Delinousha v. Nat'l Biscuit Co.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1928
• Citation: 248 N.Y. 93,161 N.E. 431
• Parties: DELINOUSHA et al. v. NATIONAL BISCUIT CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

248 N.Y. 93

161 N.E. 431

DELINOUSHA et al.

v.NATIONAL BISCUIT CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 1, 1928.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Demetras Delinousha and others for death benefits, opposed by the National Biscuit Company. An award of the State Industrial Board in claimant's favor was affirmed by the Appellate Division (221 App. Div. 827, 224 N. Y. S. 785), and the employer appeals.

Order of Appellate Division affirmed.

Appeal from Supreme Court, appellate Division, Third department.

Charles A. Vilas, of New York City, for appellant.

Albert Ottinger, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel), for respondents.

ANDREWS, J.

Concededly, if an injury causes insanity, which in turn causes suicide, death benefits may be awarded under the provisions of section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67). Here the finding is to the effect that the injury suffered by the deceased caused him to ‘develop and suffer from a psychosis,’which caused him to commit suicide, ‘his death being naturally and unavoidably the result of the injuries which he sustained,’ and that it ‘resulted from an uncontrollable impulse and without conscious volition to produce death.’ As there is some evidence to justify this finding, we would content ourselves with affirming without opinion were it not for the test as to the meaning of the word ‘insanity’ to be applied in such cases, as stated by the Appellate Division upon an earlier appeal.

It may be said safely that insanity is a symptom of some functional derangement of tissues of the brain. As this derangement is more or less deep seated, so the resulting symptoms are more or less profound. The legal effect differs under varying circumstances. Insanity for one purpose may not be insanity for another. The defendant is guilty of crime, if he knows the nature and quality of the act he commits, and knows that it is wrong. A testator may make a will if he has capacity to comprehend the condition of his property, his relation to those who would, or should, or might, be the natural objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of its provisions. A contract may be avoided only if a party is so affected as to be unable to see things in their true relations and to form correct conclusions in regard thereto. A policy of insurance, excepting death by suicide, may be enforced, if the insured kills himself while insane. Here, however, there is no agreement as to the precise meaning of the word-the extent of the mental deficiency which it connotes. In some courts it means inability to recognize the physical nature of the act. Cooper v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227, 3 Am. Rep. 451. In others, unconsciousness that the act will cause death, or the presence of an irresistible insane impulse. Van Zandt v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 169, 14 Am. Rep. 215. Still elsewhere such an impairment of reason that, while the act is intentional and voluntary, the insured still does not understand its moral quality and its general nature or effect, or where an irresistible impulse is present. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U. S. 468, 14 S. Ct. 155, 37 L. Ed. 1148. And again the absence of criminal intent-of an evil motive. Eastabrook v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224, 89 Am. Dec. 743.

The New York rule, a compromise...