Delaware, Lackawanna Western Railroad Company v. United States of America

• Decision Date: 01 December 1913
• Docket Number: No. 275,275
• Citation: 58 L.Ed. 269,231 U.S. 363,34 S.Ct. 65
• Parties: DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA, & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

231 U.S. 363

34 S.Ct. 65

58 L.Ed. 269

DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA, & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

No. 275.

Argued October 17, 1913.

Decided December 1, 1913.

Mr. W. S. Jenney for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 363-367 intentionally omitted] Assistant to the Attorney General Todd for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 367 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Lamar delivered the opinion of the court:

The Delaware, Lackawanna, & Western Railroad Company was indicted for hauling, over its lines, between Buffalo, New York, and Scranton, Pennsylvania, twenty carloads of hay, belonging to the company, but not necessary for its use as a common carrier. This transportation was charged to be in violation of the commodity clause of the Hepburn act (34 Stat. at L. 585, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1287), which makes it unlawful 'for any railroad company to transport [in interstate commerce] any article . . . it may own . . . or in which it may have any interest . . . except such . . . as may be necessary . . . for its use in the conduct of its business as a common carrier.'

On the trial it appeared that the defendant was not only chartered as a railroad, but had also been authorized to operate coal mines. The hay, referred to in the indictment, had been purchased for the use of animals employed in and about the mines at Scranton,—all the coal taken therefrom being sold for use by the public, except the steam coal which was used as fuel for the company's locomotives.

The defendant was found guilty and sentenced on each of the twenty counts. It brought the case here, insisting that the commodity clause violated the 5th Amendment, deprived the company of a right to contract, and prevented it from carrying its own property needed in a legitimate intrastate business, conducted under authority of a charter granted by the state of Pennsylvania, many years before the adoption of the Hepburn bill.

1. This contention must be overruled on the authority of United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Delaware & H. Co. 213 U. S. 366, 416, 53 L. ed. 835, 852, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527. It is true that the decision in that case related to shipments of coal from mine to market, while here the merchandise was transported from market to mine. But the statute relates to 'all commodities, except lumber, owned by the company,' and includes inbound as well as outbound shipments. Both classes of transportation are within the purview of the evil to be corrected, and therefore subject to the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The exercise of that power is, of course, limited by the provisions of the 5th Amendment. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 336, 37 L. ed. 471, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367), but the commodity clause does not take property, nor does it arbitrarily deprive the company of a right of property. The statute deals with railroad companies as public carriers, and the fact that they may also be engaged in a private business does not compel Congress to legislate concerning them as carriers so as not to interfere with them as miners or merchants. If such carrier hauls for the public and also for its own private purposes, there is an opportunity to discriminate in favor of itself against other shippers in the rate charged, the facility furnished, or the quality of the service rendered. The commodity clause was not an unreasonable and arbitrary prohibition against a railroad company transporting its own useful property, but a constitutional exercise of a governmental power intended to cure or prevent the evils that might result if, in hauling goods in or out, the company occupied the dual and inconsistent position of public carrier and private shipper.

It was suggested that the case is not within the statute because, as the company could buy, in Scranton, hay that had already been transported over its line, no possible harm could come to anyone if it bought the same hay in Buffalo, and then hauled it to Scranton for use at the mine, but not for sale in competition with other dealers in stock food. But the courts are not concerned with the question as to whether, in a particular case, there had been any discrimination against shippers or harm to other dealers. The statute is general, and applies not only to those particular instances in which the carrier did use its power to the prejudice of the shipper, but to all shipments which, however innocent in themselves, come within the scope and probability of the evil to be prevented.

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