Department of Human Resources v. Anderson

Decision Date14 September 1995
Docket NumberNo. A95A1734,A95A1734
Citation218 Ga.App. 528,462 S.E.2d 439
PartiesDEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES v. ANDERSON et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William M. Droze, Kevin M. O'Connor, Assistant Attorneys General, Kunz & Associates, Eva Jo L. Parmer, Douglasville, for appellant.

John C. Anderson, pro se.

Sandra C. Camp, pro se.

ANDREWS, Judge.

Pursuant to the authority of OCGA § 19-11-12, the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) ex rel. the minor child of Anderson and Camp conducted a review of an existing child support order and issued an administrative order pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-12(d) adjusting the existing court award of child support. After the order was issued and the time limits for review set forth in OCGA § 19-11-12(c) had expired, DHR petitioned the Superior Court for an order adopting the final administrative order as the order of the Court. DHR appeals from the Superior Court's denial of its petition. 1

OCGA § 19-11-12 was enacted pursuant to congressional mandate that the states periodically examine existing child support orders to address any inequities in the establishment of support obligations. Under OCGA § 19-11-12(d), "[t]he administrative order adjusting the child support award ... shall, upon filing with the local clerk of the court, have the full effect of a modification of the original order or decree of support." The Superior Court concluded that the statute does not provide for the court to enter an order adopting the administrative order, but provides that, "upon filing with the local clerk of the court," the administrative order, by operation of law, shall "have the full effect of a modification of the original [court] order" or decree of support.

DHR argues that DHR regulation 290-7-1-.08 provides authority requiring the Court to enter an order adopting the administrative order. The regulation is predicated upon OCGA § 19-11-12 and provides that the Office of Child Support Recovery of DHR "may petition the appropriate court for modification in accordance with the final administrative decision...." The regulation further provides for service of the petition upon the custodial and noncustodial parents and concludes that "[u]pon adoption by the court, the final administrative decision adjusting the child support award ... shall have the full effect of a modification of the original order or decree of support."

"The test of the validity of an administrative rule is twofold: whether it is authorized by statute and whether it is reasonable." Brown v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 190 Ga.App. 311, 312, 378 S.E.2d 718 (1989); Georgia Real Estate Commission v. Accelerated Courses, etc., 234 Ga. 30, 32-33, 214 S.E.2d 495 (1975). A valid administrative rule has the same force and effect as the statutory scheme upon which it is predicated. Dallas Blue Haven Pools v. Taslimi, 180 Ga.App. 734, 735-736, 350 S.E.2d 265 (1986). However, an administrative rule which exceeds the scope of or is inconsistent with the authority of the statute upon which it is predicated is invalid. Strickland v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 248 Ga. 582, 586, 284 S.E.2d 271 (1981); Rielli v. State, 174 Ga.App. 220, 222, 330 S.E.2d 104 (1985).

DHR argues that "[a]lthough OCGA § 19-11-12(d) suggests that the mere filing of an administrative adjustment works a modification, the Department has established the cited procedure to assure against any perceived violation of the separation of powers principles embodied in the Constitution. Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III ... [and that] [t]he rule merely adds an additional procedure which allows a court to adopt the Department's administrative findings and decision...." The language of OCGA § 19-11-12(d) does more than merely suggest that the filing of an administrative order with the clerk of the court modifies the court child support order--the statute flatly states that "[t]he...

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  • Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Cunard
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 15, 2021
    ...to the defendants with respect to the HOA's involuntary servitude arguments.14 5. Finally, citing Department of Human Resources v. Anderson , 218 Ga. App. 528, 529, 462 S.E.2d 439 (1995),15 the HOA contends that Section 4.2.2 is invalid because it is an administrative rule that "exceeds the......
  • Ga. Soc'y of Ambulatory Surgery Centers v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 12, 2011
    ...whether it is authorized by statute and whether it is reasonable.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dept. of Human Resources v. Anderson, 218 Ga.App. 528, 529, 462 S.E.2d 439 (1995). In applying this test, we have explained that “the interpretation of a statute by an administrative agenc......
  • North Fulton Medical Center v. Stephenson
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    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 26, 1998
    ...See note 10, supra; OCGA § 31-6-21(b)(4). 16. Id.; North Fulton I, 263 Ga. at 814, 440 S.E.2d 18; see Department of Human Resources v. Anderson, 218 Ga.App. 528, 529, 462 S.E.2d 439 (1995) (invalidating regulation that was inconsistent with "clear authority of statute"); Collins v. Prince S......
  • Department of Revenue v. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 23, 2004
    ...and BARNES, J., concur. 1. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-7-8-.42(2). 2. OCGA § 48-7-40.12(a)(1), (c). 3. Dept. of Human Resources v. Anderson, 218 Ga.App. 528, 529, 462 S.E.2d 439 (1995) ("an administrative rule which exceeds the scope of or is inconsistent with the authority of the statute u......
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