Knotts v. BNSF Railway Company, Court File No. 27-CV-06-3197.
| Decision Date | 02 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | Court File No. 27-CV-06-3197. |
| Parties | Darin M. Knotts, Plaintiff, v. BNSF Railway Company, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | Minnesota District Court |
Cortney S. LeNeave, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.
JoAnn C. Toth, Esq. appeared on behalf of Defendant.
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint, FELA, is denied. As a matter of law, Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff. As to the other elements of the FELA claim, Count I, including breach, causation, and damages, there exist genuine issues of material fact and Count I shall proceed to trial.
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint, LIA, is denied. The switching locomotive was "in use" in interstate commerce. As to the all other elements of the LIA claim, Count II, there exist genuiune issues of material fact and Count II shall proceed to trial.
3. The attached Memorandum is incorporated herein.
MEMORANDUMOn November 30, 1991, Plaintiff Darin M. Knotts ("Knotts") began working for Defendant BNSF Railway Company ("BNSF"), a Delaware corporation engaged as a common carrier in interstate commerce. On November 2, 2002, Knotts was working as foreman of the Switch Engine Assignment 203I in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Knotts and his crew were to transfer railcars to various industries. The crew traveled on the main line several miles beyond the yard to reach these industries. While engaged in the task of switching (i.e., delivering a loaded car) in the Highland Homes industry, Knotts was standing on the step of a locomotive moving approximately 2-4 miles per hour. Knotts alleges that he was facing the locomotive, with both feet on the step and his right hand holding onto the handrail. Knotts alleges that while standing on that step, the right side weld of the step broke underneath him and he fell to the ground. Knotts claims that he suffered a variety of permanent injuries as a result of the fall.
Plaintiff's Complaint contains two counts, alleging negligence by Defendant in violation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., and use of a defective and unsafe locomotive in violation of the Locomotive Inspection Act ("LIA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq., and seeks damages, costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorneys' fees. BNSF has moved for summary judgment on both counts, arguing that Knotts has not established the essential elements of negligence under the FELA, and that the locomotive was not "in use" at the time of the incident as required by the LIA.
Summary judgment shall be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56. See Hinrichs v. Farmers Co-op. Grain & Seed Ass'n, 333 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1983); see also Lindgren v. Sparks, 58 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 1953). A material fact that will preclude issuance of a summary judgment is one that "will affect the result or outcome of the case depending on its resolution." Zappa v. Fahey, 245 N.W.2d 258, 259-60 (Minn. 1976).
Summary judgment is the proper remedy where the facts in a case are not in dispute and where the decision is made on questions of law only. Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 134 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1965); Greaton v. Enich, 185 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1971). "Although summary judgment is intended to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition, it is not designed to afford a substitute for a trial where there are issues to be determined." Ahlm v. Rooney, 143 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 1966), citing Sauter v. Sauter, 70 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 1955), and Bustad v. Bustad, 116 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1962). "[T]he purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try." Abdallah, Inc. v. Martin, 65 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 1954) (citing Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944)). "A motion for summary judgment should be denied if reasonable persons might draw different conclusions from the evidence presented." Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn. 1978) (citing Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 84 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Minn. 1957)).
A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts; "the nonmoving party has the benefit of that view of the evidence which is most favorable to him." Sauter, 70 N.W.2d at 353. Where affidavits are submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot simply rely on general statements in a complaint; the "adverse party must present specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial unless, of course, the facts asserted by the moving party fail to adequately negate any issue of fact raised by the pleading." Ahlm, 143 N.W.2d at 68, cited and emphasized in First Fiduciary Corp. v. Blanco, 276 N.W.2d 30, 32-3 (Minn. 1979). In addition, "all inferences from circumstantial evidence and all doubts must be resolved against the movant, without undertaking to determine credibility." Forsblad v. Jepson, 195 N.W.2d 429, 430 (Minn. 1972). "[I]f any doubt exists as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact, the doubt must be resolved in favor of finding that the fact issue exists." Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Co., 219 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 1974). Even if the record "leads one to suspect that it is unlikely [that a party] will prevail upon trial, that fact is not a sufficient basis for refusing [that party] his day in court with respect to issues which are not shown to be sham, frivolous or so unsubstantial that it would obviously be futile to try them." Dempsey v. Jaroscak, 188 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1971) (quoting Whisler v. Findeisen, 160 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Minn. 1968)).
0. Duty of Defendant under the FELA
The Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") imposes liability on common carriers engaged in interstate commerce for work-related injuries caused, in whole or in part by the common carrier's negligence and allows railroad workers to recover for the negligence of their employers. 45 U.S.C. § 51; see Lecy v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 663 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Ackley v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 820 F.2d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1987)). Both state and federal courts have jurisdiction to hear FELA claims. 45 U.S.C. § 56. The act also requires a claim to be brought "within three years from the day that cause of action accrued." Id.
FELA also requires that the common carrier be engaged in interstate commerce. Most railroads meet this requirement. For example, courts have held that a terminal railroad or an industrial railroad operating entirely within the borders of a single state is within the Act if it transports goods shipped from outside the state to points within the state, or transports solely within a state goods destined for eventual transportation by other lines to points without a state. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284 (1920); Kach v. Monessen Sw. Ry. Co., 151 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1945); Newkirk v. L.A. Junction Ry. Co., 131 P.2d 535 (Cal. 1942).
In Healy v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 205 N.W. 260, 260 (Minn. 1925), the Minnesota Supreme Court held:
[B]ecause of the interdependence and essentially unitary character of our commerce, so far as it is the subject of railroad transportation, there is no longer any doubt that the liability of the carrier for injuries suffered by a member of a switching crew, "in the course of its general work," that of handling without distinction both interstate and intrastate cars, at one moment dealing with one and in the next with the other or both, is subject to regulation by Congress "whether the particular service being performed at the time of the injury, isolatedly considered, was in interstate or intrastate commerce."
As such, it is only in the highly unusual case of a carrier operating solely in a single state, with no connection with any other railroad, and never transporting materials into or out of the state, that FELA does not apply. See Blount v. Parish Line Rys., Inc., 149 F.Supp. 263 (W.D. La. 1957).
To prove negligence under FELA, a plaintiff must offer evidence proving the common law elements of negligence. Smith v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 617 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Fulk v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 22 F.3d 120, 124 (7th Cir. 1994)). While a prima facie case under FELA requires the same elements as the common law, the United States Supreme Court has reduced the quantum of proof required for a plaintiff-employee to reach the jury to an absolute minimum. Hauser v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co., 346 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. 1984).
Duty is one of the elements of negligence required by the common law and the FELA. Specifically, the FELA imposes upon employers a "continuous duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work." Francisco v. Burlington N. R.R., 204 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Ackley v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 820 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1987)). At common law, the duty of the employer to use reasonable care in furnishing his employees with a safe place to work was plain. Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry. Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 352 (1943). It is clear that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of reasonable care as a matter of law. Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the remaining elements, i.e., breach, causation, and damages.
1. "In Use" under the LIA
Proof of a violation...
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