Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. Okaloosa Cnty.
| Decision Date | 05 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D12–3929.,1D12–3929. |
| Citation | 113 So.3d 1074 |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, State of Florida, Appellant, v. OKALOOSA COUNTY and Nassau County, Petitioners, and Bay County and Pinellas County, Intervenors, and Miami–Dade County, Intervenor, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
An appeal from an order of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
John Milla and Michael J. Wheeler, Assistant General Counsels, Department of Juvenile Justice, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Carly J. Schrader, Gregory T. Stewart, and Lynn M. Hoshihara of Nabors Giblin & Nickerson, Tallahassee; John R. Dowd, General Counsel, Okaloosa County Commissioners, Shalimar; David A. Hallman, Yulee; Terrell Arline, Panama City; Linda Brehmer–Lanosa, Orlando; Jennifer Wintrode Shuler, Assistant County Attorney, Panama City; Carl Edward Brody and Christy Donovan Pemberton, Assistant County Attorneys, Clearwater, for Appellees.
In this appeal, the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) Final Order. The Final Order declared certain DJJ rules relating to cost sharing for secure detention invalid exercises of DJJ's authority; specifically, DJJ's interpretations of “final court disposition” and “actual costs.” We find the ALJ correctly determined that DJJ's interpretations were improper.
If the language of a statute “is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the statute should be given its plain meaning.” Fla. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 823 So.2d 844, 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Using the basic tenet of in pari materia to construe together statutes relating to the same or similar subject matter does not imply ambiguity. See Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1265–66 (Fla.2008) (); Smith v. Crawford, 645 So.2d 513, 522–23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) () (quoting State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1973)).
Here, a plain reading of “final court disposition” cannot, as DJJ asserts, limit the term to “commitment.” Likewise, “actual costs” cannot mean a figure derived...
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...of the court's disposition of the juvenile's case, which often occurs days before commitment. See Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. Okaloosa Cty. , 113 So.3d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (Mem). In 2010, several counties challenged the Department's rules codifying this interpretation, arguing that th......
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Marion Cnty. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice
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Pinellas Cnty. v. Fla. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 1D14–4187.
...Hearings. On appeal, we held that the Department's interpretation of the cost-sharing law was erroneous. Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. Okaloosa Cty., 113 So.3d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ("Okaloosa I "). In a later-filed appeal controlled by Okaloosa I, the Department acknowledged error, where......
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Pinellas Cnty. v. Fla. Dep't of Juvenile Justice
...made, then the county will be debited or credited for the difference.") (emphasis added). See also Department of Juvenile Justice v. Okaloosa County, 113 So. 3d 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (affirming ALJ's rejection of the Department's erroneous interpretation of statutory factors used to calc......