Delgado v. Cady, 79-C-1018.

Decision Date28 December 1983
Docket NumberNo. 79-C-1018.,79-C-1018.
Citation576 F. Supp. 1446
PartiesFelix DELGADO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Elmer CADY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

Kenneth P. Casey, Asst. State Public Defender, Madison, Wis., for plaintiffs.

Robert D. Repasky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

WARREN, District Judge.

On December 10, 1979, plaintiff Felix Delgado, an inmate confined at the Waupun Correctional Institution (WCI) in Waupun, Wisconsin, instituted this action by filing a pro se complaint in which he alleged that the practice of "double celling" prisoners at WCI constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On December 20, 1979, the Court granted Delgado's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Thereafter, Delgado obtained services of counsel to represent him.

On July 9, 1980, the Court granted Delgado's motion for class certification and designated the following as the appropriate plaintiff class:

all persons who are or become in the course of this litigation confined at the Waupun Correctional Institution and who are accordingly subject to or potentially subject to double celling in a cell designed for occupancy by a single inmate.

The case proceeded to trial before the Court on October 30, 1981. The Court heard additional testimony on eight non-consecutive days during December 1981 and January 1982. In addition, the Court toured the prison on January 15, 1982.

Extensive post trial submissions were completed by May 23, 1982, and the matter was taken under advisement by the Court. On January 31, 1983, at about 9:05 A.M., a major disturbance took place at Waupun. Inmates took control of the school and the dormitory/recreation hall. Fifteen staff personnel were seized and held as hostages. The hostages were terrorized and threatened and various demands were presented by the inmates. The situation was not fully under control until that evening.

As an aftermath of this riot and the physical damage involved, there was an exacerbation of doubling-up and even treble-celling within the institution as well as a considerable movement of inmates into other institutions with attendant complaints from those prisoners. On February 16, 1983, plaintiffs petitioned this Court for interim relief with respect to the immediate conditions of confinement at Waupun. On that day, the Court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the prison administration to eliminate all triple-celling as soon as consistent with public safety and security and report back to the Court regarding progress.

Concurrent with the above developments, the State Legislature, the municipal administrations of various cities, the Governor's office and numerous citizens' groups engaged in hectic planning, discussion, debate and pronouncements regarding the desperate prison needs of the State. The Court did not wish to issue a decision in the midst of such a situation which might exacerbate tensions at WCI; however, the time is now appropriate to issue its conclusions.

At trial, plaintiffs presented the testimony of thirteen prisoners and three expert witnesses: David Fogel, Charles Fasano and Ronald Shansky. Plaintiffs also called George Kaemmerer, a Crisis Intervention Worker employed at WCI, as a witness.

Testifying on behalf of the defendants were Elmer Cady, Administrator of the Division of Corrections for the State of Wisconsin; Thomas Israel, the Superintendent at WCI; Gerald Heeringa, Assistant Superintendent for Security at WCI; Margaret A. Gust, Nursing Supervisor at WCI; and, George Smullen, Education Director at WCI. In addition, defendants called Jeffrey Jones, a physician specializing in infectious diseases, as an expert witness.

Having reviewed the testimony of the witnesses, the numerous documents received as evidence, the parties' post-trial briefs and the parties' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court is prepared to render its decision. The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The problem of prison overcrowding is by no means unique to Wisconsin. The September 1983 issue of The Third Branch, the bulletin of the Federal Courts reports that in early 1983 some twenty-four state correctional systems (including Puerto Rico's) were under some form of court order to correct overcrowding. Increases in crime, increasing commitments to prison, outmoded facilities, escalating costs of both construction and labor, as well as legislative resistance to increased appropriations have all played a part (with many other factors) in taking our society to a crisis stage.

Double celling is one of the more identifiable products of overcrowding. It is understandable on the part of prison officials as they strive to house those entrusted to their custody; but it is also among the most debasing and most dehumanizing aspects of present prison life. It rips away the sense of privacy — of dignity — which can make bearable many things which could not otherwise be endured. Each human being needs a spot to which he can retreat periodically. He needs a place which belongs to him, albeit temporarily. With double celling, all shreds of such privacy are gone.

Double celling, as a constitutional issue, was first addressed by the Supreme Court in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). In Rhodes, the Court noted that "confinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment Standards." That amendment proscribes "cruel and unusual" punishments. Reviewing its cases construing these words, the Court opined that conditions of confinement "must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain ..." and concluded that double celling per se does not inflict pain that violates the Constitution. But quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958), the Court said that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is a fluid concept which has "to draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Recognizing that such a yardstick is highly elastic depending on who is looking at the evolving standards, the Court cautioned that judicial evaluators should make their judgments on the basis of "objective factors to the maximum possible extent." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has already indicated its view that cruel and unusual punishment issues relating to prisoners require viewing the totality of the conditions of confinement, Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir.1981) (emphasis supplied).

