Denman v. City of Columbia, Opinion No. 26792 (S.C. 3/24/2010)
| Decision Date | 24 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 26792. |
| Parties | Paul Denman, Respondent, v. City of Columbia, City Council of the City of Columbia, City of Columbia Election Commission, Richland County Election Commission, Respondents, and Durham E. Carter, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Richland County, James R. Barber, Circuit Court Judge.
REVERSED.
Kevin A. Hall, Karl S. Bowers, Jr., and M. Todd Carroll, all of Hall & Bowers, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Jay Bender of Baker, Ravenel &, Bender, of Columbia, for Respondent Paul Denman.
Fernando Xavier Starkes, of Columbia, for Respondent City of Columbia Election Commission.
Kenneth E. Gaines, of Columbia, for Respondents City of Columbia and City Council of Columbia.
Bradley T. Farrar, of Columbia, for Respondent Richland County Election Commission.
In this election matter, appellant appeals an order of the circuit court enjoining the City of Columbia (City) from holding an election on April 6, 2010, to fill the unexpired term of a city council member who resigned. We reverse.
Longtime City council member E.W. Cromartie resigned his District 2 City Council seat on March 9, 2010. The next day, City adopted a resolution requiring an election to be held on April 6, 2010, the same date as the general municipal election in Columbia,1 to fill Cromartie's unexpired term. The resolution stated a notice of election must be published in The State Newspaper on or before March 14, 2010, and that the filing period for a person to file as a candidate would run from March 15th to March 19th.
The notice of election, which was published on March 14th, announced a general election for the City to be held on April 6. The notice stated the offices up for election were: (1) Mayor for term ending 2014; (2) Council Member for District 1 for term ending 2014; (3) Council Member for District 4 for term ending 2014; (4) Council Member for at-large seat for term ending 2014; and (5) Council Member for District 2 for term ending in 2012. The notice provided that people desiring to vote must have registered with the County Board of Voter Registration by March 5, 2010.
Paul Denman, a resident of District 2, filed a complaint in the circuit court on March 15th, arguing the action to hold the election to fill the District 2 seat was ultra vires. Denman sought an injunction to prevent City from conducting a special election on April 6th to fill the seat. Denman maintained he contemplated running for the seat to fill the unexpired term, but declined to do so because of the short time period between the announcement of the election and April 6th.
Appellant, who on March 16th filed his own complaint for an injunction, in which he maintained the election must be held on April 6th, sought to intervene in the instant action.
In the meantime, South Carolina House Representative James E. Smith sought an opinion from the Office of the Attorney General concerning the proper date for the election. On March 16th, the Attorney General issued an opinion in which he concluded it was permissible for City to hold the election to fill Cromartie's seat on April 6th, but that some constitutional questions as to the adequacy of notice existed. The Attorney General opined that any determination of constitutionality should be addressed by a court as quickly as possible. Based on this opinion, it appears, City elected to proceed with the election.
The circuit court heard this matter on March 18th. The next day, the court issued an order granting appellant's motion to intervene. Later that same day, the court granted an injunction in favor of Denman and ruled City could not hold the election to fill the vacant seat on April 6th, and the earliest date such election could occur is June 15, 2010. Appellant filed a notice of appeal and moved to expedite case. The Court granted the motion to expedite.
Did the circuit court err in granting an injunction and finding that City may not hold a special election to fill the District 2 seat the same day as the general election?
The legislature permits a municipality to hold its elections, primary or otherwise, whenever it wishes. S.C. Code Ann. § 5-15-50 (2004); Willis v. Wukela, 379 S.C 126, 665 S.E.2d 171 (2008). City has chosen to hold its general elections on the first Tuesday in April, rather than the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November. Columbia, S.C. Code § 6-6(a) (1998). The mayor and city council members are elected for terms of four years, and the terms for those offices are staggered, meaning one-half of the membership of the city council is elected every two years. Columbia, S.C. Code § 6-1(a) and (b) (1998).
At the heart of the instant dispute are three statutes. The first statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-200 (2004) governs the grounds for forfeiture of office of mayor or council member, and the method to fill vacancies in those offices. Section 5-7-200(b) provides, "[a] vacancy in the office of mayor or council shall be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term at the next regular election or at a special election if the vacancy occurs one hundred eighty days or more prior to the next general election." (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, Cromartie resigned less than 180 days before April 6, 2010, the date of the next general election. Therefore, § 5-7-200(b) appears to require that an election to elect a council member to replace Cromartie and fill his unexpired term take place on April 6th, provided the term "regular election" means the general election scheduled for the first Tuesday in April.2 Otherwise, the position must be filled by a special election, though the section does not specify precisely when such special election must occur.
The second statute, § 5-15-50 provides, (Emphasis added).
The third statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-35 (2009), which is titled "Notice of general, municipal, special, and primary elections," provides as follows:
The authority charged by law with conducting an election must publish two notices of general, municipal, special, and primary elections held in the county in a newspaper of general circulation in the county or municipality, as appropriate. . . . The first notice must appear not later than sixty days before the election and the second notice must appear not later than two weeks after the first notice.
(Emphasis added). Both of these general election statutes seem to require that, since Cromartie resigned on March 9th, sixty days notice is required prior to an election to fill the vacant seat.3
In granting the injunction, the circuit court found notice of the District 2 election was not published until March 14, 2010, twenty-three days prior to the general election date. He also found the period to campaign after the close of candidate filing was only eighteen days.
As to the issue of statutory conflict, the circuit court found that, where statutes cannot be read in harmony, the court must focus on constitutional policy considerations to resolve the dispute, and such focus necessarily involves an inquiry into the nature of an election. The court noted the United States Supreme Court has held voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure, and that full and effective participation in the political process means a citizen can choose to become a candidate or participate as a voter.
Concerning the District 2 vacancy, the circuit court found Cromartie resigned unexpectedly after holding his position for more than twenty-five years. As a result of City's decision to hold the District 2 election on April 6th, it found citizens of District 2 only had approximately nine-and-a-half days to decide whether to file the documents necessary to effectuate a candidacy. The court found this time period was short for possible candidates, but that it had a much more profound effect on citizens of District 2 because voter registration books close thirty days prior to an election.4 The court also found that, unless a District 2 resident was already registered to vote prior to the surprise resignation of Cromartie, whose seat was not set to expire until 2012, that voter could not vote in the April 6th election.
The circuit court also found registered voters who wish to vote, but are unavailable or unable to get to the ballot box, may be deprived of the opportunity to vote. The circuit court appeared to rule that absentee ballots, if made available only days before the election to voters who are in the military, overseas, or who are students, could disenfranchise voters.
Appellant argues the circuit court erred in granting the injunction because § 5-7-200(b) is the more specific statute in that it deals precisely and exclusively with elections to fill vacancies in municipal offices, while §§ 5-15-50 and 7-13-35 deal generally with notice of elections. Based on our rules of statutory interpretation, we agree.
The primary purpose in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Cain v. Nationwide Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 378 S.C. 25, 29, 661 S.E.2d 349, 351 (2008). Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the Court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). "It is well settled that statutes dealing with the same subject matter are in pari materia and must be construed together, if possible, to produce a single, harmonious result." Joiner ex rel. Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 109, 536 S.E.2d 372, 375 (2000). However, where two statutes are in conflict, the more recent and specific statute should prevail so...
To continue reading
Request your trial