Brink v. H. Earl Clack Company, a Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1939
• Docket Number: 6722
• Citation: 60 Idaho 730,96 P.2d 500
• Parties: IRMA BRINK, Appellant, v. H. EARL CLACK COMPANY, a Corporation, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

96 P.2d 500

60 Idaho 730

IRMA BRINK, Appellant, v. H. EARL CLACK COMPANY, a Corporation, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Respondents

No. 6722

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 24, 1939

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-AFTER EFFECT OF PREVIOUS INJURY-DEATH-CAUSAL CONNECTION-EVIDENCE-FINDINGS-REVIEW.

1. Where Industrial Accident Board found that deceased employee did not commit suicide and that his death was not caused by intoxication, the Supreme Court on appeal from order denying compensation was not required to further consider such defenses.

2. The Supreme Court was required to approve order of Industrial Accident Board denying compensation if there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain board's findings of fact that there was no causal connection between injury received by employee from accidental overturning of truck arising in the course of and out of his employment, and gunshot wounds which caused his death. (Const., art. 5, sec. 9, as amended Sess. Laws 1937, p. 498.)

3. The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed.

4. The evidence required an award of compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act where it was more probable than not that after effect of injury to head received by truck driver when truck overturned, contributed to accidental self-infliction of gunshot wounds which caused his death. (Const., art. 5, sec. 9, as amended, Sess. Laws 1937, p 498.)

APPEAL from an order of the Industrial Accident Board.

Appellant on behalf of herself and minor daughter, sought compensation for the death of her husband. From an order denying compensation she appeals. Reversed.

Order reversed with directions.

J. Ward Arney and Clay V. Spear, for Appellant.

"When an accident arising out of and in the course of employment so mentally deranges an injured employee as to deprive that employee of wilful intention to self-injury, and, while in that mental condition, the employee suicides, it is compensable." (Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 A. 644, 56 A. L. R. 455; Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466, L. R. A. 1916A, 333; Lupfer v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 A. 458; McKane v. Capital Hill Quarry Co., 100 Vt 45, 134 A. 640; British compensation cases cited in 56 A. L. R. 459 and 35 A. L. R. 174; McFarland v. Department of Labor, 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.2d 714; Gatterdam v. Department of Labor, 185 Wash. 628, 56 P.2d 693; Tetrault Case, 278 Mass. 447, 180 N.E. 231; Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431.)

Uncontrollable impulse toward self-injury or destruction, even though not tantamount to insanity resulting from mental disorder caused by industrial accident, is compensable. (Id.)

All and the only substantial competent evidence in the record establishes, without conflict, that Brink, in the truck tipover, falling from 6 to 12 feet inside the metal cab of the truck, sustained a brain concussion and was continuously thereafter mentally deranged and physically incapacitated.

Brink, from the 9:00 or 9:30 o'clock P. M. accident, was totally unconscious for from 5 to 15 minutes, remained for over half an hour in the back seat of the Flowers car; complained of head injury; could not comprehend during the entire rest of his life as to what had happened; thought that "something is rolling right over my head" (f. 270); shuffled, but did not stagger in his walk; from about 10:00 to 10:30 o'clock sat in the cafe with his head and arms on the table; cold, wet and physically low, did not disrobe at the Canyon Garage cabin; sat there with his head and arms on a chest of drawers; failed to recognize Ward, an old friend, between 5:30 and 6:00 o'clock in the morning; muttered, stumbled on the stoop and staggered into the cabin; and, within half an hour, died from self-inflicted gunshot.

All and the only medical evidence is to the effect that Brink had a serious brain concussion, depriving him of the will to intend to injure himself and to perform more than the functions of walking, breathing and relieving his bladder.

All and the only medical testimony is to the effect that Brink suicided without wilful intent, but as a direct result of brain concussion accidentally sustained.

The findings (pars. XVII, XVIII and XIX) are, in truth, "conclusions," based upon a presumption of law and an inference; discordant with all the competent substantial testimony; and reviewable as a question of law.

The evidence not being conflicting, the Supreme Court is in as good a position as was the board to decide de novo. (Johnston v. A. C. White Lumber Co., 37 Idaho 617, 217 P. 979; E. T. Chapin Co. v. Scott, 44 Idaho 566, 260 P. 172; Horst v. Southern Idaho Oil Co., 49 Idaho 58, 286 P. 369.)

