Dendy v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 29 March 1944
• Docket Number: No. 8205.,8205.
• Citation: 179 S.W.2d 269
• Parties: DENDY et al. v. WILSON et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

179 S.W.2d 269

DENDY et al. v. WILSON et al.

No. 8205.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 29, 1944.

Rehearing Denied April 26, 1944.

Error from Court of Civil Appeals of Seventh Supreme Judicial District.

Separate proceedings under the Juvenile Delinquency Act by John W. Wilson, probation officer of Lubbock county, against Billy Dendy and L. W. King, Jr., consolidated and heard together. Judgment declaring the children to be delinquent children, and committing them to the State School for Boys at Gatesville for an indeterminate period, not to extend beyond each child's twenty-first birthday was reversed and the cause remanded, 175 S.W. 2d 297, wherein the court held, however, that the Juvenile Delinquency Act was constitutional, and the children bring error.

Affirmed, and cause remanded.

Charles C. Crenshaw and James O. Cade, both of Lubbock, for plaintiffs in error.

Syrian E. Marbut, Co. Atty., of Lubbock, for John W. Wilson.

Gerald C. Mann, former Atty. Gen., of Dallas, Grover Sellers, Atty. Gen., and Ocie Speer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SHARP, Justice.

This is a proceeding against Billy Dendy and L. W. King, Jr., instituted by petition of John W. Wilson, probation officer of Lubbock County, under the provisions of Article 2338—1, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, Acts 48th Leg., 1943, p. 313, ch. 204, known as the Juvenile Delinquency Act. Upon a hearing in the Juvenile Court of Lubbock County, judgment was rendered declaring Billy Dendy and L. W. King, Jr., to be delinquent children and committing them to the State School for Boys at Gatesville, Coryell County, Texas, for an indeterminate period, not to extend beyond each child's twenty-first birthday. Upon appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals at Amarillo, the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded. 175 S.W.2d 297.

Separate petitions were filed, but inasmuch as the act alleged to constitute delinquency appeared to be the same, the juvenile court consolidated the cases, over the objection of counsel for the children, and heard them together. The petitions alleged that Billy Dendy and L. W. King, Jr., were delinquent children by reason of their taking an automobile belonging to C. B. Conditt, and both children were alleged to be over the age of ten years and under the age of seventeen years. Notices were served on the parents of the children, and motions to dismiss the petitions, which asserted that the Act authorizing the proceeding was unconstitutional, were overruled by the court. Said children asked to be tried by a jury, but the trial court held that since a jury was not demanded in the manner and as required in other civil cases, the right to a jury trial had been waived. Thereupon the hearing proceeded before the court with the general public excluded, over the objection of counsel for the children.

It was stipulated by and between counsel for the children and counsel for the petitioner that "the juveniles were taken into custody by the Sheriff of Dawson County, Texas, in possession of the car in question in Dawson County." Both children were required to testify, over the objection of their counsel, to the effect that they took the car in question from a car lot belonging to C. B. Conditt and C. J. Reynolds, and they were taken into custody in possession of the car near Lamesa, in Dawson County. On examination by the court, Billy Dendy testified to having served a term in the Boys Reformatory at Gatesville. The owners of the car testified that they knew the boys, that one of them worked for them, and that they had not given them permission to take the car.

The court found the children to be delinquent children within the meaning of the Act, and ordered them committed to the State School for Boys at Gatesville for an indeterminate period, subject to modification or revocation from time to time. In their appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals the boys attacked the constitutionality of the Act in numerous respects. The court sustained the validity of the Act generally, but held that the juvenile court erred in failing to allow the boys a jury trial and in compelling them to testify against themselves.

