Denver Brick Mfg. Co. v. McAllister

• Decision Date: 01 December 1882
• Parties: DENVER BRICK MANUFACTURING CO. v. McALLISTER.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

6 Colo. 326

DENVER BRICK MANUFACTURING CO. v. McALLISTER.

Supreme Court of Colorado

December, 1882

Error to County Court of Arapahoe County.

Mr ENOS MILES, for defendant in error.

On petition for rehearing the following opinion was delivered by

STONE J.

The petition for rehearing in this case, which is filed pro forma, for the purpose of bringing up a jurisdictional question raised in the court below since we delivered our opinion in the case, recites in substance that the amount now due the defendant in error, and for which judgment is directed by this court to be entered by the county court, is greatly in excess of the sum of $2,000, arising from the accumulation of interest since the rendition of the original judgment in that court; and the petitioner asks that we now determine the question whether, under the constitutional limitation of the jurisdiction of county courts as to amount such court has authority to enter judgment for a sum in excess of $2,000.

The constitutional provision referred to is contained in sec. 23 of art. VI of the constitution, and is as follows:

'County courts shall be courts of record, and shall have original jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons, appointment of guardians, conservators and administrators, and settlement of their accounts, and such other civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be conferred by law: provided, such courts shall not have jurisdiction in any case where the debt, damage or claim or value of property involved shall exceed $2,000, except in cases relating to the estates of deceased persons.'

The same language is employed in the act of the general assembly defining the jurisdiction and establishing the practice of county courts of the state under the constitution. Sec. 571 General Laws.

Most of the authorities I have been able to find upon questions touching jurisdiction of courts limited as to amount, agree that, upon language like that of our statute, the amount controlling the jurisdiction is the sum due, or claimed to be due, and for which judgment is seught and demanded by the plaintiff, or the value of the thing or matter in controversy at the time of the commencement of the suit. But few decisions, however, are in point upon the precise question raised here, for the reason that, in nearly all of the cases examined, the language of the statute as to actions for the recovery of money is expressed to be for 'the principal sum due,' or for the sum due, 'exclusive of interest and costs,' while the omission of such qualifying words in our statute gives rise to the question before us.

Since the question is one of construction of the statute defining the jurisdiction, we think that construction should be adopted as the most reasonable which produces the least uncertainty in litigation, and the least inconvenience and expense to litigants. Such a result could not follow if a court, guided by the sum claimed by the plaintiff, and having thereupon rightfully assumed jurisdiction, and proceeded to a hearing, could be ousted of that jurisdiction upon the sole ground that the accretion of interest, or the increase in value of the property in controversy pending the suit, had increased such sum or value to an amount, at the time of the rendition of the judgment, in excess of the sum specified in the statute. When he brings his action, it is impossible for the suitor, or for the court, to foretell the date of its determination and judgment.

A jurisdiction which depended upon a sum found due at the end of protracted litigation, and which, before that time, could not be said to lawfully attach, would be a very uncertain jurisdiction.

And to say that a court, which should take jurisdiction of a cause wherein the amount claimed was, at the commencement of the suit, clearly within the statutory limitation, could afterwards, by the mere...