Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Hagar, 90-1375

• Decision Date: 06 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1375,90-1375
• Citation: 581 So.2d 214
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, etc., Appellant, v. Thomas Andrew HAGAR, Appellee. 581 So.2d 214, 16 Fla. L. Week. D1518
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 214

581 So.2d 214

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, etc Appellant, v. Thomas Andrew HAGAR, Appellee.

No. 90-1375.

581 So.2d 214, 16 Fla. L. Week. D1518

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fifth District.

June 6, 1991.

Enoch J. Whitney, Gen. Counsel, and I. Ed Pantaleon and Peter N. Stoumbelis, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Richard S. Fitzpatrick, Inverness, for appellee.

DIAMANTIS, Judge.

Appellant, State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, appeals a circuit court order granting certiorari, thereby quashing the department's order of license revocation and directing reinstatement of driving privileges to appellee, Thomas Andrew Hagar. We treat the instant appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, ¹ grant the petition, and quash the order of the circuit court because the record fails to show that the department acted without jurisdiction or failed to follow the essential requirements of law.

Hagar was classified as an habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.264 ² of the Florida Statutes (1989). The department issued an order on September 20, 1989 revoking Hagar's driving privileges for a period of five years pursuant to section 322.27(5) ³ of the Florida Statutes (1989). The order of license revocation listed all the traffic convictions assessed against Hagar in classifying him as a habitual traffic offender, including three Alabama convictions ⁴ from 1986. Hagar's traffic convictions covered the period of time from April 23, 1984 through January 16, 1989.

In March of 1988 Hagar requested a transcript of his driving record which the department issued to Hagar on March 15, 1988. That transcript does not contain the three Alabama convictions because the department did not receive notice of those convictions until September 5, 1989.

Hagar filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court challenging the revocation order pursuant to section 322.31 of the Florida Statutes (1989). Hagar alleged it was inequitable for the department to issue an erroneous transcript, which he relied upon in good faith, and then to later rely upon information not previously provided (i.e., the Alabama convictions) in forming the basis for revocation of his driving privileges. The circuit court granted the petition, finding the revocation order was inequitable and in violation of Hagar's basic due process rights, and quashed the order of revocation with directions to reinstate Hagar's driving privileges.

Based upon the record in this case, Hagar cannot be heard to say that it was inequitable for the department to rely upon the three Alabama convictions. Hagar apparently is attempting to take refuge in the equitable doctrines of estoppel or waiver or, alternatively, laches. Hagar argues that if the three Alabama convictions had appeared on the transcript of his driving record issued in March of 1988, he would have modified his conduct and would have utilized available alternatives provided by law (i.e., a court proceeding or driving school) when faced with additional traffic citations. Even if we were to assume that equitable principles apply to the instant case, Hagar's argument overlooks the crucial fact that the department did not receive notice of the convictions from Alabama until September 5, 1989, one and one-half years after Hagar requested and received a transcript of his driving record. Hagar does not contest that he was convicted in Alabama for these three traffic violations. He was aware of these convictions and he could have altered his conduct accordingly rather than hope that these Alabama convictions would not catch up with him.

Hagar also argues that section 322.27(3)(f) ⁵ of the Florida Statutes (1989) somehow creates a duty upon the department to send some sort of warning letter to an individual who may be approaching the danger zone of having his or her license suspended for accumulated points. We find this argument to be without merit. Section 322.27(3)(f) does not mandate but instead merely authorizes the department to send a warning letter advising that any future convictions may result in a driver's license suspension. Assuming, arguendo, that the department was mandated to send a warning letter, the department, on March 30, 1988, sent Hagar notice of a thirty-day suspension based on the fact that he had accumulated twelve points within twelve months pursuant to section 322.27(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1987). Consequently, Hagar must have known that he was in a precarious position of accumulated points regarding his driver's license which could result in additional suspensions or a revocation of his driver's license.

We reject Hagar's contentions that the time interval between his first and last convictions and between his last two convictions causes an inequity. Again, even if we were to assume that equitable principles were applicable, the time periods are not so inordinate as to give rise to any equitable doctrine of laches. The record clearly reveals that within a period of less than five years Hagar was able to acquire at least fifteen moving traffic violations. We also note that chapter 322 of the Florida Statutes (1989) does not prescribe any time limitation or period in which the department may take action to suspend or revoke the driver's license of an individual who has accumulated fifteen moving traffic violations in a period of five years. Secs. 322.27, 332.264, Fla.Stat. (1989).

All of the arguments that Hagar now makes were eloquently anticipated by the Florida Supreme Court in Zarsky v. State, 300 So.2d 261 (Fla.1974), where the court upheld the constitutionality of the habitual traffic offender law and stated:

This Court has long held the view that reasonable regulation of an individual's right to drive is in the interest of public good. In Thornhill v. Kirkman [62 So.2d 740 (Fla.1953) ] this court not only pointed out that the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,...