Dempsey v. Jaroscak

• Decision Date: 02 July 1971
• Docket Number: No. 42508,42508
• Parties: LeVain DEMPSEY and Marcelline Dempsey, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Frank JAROSCAK and Adelaide G. Jaroscak, husband and wife, Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 779

188 N.W.2d 779

290 Minn. 405

LeVain DEMPSEY and Marcelline Dempsey, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Frank JAROSCAK and Adelaide G. Jaroscak, husband and wife Respondents.

No. 42508.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 2, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A motion for summary judgment may be granted pursuant to Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, only if, after taking the view of the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the movant has clearly sustained his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. Rule 56.03, which sets out the procedure for the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, does not make the use of affidavits by the adverse party mandatory.

Seltz, Tolaas & Seng, St. Paul, for appellants.

Murnane, Murnane, Battis, deLambert & Conlin, St. Paul, for respondents.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, MURPHY, OTIS, and ROGOSHESKE, JJ.

OPINION

NELSON, Justice.

Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment of the Ramsey County District Court entered pursuant to an order granting defendants summary judgment. On March 1, 1969, at approximately 6 a.m., plaintiff Marcelline Dempsey was delivering newspapers on her son's morning route. The temperature was approximately 25 degrees above zero, and there was a considerable accumulation of packed snow and ice on the ground. Defendants had requested that their paper be delivered to the rear entrance of their home. To comply with this request, Mrs. Dempsey parked her car near defendants' driveway, which was the only access from the back of the house to the street, got out with defendants' paper, and walked to their driveway. She proceeded up the broad, flat driveway, which, like most of the other driveways in the block, was compacted with snow and ice. However, an area had been shoveled at a point where the driveway met with the rear sidewalk leading to defendants' back door. The cleared area appeared to have all of the snow removed down to the concrete of the driveway, but a thin coating of glare ice had formed on the surface of the concrete. As Mrs. Dempsey stepped from the packed snow onto the cleared area, she slipped on the ice and fell, injuring her left knee. No sand, salt, or other abrasive had been placed on the cleared area prior to the accident.

Mrs. Dempsey brought this action to recover for injuries sustained in the fall in defendants' driveway. Her husband, plaintiff LeVain Dempsey, sought to recover hospital and medical expenses resulting from the accident as well as damages for loss of his wife's services. Based upon the pleadings, Mrs. Dempsey's deposition, and photographs of the accident scene, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that there were no genuine issues of fact. The trial court, in its memorandum accompanying its order, stated:

'* * * (I)t appears without dispute that the evidence as adduced in the taking of the deposition of the plaintiff, Mrs. Dempsey, that no actionable negligence is shown on the part of the defendants, and therefore, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. It is for these reasons the Court has granted the motion of the defendants herein.'

The only issue on this appeal is whether summary judgment was properly granted by the court below.

1. Plaintiffs contend that Marcelline Dempsey's legal status, the nature of the duty owed to her by defendants, and whether that duty was breached, were genuine issues of fact to be determined by a jury, and that therefore the trial court's disposition of the case by summary judgment was error.

This court has consistently stated that, although summary judgment is intended to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of a case, it is not designed to afford a substitute for a trial where there are issues of fact to be determined. Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 143 N.W.2d 65; Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482, 70 N.W.2d 351.

As stated in 2 Hetland & Adamson, Minnesota Practice, p. 574: on a Rule 56 summary judgment cause are seldom matters capable of determination on a Rule 5l summary judgment motion. The legal standards of reasonableness and causation are uniquely jury functions.'

In Sauter v. Sauter, Supra, the plaintiff sought to recover for personal injuries which she sustained when defendant's alleged negligent acts caused the car in which she was a passenger to go off the road into a ditch and strike a telephone pole. On the basis of evidence adduced from depositions, the trial court ordered summary judgment for defendant, but this court reversed, stating (244 Minn. 484, 70 N.W.2d 353):

'A motion for summary judgment may be granted pursuant to Rule 56.03 only if, after taking the view of the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the movant has clearly sustained his burden of showing that there is no Genuine issue as to any Material fact and that he is entitled to jugment as a matter of law. * * * In other words a summary judgment is proper where there is no issue to be tried but is wholly erroneous where there is a genuine issue to try.' (Italics supplied in part.)

However, this court did point out that summary judgment may be used to dispose of negligence actions, stating (244 Minn. 486, 70 N.W.2d 354):

'Although it is generally recognized that issues of negligence and contributory negligence are questions of fact and are not ordinarily susceptible of summary adjudication either for or against the claimant, it is not to be overlooked that in proper cases summary judgment may be entered where the material facts are undisputed and as a matter of law compel only one conclusion.'

In the instant case, although the facts are not in dispute, they do not necessarily lead to one conclusion. Plaintiff's deposition revealed that she was delivering newspapers for her hospitalized son at the request of his newspaper supervisor. She had delivered papers to defendants on previous occasions, and she knew that they had requested deliveries be made at the rear entrance of their home. Her son, had he been delivering the newspaper, would have had the status of a business invitee on their premises, and it would seem quite...