With these criteria before us from those tribunals to whom we owe adherence, the Court proceeds to a review of those prison confinement conditions and practices covered in the trial testimony.

I. THE FACILITIES

WCI is a multi-structure maximum security penitentiary originally built about the time of the Civil War. The present structure is over 100 years old with the sort of high walls and large, multi-level cell blocks usually built during the nineteenth century. It has a rated capacity of 840 inmates. Like many prisons in the United States, WCI has faced a serious overcrowding problem over the past few years. On March 12, 1980, there were 1147 inmates confined at WCI. By December 31, 1980, the number of inmates confined at WCI had dropped to 1068 inmates. On March 17, 1981, the number of inmates confined at WCI was 1081.

As a result of the overcrowding at WCI, prison officials on many occasions have placed two prisoners in cells designed to hold one prisoner. There have also been occasions when prison officials have placed three inmates in a cell. This triple celling occurs when disturbances result in numerous inmates being moved to the prison's Adjustment Center simultaneously.

To accommodate the extra prisoners, prison officials place an extra mattress or mattresses in those cells which contain more than one inmate. Unlike the bunks which are permanent fixtures in each cell, these additional mattresses are not attached to the wall. Rather, the mattresses simply lie on the floor.

Although most inmates are housed in four different cell blocks or the prison's Adjustment Center, the practice of double celling is limited to the Adjustment Center, the North Cell Hall, and the Northwest Cell Hall, those facilities where most of the prisoners who are not part of the prison's general population are housed.

A. The Adjustment Center

As its name implies, the Adjustment Center houses WCI's problem prisoners. It is a two-story steel and concrete building built during the 1950's. Fifty-nine cells in its main section are used for double celling, when necessary. Eight additional cells located in the lower level of the building are used for protective custody and are not used for double celling.

The main section of the Adjustment Center contains two tiers of cells. The cells in the lower tier measure 6.5 feet by 9.5 feet (61.75 square feet). In the upper tier, the cells measure 6.5 feet by 9.75 feet (63.38 square feet). The ceiling height in each cell is 7.5 feet.

Cells 1-9 on the Adjustment Center have a bunk fastened to the floor; cells 10-15 have a stool, table and bunk fastened to the floor; cells 16-60 have a bunk and table fastened to the wall, and a stool. In addition, each cell contains a one-piece combination sink-toilet. The net space (gross floor space less floor space occupied by furniture) in each cell is approximately 35.25 square feet.

None of the cells in the Adjustment Center have windows. There are, however, large windows on the outside of the building facing each cell. Ventilation is adequate.1

The Adjustment Center is an extremely noisy building. The inmates housed there often yell at each other or at...

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  • Reece v. Gragg, Civ. A. No. 82-1970.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • 17 Diciembre 1986
    ...away the sense of privacy — of dignity — which can make bearable many things which otherwise could not be endured." Delgado v. Cady, 576 F.Supp. 1446, 1448 (E.D.Wis.1983). The only conceivable purpose of overcrowding at the Sedgwick County Jail is to allow the county to house more inmates w......
  • Wingard v. Louisiana
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana
    • 29 Marzo 2022
    ...of inmates is not a per se unconstitutional condition.).88 R. Doc. 8, pp. 14-15 (emphasis in original), citing Delgado v. Cady , 576 F. Supp. 1446 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 28, 1983).89 R. Doc. 8, p. 15.90 Barrow , 2019 WL 2130237 at *2, citing Bell , 441 U.S. at 542, 99 S.Ct. 1861.91 See also Barrow......
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    • 5 Agosto 2010
    ...detainees are free to move between their rooms and the common area.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 543, 99 S.Ct. 1861; see also Delgado v. Cady, 576 F.Supp. 1446, 1456 (E.D.Wisc.1983) (“As a temporary response to a situation created by the inmates own actions, ... [triple celling] does not constitute a......
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    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana
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    ...of inmates is not a per se unconstitutional condition.). [88] R. Doc. 8, pp. 14-15 (emphasis in original), citing Delgado v. Cady, 576 F.Supp. 1446 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 28, 1983). [89] R. Doc. 8, p. 15. [90] Barrow, 2019 WL 2130237 at *2, citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 542. [91] See also Barrow, 2019 ......
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