Denver Area Labor Federation, AFL-CIO v. Buckley

• Decision Date: 23 September 1996
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,No. 95SC314,95SC314
• Parties: DENVER AREA LABOR FEDERATION,, a Colorado Corporation, and Jack Hawkins, Petitioners, v. Victoria BUCKLEY, Secretary of State for the State of Colorado, and Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 524

924 P.2d 524

DENVER AREA LABOR FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, a Colorado

Corporation, and Jack Hawkins, Petitioners, v. Victoria BUCKLEY, Secretary of State for the State of

Colorado, and Colorado Compensation Insurance

Authority, Respondents.

No. 95SC314.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Sept. 23, 1996.

Dallas, Holland & O'Toole, P.C., Neil D. O'Toole, Denver, for Petitioners.

Gale Norton, Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Maurice Knaizer, First Assistant Attorney General, State Services Section, Denver, for Respondent Secretary of State.

Curt Kriksciun, Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Denver, for Respondent Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority.

Justice KIRSHBAUM delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In Denver Area Labor Federation v. Meyer, 907 P.2d 638 (Colo.App.1995), the court of appeals affirmed a judgment of the Denver District Court affirming an order entered on February 3, 1993, by the Secretary of State (the Secretary) ¹ dismissing a complaint filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners Denver Area Labor Federation, AFL-CIO, and Jack Hawkins (the petitioners) against the defendant-respondent Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority (the Authority). The petitioners alleged in the complaint that the Authority violated the Campaign Reform Act of 1974, sections 1-45-101 to -123, 1B C.R.S. (1980 & 1994 Supp.) (the Act), and exceeded its statutory authority in making contributions in kind or contributions of public moneys for the purpose of opposing a proposed amendment to the Colorado Constitution. A divided panel of the court of appeals determined that the Authority did not violate section 1-45-116(1)(a), 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), of the Act because the contributions did not constitute contributions of public moneys or prohibited contributions in kind. Having granted certiorari to review the propriety of the court of appeals' decision, we reverse and remand with directions. ²

I

The petitioners filed a petition with the Secretary to include on the 1992 state ballot a proposed amendment to the Colorado Constitution entitled the "Safe Work Environment Amendment." An organization, the Coalition to Save Colorado Jobs (the Coalition), was formed to defeat the proposed amendment. The Authority printed articles opposing the proposed amendment in its publication and, on behalf of the Coalition, purchased posters prepared by the Coalition and distributed them to employers. In addition, the Coalition filed reports with the Secretary indicating that the Authority had made contributions to the Coalition.

On December 15, 1992, the petitioners filed a verified complaint with the Secretary pursuant to section 1-45-113(2) of the Act alleging that the Authority, as a political subdivision of the state, violated the Act and exceeded its statutory authority in making these contributions. On December 17, 1992, the Authority filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the contributions did not constitute contributions of "public moneys" or prohibited contributions in kind because the Colorado compensation insurance authority fund administered by the Authority consists primarily of premiums paid into the fund by employers for the purchase of workers' compensation insurance. The Authority also argued that the determination of whether the Authority exceeded its statutory authority in making the contributions was not within the jurisdiction of the Secretary. The Secretary agreed with these arguments and on February 3, 1993, entered an order dismissing the complaint.

The petitioners filed a complaint in the district court seeking review of the Secretary's order, pursuant to section 24-4-106(4), 10A C.R.S. (1988). By order dated February 8, 1994, the district court affirmed the Secretary's decision. The petitioners appealed to the court of appeals, which court affirmed the district court's judgment. The court of appeals determined that the fund administered by the Authority does not consist of "public moneys" for purposes of the Act. Denver Area Labor Federation, 907 P.2d at 640-41. The court of appeals also determined that the Act does not prohibit contributions in kind which derive from moneys which are not "public moneys." Id. at 641.

II

The petitioners argue that the moneys in the fund administered by the Authority constitute "public moneys" for purposes of section 1-45-116(1)(a), 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). ³ We agree.

