Dennis v. Williams Furniture Corp., 18103

• Decision Date: 26 July 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18103,18103
• Citation: 243 S.C. 53,132 S.E.2d 1
• Parties: Jimmy DENNIS, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS FURNITURE CORPORATION, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 1

132 S.E.2d 1

243 S.C. 53

Jimmy DENNIS, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS FURNITURE CORPORATION, Respondent.

No. 18103.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 26, 1963.

Edward V. Atkinson, Sumter, for appellant.

George D. Levy, C. M. Edmunds, Sumter, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice.

In this Workmen's Compensation case the hearing Commissioner made an award to the claimant for permanent, partial disability based on the undisputed fact that claimant is suffering from a rupture or degeneration of an intervertebral disc. The full Commission, on appeal, adopted, in toto, the hearing Commissioner's findings of fact, conclusions and award. The employer appealed to the circuit court on eight exceptions, and the circuit court, without any discussion, in its order, of the somewhat complicated facts, reversed the award of the Commission on the sole ground that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, Section 72-303, 1962 Code of Laws, thus finding it unnecessary to pass upon the other exceptions. On appeal by the claimant, the employer urges as additional sustaining grounds the exceptions to the award of the Industrial Commission not passed upon by the circuit court.

The claimant was employed at the furniture factory of the employer and in February or March of 1959, and for sometime prior thereto, his duties involved 'pulling glue clamps.' It is undisputed that, on or about March 4, 1959, a handle on a glue clamp broke off, with the result that claimant fell to the floor. The extent and nature of his fall, however, is in sharp dispute. The employer denies that the claimant actually sustained or claimed any injury as a result of that accident. Whether he did or not, within about thirty days thereafter, he was referred to a Dr. Hewitt who performed a hernia operation on him, and he was away from his job until May 11, 1959, his medical expenses and lost time being reimbursed in part under a group health and accident insurance policy, a part of the premium therefor being paid by the employer and a part by the employee.

When claimant returned to work his regular job had been filled by another man and, as claimant was still recuperating from the operation, he was put on lighter work where he remained until some time in the summer of 1960, according to the claimant, the month of July. At that time, which we think from the other evidence in the record was clearly August 11, due to the fact that certain other employees were out and another man was needed on the glue clamps, the claimant was returned to his former duties handling the glue clamps. Just what happened when he returned to this work is in sharp dispute. In any event, no claim for compensation was filed with the Industrial Commission until December 2, 1960, and although it is not clear, it is inferable from the record that the claim then filed was based on the accident which occurred on or about March 4, 1959.

The claimant's contention is that he sustained injuries in the March 1959 accident and that such injuries were aggravated by accidental means in the course of his employment in the summer of 1960. The award of the Commission lacks a great deal in clarity as to the basis of the award. After finding as a fact that the claimant had sustained a compensable injury on or about March 4, 1959, it was found that 'this injury was further aggravated when the employee returned to heavy work in July 1960.' There was no specific finding of fact that the claimant sustained any injury or aggravation thereof by any accidental occurrence in July 1960. Without stating any reason therefor, the Commission found as a fact that the claim was filed within the statutory time. While denominating such as a finding of fact, we think that such was only a conclusion of law, rather than a finding of fact, and it is, therefore, reviewable. Fox v. Union-Buffalo Mills, 226 S.C. 561, 86 S.E.2d 253.

Although much of the testimony deals with what did or did not occur during two unspecified nights in July 1960, it is otherwise clear from the record that the nights referred to were actually Thursday and Friday, August 11 and 12, 1960. The claimant's version is that on Thursday night, August 11, he was requested to return to work on the glue clamps, but remonstrated against doing so, telling his superior repeatedly that 'my back hurts me too bad and my stomach to pull them things. I've just got a sore in my stomach, a knot in my stomach and it's sore.' He further testified that his back and his stomach had been bothering him ever since the accident of March 4, 1959, but that at the insistence of his superior he returned to the glue clamps on Thursday night which was 'light' and that on Friday night, which would have been August 12, while pulling glue clamps, his stomach pulled loose and he felt something pop loose, and then it just got to lingering in his back, hurting him worse and worse. Testimony in behalf of the employer negates the occurrence of anything of an accidental nature at that time, or any complaint of an accident, but admits that the claimant complained that he was unable to work on the glue clamps as a result of which he was told to go see the doctor and ascertain whether or not the doctor would certify him for light work. As a result, claimant attempted to see Dr. Hewitt, on the following Monday, but was not able to see him until Friday, August 19. In the course of the next several months he was seen by several doctors, and it developed that, in addition to his back condition, he was suffering from hypertension and an ulcerated stomach, to which latter ailment medical evidence attributed his stomach pains. Although claimant came back and tried to work one night during September, he last regularly worked for his employer on August 12.

He drew benefits under the aforementioned group policy until November, when the same were terminated, and evidence on behalf of the employer is to the effect that claimant never made any complaint or claim of any accidental injury until after his insurance payments terminated.

The questions raised on appeal are several, but, in our view, it is necessary to decide only one question. Any claim for injuries sustained in the accident of March 4, 1959 is clearly barred by the statute. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fact by the Commission that the claimant sustained an injury, or aggravation thereof, by accident in the course of his employment in July 1960, (actually August 12th), even if the Commission had so specifically found. The key question, and we think the only one necessary to decide, is whether there is any competent evidence to support a finding of fact that the present back disability of the claimant is causally connected with any accident which may have occurred August 12, 1960.

As to causal connection, the claimant relies principally upon the testimony of his witnesses, Dr. Lee Givens, who apparently specializes in internal medicine and cardiology, and Dr. Haynes Barr,...