Denault v. State

• Decision Date: 12 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. 20160294,20160294
• Citation: 898 N.W.2d 452
• Parties: Timothy Ray DENAULT, Petitioner v. STATE of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellant
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

898 N.W.2d 452

Timothy Ray DENAULT, Petitioner

v.STATE of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellant

No. 20160294

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Filed July 12, 2017

Britta K. Demello Rice, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General Office, Bismarck, ND, for respondent and appellant.

Timothy Ray Denault, petitioner; no appearance.

Kapsner, Justice.

[¶ 1] The State appeals from a district court order granting Timothy Denault's petition for declaratory relief and vacating his duty to register as a sexual offender in North Dakota. We conclude that the court abused its discretion in granting declaratory relief and that the Minnesota criminal offense to which Denault pled guilty is equivalent to a North Dakota offense for purposes of sexual offender registration under N.D.C.C. § 12.1–32–15(3)(b). We reverse.

I

[¶ 2] In 2000, Denault pled guilty in Clay County, Minnesota, to violating Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, for lewd exhibition, gross misdemeanor criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree. Denault subsequently moved to North Dakota. In December 2014, Denault filed a petition and affidavit in the district court, seeking declaratory relief from being required to register as a sexual offender in North Dakota. Denault alleged he had been informed that the North Dakota attorney general's office determined he was required to register based on his conviction in Minnesota, despite not having had to register in Minnesota. He requested the court to declare the requirement to register as a sexual offender unlawful, to terminate his registration requirement, and to remove him from the attorney general's list of sexual offenders.

[¶ 3] In January 2015, Denault filed additional exhibits, including copies of the complaint and final order from his criminal case in Minnesota. In June 2016, the district court issued a notice of default hearing because the State had not responded to the petition. The State opposed entry of a default judgment, and the court allowed the State to respond to Denault's petition. In August 2016, the State filed a brief opposing Denault's petition for declaratory relief, arguing N.D.C.C. § 12.1–32–15 treats offenders moving here from out-of-state the same as if convicted in North Dakota and Denault does not qualify to be exempted from registration.

[¶ 4] The district court granted Denault's petition, vacated his sexual offender registration requirement, and ordered him to be removed from the attorney general's list of sexual offenders. The court concluded the executive branch had imposed the registration requirement on Denault, rather than the judicial branch of government. The court further held the attorney general's office acted in excess of its statutory authority and in violation of the North Dakota Constitution's separation of powers in deciding there was an equivalent North Dakota offense and by imposing a duty to register as a sexual offender.

II

[¶ 5] The State argues the district court erred in granting Denault's petition for declaratory relief.

[¶ 6] We review declaratory judgment actions under the same standards as other cases. N.D.C.C. § 32–23–07 ; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Lagodinski , 2004 ND 147, ¶ 7, 683 N.W.2d 903 ; Hanneman v. Cont'l W. Ins. Co. , 1998 ND 46, ¶ 19, 575 N.W.2d 445. The Declaratory Judgment Act's purpose is "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations, and it is to be construed and administered liberally." N.D.C.C. § 32–23–12. "The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree if such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." N.D.C.C. § 32–23–06.

[¶ 7] We have said a justiciable controversy must exist, ripe for a judicial determination. Ramsey Cty. Farm Bureau v. Ramsey Cty. , 2008 ND 175, ¶ 22, 755 N.W.2d 920 ; Saefke v. Stenehjem , 2003 ND 202, ¶ 12, 673 N.W.2d 41. "The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not give a court the power to render advisory opinions or determine questions not essential to the decision of an actual controversy." Richland Cty. Water Res. Bd. v. Pribbernow , 442 N.W.2d 916, 918 (N.D. 1989) (quoting Davis v. Dairyland Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas , 582 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) ). Under N.D.C.C. § 32–23–06, "the [district] court's decision to grant or deny a request for a declaratory judgment is discretionary." Nodak Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wamsley , 2004 ND 174, ¶ 7, 687 N.W.2d 226. The court's decision will not be set aside on appeal absent an abuse of its discretion. Id.