Section 1-45-116(1)(a) contains the following pertinent language:

State and political subdivisions--limitations on contributions. (1)(a) No agency, department, board, division, bureau, commission, or council of the state or any political subdivision thereof shall make any contribution or contribution in kind in campaigns involving the nomination, retention, or election of any person to any public office, nor shall any such entity expend any public moneys from any source, or make any contributions in kind, to urge electors to vote in favor of or against any issue before the electorate....

Section 1-45-116(1)(a) thus prohibits certain entities from expending "public moneys from any source" to urge electors to vote in a particular manner on issues before the electorate.

In construing the language of a statute, courts must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly in enacting the statute. Boatright v. Derr, 919 P.2d 221, 224 (Colo.1996); Colorado Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153, 160 (Colo.1988). To determine such intent, courts should first look to the statutory language giving words and phrases their commonly understood meaning. Colorado Common Cause, 758 P.2d at 160. If the language of that statute is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, courts should construe the language in light of the objective sought to be achieved. Id. Moreover, a statute should be construed so as to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Id.

The Act prohibits the expenditure of "public moneys from any source" for certain purposes. While the term "public moneys" is not defined, the all-inclusive language "from any source" indicates that the General Assembly intended an expansive definition of the phrase. Thus, the term "public moneys" may not be construed to refer only to sums realized from the imposition of taxes. Given the broad sweep of this term, any effort to determine whether certain moneys constitute public moneys for purposes of the Act by reference solely to the source of such moneys would prove futile.

The Authority and the Secretary rely upon our decision in Stong v. Industrial Commission, 71 Colo. 133, 204 P. 892 (1922), in support of their argument that the fund administered by the Authority does not consist of public moneys for purposes of section 1-45-116(1)(a) of the Act. That case is readily distinguishable, however. In Stong, we determined that because the state compensation insurance fund administered by the industrial commission did not constitute part of the state treasury, a district court's order requiring the state treasurer as custodian of the fund to obey the directions of the industrial commission regarding investment of fund moneys in United States bonds did not encroach upon the state treasurer's constitutional power over the state treasury. Id. at 136, 204 P. at 893. The question presented here is not whether the moneys of the workers' compensation fund are part of the state treasury but whether those moneys are "public moneys" for purposes of section 1-45-116(1)(a) of the Act. The Act expressly applies not only to discrete state entities but also to all political subdivisions of the state. A conclusion that moneys contained in the account or fund of a political subdivision do not constitute "public moneys" for purposes of section 1-45-116(1)(a) would render meaningless the prohibition of the use of public moneys by political subdivisions.

The parties do not dispute that the Authority is a political subdivision of this state and enjoys governmental immunity. See § 8-45-101(1), 3B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.); § 24- 10-103(5), 10A C.R.S. (1995 Supp.). While moneys collected by the Authority are not derived from state-imposed sales, use, property, or income taxes, those moneys may be spent by the Authority only for authorized public purposes. The General Assembly has in essence declared that the expenditure of moneys in the fund for purposes prohibited by section 1-45-116(1)(a) are not authorized expenditures for public purposes.

The court of appeals referred to our decision in Pensioners Protective Association v. Davis, 112 Colo. 535, 150 P.2d 974 (1944), in the course of its decision. In Davis, we concluded that an award of attorney fees satisfied from moneys taken from the old age pension fund did not constitute a recovery against the state and, therefore, was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. at 539-40, 150 P.2d at 976. In the course of reaching that conclusion, we determined that moneys comprising the old age pension fund did not constitute "public funds" belonging to the state. Id. at 540, 150 P.2d at 976. The court of appeals in this case stated that the General Assembly is presumed to be aware of our interpretation of the term "public funds." Denver Area Labor Federation, 907 P.2d at 640-41.

It must first be observed that section 1-45-116(1)(a) prohibits the use of "public moneys from any source," not the use of "public funds." The General Assembly thus selected a phrase not previously construed by this court in seeking to limit the expenditure of funds by various governmental entities for certain purposes. It is noteworthy that the General Assembly has defined the term "public funds" quite broadly in another statute to include not only those funds belonging to a public entity but also any funds "in the custody, possession, or control of a public entity." See § 24-75-601(2), 10B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.).

Furthermore, the question presented here is not whether...