Denne v. Jones
| Decision Date | 17 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:17cv124-MCR-CJK |
| Parties | MONTE JAE DENNE, Petitioner, v. JULIE JONES, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1). Respondent filed an answer (doc. 16), providing relevant portions of the state court record (doc. 25). Petitioner replied (doc. 20). The matter is referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B). The undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, and that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.
On April 9, 2011, petitioner Monte Denne shot Bobbie Gryner in the chest with a firearm, intending to kill her. The attempted murder was premeditated. (Doc. 25, Ex. A, p. 11 (information); see also pp. 1-2 (arrest report)).1 Denne was charged in Santa Rosa County Circuit Court with attempted first degree premediated murder with a firearm and having discharged the firearm during commission of the offense. (Ex. A, p. 11). The maximum penalty was life in prison, and the mandatory minimum was 20 years in prison. See Fla. Stat. §§ 782.04(1) (murder statute), 777.04 (criminal attempt statute), 775.087 (mandatory minimum statute).
The parties conducted discovery for two years, and the case was set for trial. After jury selection, Denne and the State reached a counseled, negotiated plea agreement. Denne entered a "best interests" no contest plea to the charge in exchange for the State recommending the mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years in prison. (Ex. A, pp. 84-87). The trial court conducted a plea colloquy, determined Denne's plea was supported by a factual basis and was knowing and voluntary, accepted the plea and sentenced Denne to the negotiated sentence. (Ex. C (plea hearing transcript); Ex. A, pp. 93-100 (judgment)). Denne appealed, and appellate counsel filed an Anders2 brief. (Ex. D). Denne did not file a pro se brief. (Ex. E). On October 13, 2013, the Florida First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) affirmedper curiam without opinion. Denne v. State, 124 So. 3d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Table) (copy at Ex. F).
On January 6, 2015, petitioner filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which later he amended. (Ex. G, pp. 1-12 (original motion), 23-84 (amended motion)). The state circuit court granted a limited evidentiary hearing and appointed postconviction counsel. (Id., pp. 98-99). After hearing, the circuit court denied postconviction relief by written order. (Ex. I, pp. 1-86 (evidentiary hearing transcript); Ex. J (order)). The First DCA affirmed per curiam without opinion. Denne v. State, 225 So. 3d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (Table) (copy at Ex. N). The mandate issued May 9, 2017. (Ex. N).
Denne filed his federal habeas petition on April 24, 2017. (Doc. 1). Denne claims his plea was invalid because: (1) counsel was ineffective by failing to advise him of the rights he was waiving by entering the plea and by affirmatively mis-advising him he could withdraw his plea at a later date, ask for a reduction of sentence at a later date, and directly appeal from the judgment; and (2) he did not understand the rights he was waiving by entering his plea because he did not read the plea agreement, counsel did not explain it, and the trial judge's plea colloquy did not comply with the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). Respondent asserts that although Denne satisfied the exhaustion requirement concerning counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, he procedurally defaulted the remaining freestanding challenge to his plea. (Doc. 16).
Federal courts are precluded from granting a habeas petition on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's factual determinations are presumed correct, unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).3 Justice O'Connor described the appropriate test:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a casedifferently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Under the Williams framework, the federal court must first determine the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). The law is "clearly established" only when a Supreme Court holding at the time of the state court decision embodies the legal principle at issue. See Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010); Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) .
After identifying the governing legal principle(s), the federal court determines whether the state court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law. The adjudication is not contrary to Supreme Court precedent merely because it fails to cite that precedent. Rather, the adjudication is "contrary" only if either the reasoning or the result contradicts the relevant Supreme Court cases. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (). Where there is no Supreme Court precedent on point, the state court's conclusion cannot be contrary to clearly established federal law. See Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1377 . If the state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law, the federal habeas court must independently consider the merits of the petitioner's claim. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954 (2007).
If the "contrary to" clause is not satisfied, the federal habeas court next determines whether the state court "unreasonably applied" the governing legal principles set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. The federal court defers to the state court's reasoning unless the state court's application of the legal principle(s) was "objectively unreasonable" in light of the record before the state court. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004). The Supreme Court described the "unreasonable application" standard this way:
When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong. Federal habeas review thus exists as "a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington, supra, at 102-103, 131 S. Ct. 770 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)). The § 2254(d) standard "is difficult to meet . . . because it was meant to be." Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.
Section 2254(d) also allows federal habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court where that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The "unreasonable determination of the facts" standard is implicated only to the extent the validity of the state court's ultimate conclusion is premised on unreasonable fact finding. See Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011). As with the "unreasonable application" clause, the federal court applies an objective test. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (). Federal courts "may not characterize . . . state-court factual determinations as unreasonable merely because we would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).
Only if the federal habeas court finds that the petitioner satisfied § 2254(d), does the court take the final...
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