Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons

• Decision Date: 22 May 1959
• Docket Number: 16009,Nos. 16008,s. 16008
• Citation: 325 S.W.2d 222
• Parties: DELTA DRILLING COMPANY, Appellant, v. Maxwell D. SIMMONS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 222

325 S.W.2d 222

DELTA DRILLING COMPANY, Appellant, v. Maxwell D. SIMMONS et al., Appellees.

Nos. 16008, 16009.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

May 22, 1959.

Rehearing Denied June 19, 1959.

Kliewer & Roach, and Edward Kliewer, Jr., Dallas, for appellant.

Spruiell, Lowry, Potter, Lasater & Guinn, and Wilbert Lasater, Tyler, for appellees.

MASSEY, Chief Justice.

The case before us is by consolidation of appeals taken by Delta Drilling Company. By one case this Company appealed from a partial summary judgment in an abundance of precaution and because of the possibility that it might properly be considered to have been a final judgment. By the other case the Company appealed from the final judgment which incorporated the summary judgment as a part thereof, then by application of the principles of law decided upon pursuant to entry of summary judgment, adjudicated the property rights of the parties as in a declaratory judgment, fixing attorney's fee, and decreeing recovery as for unsecured indebtedness, etc.

We agree with all the attorneys that the appeal taken from the partial summary judgment was erroneous and the case by which it is presented is ordered dismissed.

We affirm the final judgment.

The appellant, Delta Drilling Company, is successor to such interest under a deed as was originally received by one of two grantees, each of whom acquired a one-eighth interest to the minerals under certain lands, restricted in character, particularly as to rights relative to royalty. The appellees were successors in interest, right and title, to the grantor in said deed.

The parties are in dispute upon the matter of the extent of the appellant's rights under and by virtue of the original deed. The extent thereof was completely determined by the summary judgment which was rendered in favor of the appellees. Thereafter the final judgment was primarily by mathematical calculation as applied to the obligations of the parties, one to the other.

For the purposes of resolving the main question in this cause, we may take as a premise the case of Richardson v. Hart, 1945, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563. It is to be noticed that in such case it was judicially determined what the grantee (and the successors to grantee's interest under deed) received under a mineral deed which is identical in all material particulars necessary to be considered to the deed to be construed in the instant case.

The difference to be noted is this. The determination made in the Richardson v. Hart case was as of a time when the oil and gas production occurred through operations performed under the oil and gas lease which was in effect at the time the deed was executed. The determination to be made in the insant case is at a time after expiration or cancellation of the lease in effect at time the deed was made, and after a new lease had been made to a different lessee by the party having the 'lease interest', under which new lease oil production was realized.

Does this circumstance make any difference in the result to be determined? We are of the opinion that it does not. It is to be noted at page 565 of 185 S.W.2d that under the provisions of the deed there construed that the second estate, i. e., the royalty to be due and payable under the lease on the land, '* * * is fixed as a permanent grant irrespective of * * * this or any future lease, and, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, would determine the proportionate share of the grantee or his assigns in the royalties in the oil or other minerals produced from the land.' Though the quoted language is dictum as applied to the question resolved in the Richardson v. Hart case, we nevertheless believe it is correct. If it is correct it provides a rule by which the case before us is resolved. Since we deem it correct we use it to resolve the question in accordance therewith. It being obvious that the trial court's judgment likewise so resolved the case below it would serve no useful purpose to encumber the opinion by detailing the mathematical calculation thereunto entailed.

We do believe that it would be well to mention the contentions of the appellant upon the matter of the term 'lease interest.' Provisions of the lease before us for construction are in no sense different from paragraph No. 4 of the lease construed in the Richardson v. Hart case, and the term 'lease interest' is to be considered just as it might have been in that case had the circumstances been such that the deed therein construed was before the Supreme Court after a new lease had been executed rather than during the effective period of the lease in existence at time the deed was executed. As used in the deed the term 'lease interest' means that the grantee does not receive any right to participate in the making of any subsequent lease, if and in the event the lease in effect at time the deed was executed should be canceled, forfeited, or otherwise expire,--but that the right to execute any subsequent lease was reserved to the grantor and constituted no part of the property or property rights conveyed thereby. Or, it might be...