Lorick v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co.
| Decision Date | 13 April 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 18331,18331 |
| Citation | 245 S.C. 513,141 S.E.2d 662 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Mrs. Johnnie R. LORICK, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY, Appellant. |
Cooper, Gary, Nexsen & Pruet, Harold W. Jacobs, Columbia, for appellant.
H. V. Sandifer, Lexington, Sidney D. Duncan, Columbia, for respondent.
This case arose under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 72-1 et seq., Code of 1962. It involves a claim for compensation arising out of the death of Johnnie R. Lorick, who left surviving him his dependent widow, the respondent herein. She alleges that Johnnie R. Lorick, who was employed by South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, the appellant herein, as a bus driver, died on July 29, 1963, from a coronary occlusion. She contends that such was an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as aforesaid, and that his death was caused by unusual strain and overexertion in the performance of the duties of his employment and, therefore, was a compensable accident. The appellant denied that the death of Johnnie R. Lorick arose out of and in the course of his employment, contending that his death was a result of natural causes.
A hearing was held before a Single Commissioner on December 30, 1963. This Commissioner, on February 14, 1964, filed his award wherein he found that Johnnie R. Lorick died on July 29, 1963, as a result of a coronary occlusion, and 'such was precipitated by excessive and unexpected strain, stress and tension in the performance of his duties, thereby constituting a compensable accident.' The appellant made timely application for a review of this award to the Full Commission, and by appropriate exceptions challenged the correctness of the findings of fact made by the Single Commissioner. The Commission, by a three to two majority, affirmed the award made by the Single Commissioner. Thereafter, an appeal was duly taken by the appellant to the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County and was heard by the Honorable John Grimball, Resident Judge, who, on June 9, 1964, issued his order affirming the decision and award of the Commission. Timely appeal to this Court followed.
The basic question for decision here is whether there was any evidence to support the findings of the Commission that the coronary occlusion suffered by the deceased was a compensable accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is the contention of the appellant that the deceased, at the time of his heart attack, was engaged in his usual work and was not subjected to any unusual or unexpected strain or overexertion in the performance of the duties of his employment or by any unusual or extraordinary conditions thereof. Hence, it is the contention of the appellant that there was no causal connection between the employment of the deceased and his heart attack. The respondent contends to the contrary.
We have held in numerous cases and it is now well established that a claimant, who asserts the right to compensation, must establish by the preponderance of the evidence the facts which will entitle her to an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and such award must not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation. Glover v. Columbia Hospital, 236 S.C. 410, 114 S.E.2d 565, and Fowler v. Abbott Motor Co., 236 S.C. 226, 113 S.E.2d 737. Likewise, it is well settled that in workmen's compensation cases the Commission is the fact finding body and that on appeal, this Court and the Circuit Court are limited in their review of the facts to a determination of whether or not there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings of the Commission. When there is a conflict in the evidence, the findings of fact of the Commission are conclusive. It is only when the evidence gives rise to but one reasonable inference that the question becomes one of law for the Court to decide. Black v. Barnwell County, 243 S.C. 531, 134 S.E.2d 753.
The mere fact of death during employment is not a basis for an award. The death must be proximately caused by an accident that arose out of the employment; and the burden is on the claimant to establish such fact. Rivers v. V. P. Loftis Co., 214 S.C. 162, 51 S.E.2d 510. Since it is conceded that the deceased was about the duties of his employment when he suffered the fatal coronary occlusion, the burden was upon the respondent to show by a preponderance of the evidence a causal connection between the employment and the heart attack.
The testimony shows that the deceased had been employed by the appellant as a bus driver in the City Columbia from November 1, 1942 until his death on July 29, 1963. On October 8, 1951, he suffered a coronary occlusion, as a result of which he was disabled for approximately six months. At the time of this attack he was driving the Camp Fornance-Rose Hill run, the daily shift which was 9 hours and 30 minutes, and involved driving 100 miles. After returning to work he requested the was assigned to the Edgewood run, which required a daily shift of 9 hours of driving and covered 93.7 miles. After this, on March 27, 1960, he requested and was transferred to the Melrose Heights run, where he operated until his death, which was 87.7 miles in length and required 8 hours and 40 minutes per day of driving. He drove six days per week on all of these shifts.
The decedent reported to work on July 29, 1963, at 3:25 P.M. and was assigned his regular bus No. 210, which was a forty-five passenger GMC 1963 model, and was the newest model of buses operated by the appellant. The end of the Melrose Heights run was at the corner of Woodrow Street and Millwood Avenue. It was at this place that the decedent would have a three to five minutes break before starting back to the city and normally he ate his lunch during this break.
Elnora Robinson, a witness for the respondent, testified that she lived on Laurel Street which is on the western side of the City of Columbia, but that she worked at 2709 Gervais Street. She boarded the bus driven by the decedent at 7:40 P.M. for the purpose of riding from her place of employment to her home. At the time she boarded the bus there were no other passengers thereon nor did the bus pick up any others before reaching the corner of Woodrow Street and Millwood Avenue, a distance of approximately two miles. There the bus stopped for a short period of time and the decedent, as was his custom, left the bus with his lunch but reboarded almost immediately without eating it. This witness testified that she had been a regular passenger on the bus ever since the decedent had taken over the run and knew him well. She testified that the decedent talked to her all the time when she got on the bus but on this evening he was quiet and didn't say a word to her and she thought this was unusual. She said that after the decedent reboarded the bus he proceeded down Millwood Avenue towards Gervais Street, driving at a considerably slower speed than was his normal custom. She was asked what, if anything, happened after the bus had come down Millwood Avenue and got almost to Gervais Street. We quote the following from the testimony:
This witness testified that after the bus swerved that she could tell that the bus driver had his feet on the brakes because something was stopping the bus. She said that a few moments later and prior to the time the bus hit the power pole on the right of the street that the bus driver was looking up and she 'thought he was looking in the mirror' of the bus. She testified that after the bus struck the power pole, the decedent was slumped over the steering wheel.
The record shows that Willis Haymon boarded the bus at the corner of House Street and Millwood Avenue. He said that when the bus got near Powell's garage at the intersection of Millwood and Gervais that 'I was looking out and some children started out in front of the bus so he swerved it to the left and then hit the brakes and after a while he did like this here and kept rocking and then he ran into the pole and then he fell over after he hit the pole.' This witness, describing the actions of the decedent, said 'He swerved and switched a little bit and then hit the brakes,' and 'then about from here to the window he went into the pole.'
W. E. Dorn, a bus driver with twenty-one years experience, testified that once a week he drove the same bus over the same route as did the decedent. He was asked as to some of the problems encountered in driving a bus on this run. His reply was 'Well, you got bicycles to watch, kids on skates, balls rolling in the street, people walking in front of you, dodging cars, but that's just in a days work.' We quote the following from his testimony:
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