[¶ 8] In granting Denault's petition for declaratory relief, the district court granted relief as a matter of law on legal grounds based on undisputed facts, akin to a summary judgment. Our standard for reviewing summary judgment is also well established:

Summary judgment is a procedural device for promptly disposing of a lawsuit without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences which can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. Whether summary judgment was properly granted is a question of law which we review de novo on the entire record. On appeal, this Court decides if the information available to the trial court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Ramsey Cty. , 2008 ND 175, ¶ 6, 755 N.W.2d 920 (quotation marks omitted).

III

[¶ 9] The State argues the district court abused its discretion in granting declaratory relief by holding that the attorney general had imposed Denault's duty to register in North Dakota as a sexual offender, that only a judge can impose sexual offender registration, and that the statutory requirement to register under N.D.C.C. § 12.1–32–15(3)(b) is "wholly illegal and void."

[¶ 10] Our standards for interpreting a statute are well established:

Our primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, and we first look to the plain language of the statute and give each word of the statute its ordinary meaning. When the wording of the statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. If, however, the statute is ambiguous or if adherence to the strict letter of the statute would lead to an absurd or ludicrous result, a court may resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to interpret the statute. A statute is ambiguous if it [is] susceptible to meanings that are different, but rational. We presume the legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences, and we construe statutes in a practical manner, giving consideration to the context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were enacted.

State v. Meador , 2010 ND 139, ¶ 11, 785 N.W.2d 886 (quoting State v. Brown , 2009 ND 150, ¶ 15, 771 N.W.2d 267 ). The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. Id.

[¶ 11] Section 12.1–32–15(3), N.D.C.C., imposes a duty to register on an individual in this state when convicted of certain offenses in another state, providing in part:

If a court has not ordered an individual to register in this state, an individual who resides, is homeless, or is temporarily domiciled in this state shall register if the individual:

....

b. Has pled guilty or nolo contendere to , or been adjudicated for or found guilty of, an offense in a court of this state for which registration is mandatory under this section or an offense from another court in the United States , a tribal court, or court of another country equivalent to those offenses set forth in this section ....

(Emphasis added.)

[¶ 12] Here, the district court held that the executive branch—i.e. , the attorney general's office—could not impose a requirement to register as a sexual offender under N.D.C.C. § 12.1–32–15(3)(b), and that such action violated the doctrine of separation of powers because the decision involves a judicial function. The court reasoned the statute as a whole does not give the executive branch any authority to impose a duty to register, registration can only be imposed as a part of probation conditions, and only a court has authority to impose those conditions. The district court also relied on State v. Nelson , 417 N.W.2d 814, 817 (N.D. 1987), and State v. Saavedra , 406 N.W.2d 667, 671 (N.D. 1987), for the general proposition that a court may not delegate sentencing authority. The court held only a judge could impose sexual offender registration under N.D.C.C. § 12.1–32–15(3).

[¶ 13] The State responds, however, that the legislature created the duty to register as a sexual offender under N.D.C.C. § 12.1–32–15(3), and the district court erred in holding the attorney general had acted in excess of its authority. The State contends that the statute imposes a duty to register on Denault and that the attorney general, "as the administering agency, works alongside various departments to implement the statute." The State asserts this may include the notification to Denault that he has a statutory duty to register.

[¶ 14] The State argues our precedent confirms an offender's duty to register exists, even when a judge is not involved, and a majority of this Court has previously held the sexual offender registration statute valid. See State v. Rubey , 2000 ND 119, ¶¶ 10–11, 611 N.W.2d 888 ; State v. Burr , 1999 ND 143, ¶¶ 26–27, 598 N.W.2d 147. The State asserts Rubey and Burr establish that the duty to register can be imposed by either a court, by statute, or by both; and the requirement is not imposed by the attorney general's office. Although the attorney general's office or law enforcement may inform an offender of a statutory duty to register, the State asserts this is relevant to establishing a willful violation and does not create a separation of powers...