The record uncontradictorily establishes mental and physical disability, resulting in self-inflicted death through (1) uncontrollable impulse to suicide; or (2) bungling, accidental handling of a gun.

The case was pleaded and tried on the respective theories of (1) self-inflicted death through mental disturbance, opposed by (2) intoxication and wilful intention to self-injure, and should have been so decided. (Brown v. Hardin, 31 Idaho 112, 169 P. 293; Hindman v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 32 Idaho 133, 178 P. 837.)

The defense being based upon intoxication and wilful intention to self-injure (sec. 43-1002), and those defenses having failed, and claimant having borne the burden of proving, without conflict, mental and physical subnormality, resultant from brain concussion, award should have been made claimant for death due to mental and physical derangement, whether the gunshot wound was inflicted through uncontrollable impulse or through the bungled handling of a gun.

Brink, after the accident, was neither mentally able to intend self-destruction nor to properly normally handle a gun; misuse of the gun, whether suicidal or bungling, being proximately caused by brain concussion and lowered mental and physical ability.

Clarence L. Hillman, for Respondent.

The burden of proof is upon appellant to prove that the deceased employee sustained an injury in the course of his employment, that such injury produced mental derangement to the extent that the employee could not entertain a fixed purpose to take his own life and that his commission of suicide (if there were a suicide) was the direct result of that lack of purpose that characterizes an insane mind, in order to recover compensation in this case. (In re Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466, L. R. A. 1916A, 333; Ruschetti's Case, (Mass.) 13 N.E.2d 34; Nichols v. Winslow Coal Corp., (Ind. App.) 18 N.E.2d 475; Mitchell v. Industrial Com. of Ohio, 135 Ohio St. 110, 19 N.E.2d 769.)

GIVENS, J. Budge, Morgan, and Holden, JJ., concur. Ailshie, C. J., did not sit in this case.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.

November 13, 1938, Stanley L. Brink was, and for about a year prior thereto had been, in charge of and engaged in the distribution of gasoline by motor truck for H. Earl Clack Company, one of the defendants herein, at and from Coeur d'Alene.

The evening of the 12th, Brink, accompanied by his brother-in-law Ed. Bryan, delivered gasoline to Rose Lake, whence returning attempting to pass a stalled automobile on a muddy and slippery road (Bryan having gotten out of the truck to see if it could be driven by the stalled automobile) the truck overturned on its top in the barrow pit rendering Brink unconscious for ten or fifteen minutes. After having been extricated from the metal cab of the truck and regaining consciousness he was returned in the stalled automobile to Rose Lake where he stayed until about midnight, continuing to be more or less dopey, his memory faulty, resting his head on his arms as he sat by a table and complaining that his head hurt and that something was rolling over it. The cafe where he was thus resting, closing at midnight, Brink and Bryan were compelled to walk about six miles to the Canyon Garage on the road to Coeur d'Alene; Brink walked in a more or less shuffling manner and still complained about his head.

Securing shelter but no bed in a house at the Canyon Garage, the two occupants thereof and Bryan went to sleep, leaving Brink sitting up and still complaining of his head.

The Industrial Accident Board's Finding of Fact No. 14 clearly details the ensuing denouement:

"That while said Brink was sitting by the said chest of drawers, the other occupants of the cabin went to sleep and the next time Brink was seen he was putting fire-wood into the stove and then sit in front of it; that later, and between five thirty and six o'clock in the morning of November 13, 1938, he was by an acquaintance seen outside of the cabin door urinating; that the said acquaintance greeted said Brink by saying, 'Hello, Brink, how's everything this morning?' and Brink answered, 'Oh, all right, I guess,' and turned and stumbled on the stoop and staggered into the door; that the next which was seen of said Brink was after the occupants of the cabin, awakened by the discharge of a rifle, found said Brink had been shot in the head with the rifle which he had taken with him in his truck from Coeur d'Alene and that he was dead of said gun shot wound."

Brink's wife, on behalf of herself and minor daughter, sought compensation.

The board found Brink did not commit suicide and that his death was not caused by intoxication, two of the defenses interposed (which therefore, we need not further consider), and denied compensation thus:

"XVIII

"Since the presumption against suicide is in the nature of evidence and is so strong and since there is nothing to overcome such presumption, except possible inferences from facts established by the testimony, and since from said facts it is...