Industrial Commission of Colorado v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., Ltd.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1919
• Docket Number: 9599.
• Citation: 185 P. 344,66 Colo. 575
• Parties: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO v. LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., Limited, et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

185 P. 344

66 Colo. 575

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF COLORADO v. LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., Limited, et al.

No. 9599.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

November 3, 1919

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Clarence J Morley, Judge.

Proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act by Ray Brown for compensation for injury, opposed by the Great Western Sugar Company, employer, and the London Guarantee & Accident Company, Limited, insurer. Award of Industrial Commission for claimant, and insurer took case to district court, which entered judgment on stipulation without approval of Industrial Commission, and the Industrial Commission brings error.

Reversed with directions.

Victor E. Keyes, Atty. Gen., and John S. Fine, Asst. Atty. Gen (Walter E. Schwed, of Denver, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Fancher Sarchet, of Ft. Collins, for defendant in error Brown.

Wm. E Hutton and B. B. McCay, both of Denver, for defendants in error Great Western Sugar Co. and London Guarantee & Accident Co., Limited.

TELLER J.

Defendant in error, Ray Brown, was awarded compensation for an injury, on a hearing before the industrial Commission.

The case was taken by the Guarantee Company to the district court, and, while pending there, Brown and the said company entered into a stipulation for a settlement of Brown's claim for a sum less than that awarded him by the commission.

Upon the filing of this stipulation in the district court, objection was made by the commission to any order being entered thereon, it being insisted that the court could give judgment only after a hearing and under the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Judgment was, however, entered on the stipulation, and the commission brings the cause here for review.

The commission was made a party to the proceeding in the district court, as required by the statute, and, being a party there, it had the right to bring the case here for determination of the questions raised by it.

Counsel for defendants in error urge that, as the insurance company and Brown are the only parties financially interested, they may settle the controversy, and, if such settlement is approved by the district court, it must stand.

This ignores a very important consideration in the case. Inasmuch as the statute provides that the commission be made a party to the proceedings in the district court, it cannot be supposed that the cause there may be conducted solely by the other parties. The commission has a function to perform in the district court, and that manifestly is to defend its award, in the interest both of the claimant and of the state. The Workmen's Compensation Act is an acknowledgment by the state of a duty to aid the the injured employés in securing compensation for their injuries, and to prevent the delays and miscarriage of justice which sometimes occurred in personal injury actions in the courts. As has been frequently pointed out, the state has an interest in the recovery of just compensation by injured emploý ployes to the end that they do not, because of their injuries, become public charges. Rosensteel v. Niles F. & M. Co., 7 Neg. & Comp. Cas. 798; Gerber v. Central Council of Stockton, 2 Cal. Ind. Acc. Com. 554; Dettloff v. Hammond Standish & Co., 195 Mich. 117, 161 N.W. 949. It is that fact which induced the lawmakers to give to such commissions the power to approve settlements as a condition of their becoming binding on the parties to them.

In Rosensteel v. Niles Forge & Mfg. Co., supra, the Ohio Industrial Commission held that the proceeding before the Industrial Commission is not a civil action, and does not partake of the nature of such action. The commission said:

'When the injured employé, or his dependent in the event of his death, elect to take compensation, as in the claim now under consideration, the protection of the statute is thrown about him. The moment he files his proceeding with the Industrial Commission the state has a direct interest in the proceeding. It assumes jurisdiction and, unlike in a civil action in the courts the claimant has not thereafter the right to settle or compromise his claim without the consent of the commission. This is evidenced by the fact that after the amount of compensation has been determined by the commission the employé himself cannot sue the employer in the event of his refusal to pay the same, but the action must be brought in the name of the state, by its chief legal

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