application the question whether plaintiff's premises were conducted as a disorderly house frequented by lewd women was contested upon conflicting affidavits. The learned court at Special Term denied the application in so far as it sought to restrain the posting of police officers in front of plaintiff's premises, but granted an injunction order restraining the defendant and all officers or agents under his control ‘from in any manner stopping any persons who may desire to enter the premises known as No. 54 Rivington street, in the borough of Manhattan, city of New York, or voluntarily informing them or any person that the hotel conducted therein is a disorderly place, or that it is likely to be raided by the police department of the city of New York, or that if a raid should be made upon said premises any person found therein at the time would be liable to arrest, or by interfering in any other way by voluntary statements as to the character of said premises, or threats of possible raids to be made in or upon them, or by interfering with any person they may see going into said premises, or by informing any person they may see going into said premises, or any person in or upon said premises, that the said premises is a house of prostitution or notorious to the community, or is liable to be raided, or in any way interfering with said premises by voluntary statements as to its character or possible raids.’

The Appellate Division affirmed the order of the Special Term, allowed an appeal to this court, and certified the following questions for our determination: ‘(1) Have the police authorities the power to station policemen outside of a place which has a liquor tax license, and which they suspect of being a disorderly house, and to notify customers who are in the place and those who are about to enter the premises that the place is a disorderly house, and as such is likely to be raided by the police at any monent, and that those who are in the place at the time of the raid are liable to arrest? (2) Do such acts constitute a trespass? (3) If so, will equity intervene to restrain such acts?’

John J. Delany, Corp. Counsel (Theodore Connoly and Terence Farley, of counsel), for appellant.

WERNER, J. (after stating the facts).

The three questions certified to us, when considered separately, cannot be answered categorically; but, when they are reduced in terms to the concrete and practical issue involved, they present a question of substantial importance that should be decided without regard to mere matters of form. The question, in substance, is whether equity will intervene to restrain the police authorities from stationing officers outside of a place having a liquor tax certificate, when such authorities suspect that place of being con ducted as a disorderly house, and from notifying customers who are in the place and those who are about to enter the same that it is a disorderly house which is likely to be raided at any moment, and that those who are on the premises at the time fo such raid are liable to arrest. The pivotal point around which this question revolves is that the plaintiff is engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors. That is a business which, when uncontrolled and unregulated by law, is fraught with grave dangers to the public peace health, morals, and safety; and even when regulated by statute, as far as it may be, it is productive of much idleness, pauperism, disorder, and crime. In order to prevent and to minimize...