It is quite obvious that the tendency of modern legislation is to radically change the method of procedure in the trial of juveniles. The underlying thought in our early criminal laws was to punish the offender, and this rule applied to children and adults alike. Prior to the enactment of the law now under consideration, the Legislature of this State had enacted laws applicable to the trial of juveniles. See Articles 1083 to 1093, inclusive, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Articles 2329 to 2338, inclusive, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. In Article 1093, Code of Criminal Procedure, it was provided that the prosecution and conviction of a juvenile shall be regarded as a criminal case, and an appeal of such case had to be taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals had occasion to construe Article 1083 et seq., Code of Criminal Procedure, and held that they were designed for the protection and reformation of juvenile offenders. It also held that the law was corrective, not punitive. In the case of Phillips v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 20 S.W.2d 790, 791, it was said: "In order that the beneficent purpose of the act may be effectuated, it should be construed liberally, except in so far as it purports to restrain the liberty of the child, in which case it should be strictly construed." See also Davis v. State, 113 Tex.Cr.R. 429, 21 S.W.2d 1068; Morgan v. State, 114 Tex. Cr.R. 434, 25 S.W.2d 842.

In 1943 the Legislature enacted the Act under consideration. It is quite long, and we shall refer only to the parts thereof essential to this opinion.

Section 1 of Article 2338—1 states the underlying purpose of this Act as follows:

"Section 1. The purpose of this Act is to secure for each child under its jurisdiction such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will serve the child's welfare and the best interest of the state; and when such child is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given him by his parents. * * *"

Section 3 reads as follows:

"Sec. 3. The word `court' means the `Juvenile Court.' The word `Judge' means the Judge of the Juvenile Court. The term `delinquent child' means any female person over the age of ten (10) years and under the age of eighteen (18) years and any male person over the age of ten (10) years and under the age of seventeen (17) years:

"(a) who violates any penal law of this state of the grade of felony;

"(b) or who violates any penal law of this state of the grade of misdemeanor where the punishment prescribed for such offense may be by confinement in jail;

"(c) or who habitually violates any penal law of this state of the grade of misdemeanor where the punishment prescribed for such offense is by pecuniary fine only;

"(d) or who habitually violates any penal ordinance of a political subdivision of this state;

"(e) or who habitually violates a compulsory school attendance law of this state;

"(f) or who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others;

"(g) or who habitually associates with vicious and immoral persons."

Section 4 defines how juvenile courts may be established.

Section 5 reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. The Juvenile Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings governing any delinquent child, and such court shall be deemed in session at all times.

"Nothing contained herein shall deprive other courts of the right to determine the custody of children upon writs of habeas corpus, or when such custody is incidental to the determination of causes pending in such courts.

"When jurisdiction shall have been obtained by the court in the case of any child, such child shall continue under the jurisdiction of the court until he becomes twenty-one (21) years of age, unless discharged prior thereto; such continued jurisdiction shall, however, in no manner prejudice or constitute a bar to subsequent or additional proceedings against such child under the provisions of this Act."

Section 6 describes how a transfer of cases may be made.

Sections 7, 7-A, 8, 9, and 10 describe how an information may be filed, where the venue of the case is, the method and service of summons, the punishment for failure to obey such summons, and the issuance of a warrant.

Section 11 provides how a child taken into custody may be released. Section 13 reads as follows:

"Sec. 13. The Judge may conduct the hearing in an informal manner and may adjourn the hearing from time to time. In the hearing of any case the general public may be excluded. All cases involving children shall be heard separately and apart from the trial of cases against adults.

"If no jury is demanded, the Judge shall proceed with the hearing. When the proceeding is with a jury, the verdict shall state whether the juvenile is a `delinquent child' within the meaning of this Act, and if the Judge or jury finds that the child is delinquent, or otherwise within the provisions of this Act, the court may by order duly entered proceed as follows:

"(1) place the child on probation or under supervision in his own home or in the custody of a relative or other fit person, upon such terms as the court shall determine;

"(2) commit the child to a suitable public institution or agency, or to a suitable private institution or agency authorized to care for children; or to place them in suitable family homes or parental homes for an indeterminate period of time, not extending beyond the time the child shall reach the age of twenty-one (21) years;

"(3) make such further disposition as the court may deem to be for the best interest of the child, except as herein otherwise provided.

"No adjudication upon the status of any child in the jurisdiction of the court...