Dennard v. City of Buffalo Examining Bd. of Plumbers

• Decision Date: 02 January 2015
• Docket Number: 1305 TP 14-00849.
• Citation: 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 00087,997 N.Y.S.2d 585,124 A.D.3d 1337
• Parties: In the Matter of Marvin DENNARD, Petitioner, v. CITY OF BUFFALO EXAMINING BOARD OF PLUMBERS, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

124 A.D.3d 1337

997 N.Y.S.2d 585

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 00087

In the Matter of Marvin DENNARD, Petitioner

v.CITY OF BUFFALO EXAMINING BOARD OF PLUMBERS, Respondent.

1305 TP 14-00849.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Jan. 2, 2015.

Amil Sarfraz, PLLC, Williamsville (Peter Mcgrath of Counsel), for Petitioner.

Timothy A. Ball, Corporation Counsel, Buffalo (David M. Lee of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY AND SCONIERS, JJ.

OpinionMEMORANDUM:

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination revoking his master plumber's license. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180–181, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 ). Although the determination is based in part on hearsay evidence, it is well settled that “[h]earsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, ‘and if sufficiently relevant and probative may constitute substantial evidence’ ” (Matter of Szczepaniak v. City of Rochester, 101 A.D.3d 1620, 1621, 956 N.Y.S.2d 362, quoting People ex rel. Vega v. Smith, 66 N.Y.2d 130, 139, 495 N.Y.S.2d 332, 485 N.E.2d 997 ; see Matter of Gray v. Adduci, 73 N.Y.2d 741, 742, 536 N.Y.S.2d 40, 532 N.E.2d 1268 ). We likewise reject petitioner's further contention that he was denied a fair hearing based on the use of hearsay evidence at the hearing (see Matter of Bauer v. New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., Bur. of Early Childhood Servs., 55 A.D.3d 421, 422, 866 N.Y.S.2d 626 ; Matter of Murphy v. New York Racing Assn., 146 A.D.2d 778, 778–779, 537 N.Y.S.2d 259, lv. dismissed 74 N.Y.2d 715, 543 N.Y.S.2d 402, 541 N.E.2d 431 ; cf. Matter of Scarpitta v. Glen Cove Hous. Auth., 48 A.D.2d 657, 658, 367 N.Y.S.2d 542 ).

Finally, we conclude that petitioner received timely notice of the charges against him and was thus not denied a fair hearing based on untimely notice (see Matter of Block v. Ambach, 73 N.Y.2d 323, 332, 540 N.Y.S.2d 6, 537 N.E.2d 181 ; Matter of Oznor Corp. v. County of Monroe, 60 A.D.3d 1492, 1493, 875 N.Y.S.2d 727 ; see generally Matter of Tax Foreclosure No. 35, 127 A.D.2d 220, 223, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390, affd. 71 N.Y.2d 863, 527 N.Y.S.2d 747, 522 N.E.2d 1044 ). Petitioner was notified of the charges against him more than one year before the instant hearing. Although a prior determination on those charges was aned and a new hearing ordered, the nature of the charges...