Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley

• Decision Date: 28 February 1963
• Citation: 379 P.2d 22,59 Cal.2d 247,28 Cal.Rptr. 718
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 379 P.2d 22 DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William A. HAWLEY, Defendant and Appellant. S. F. 21219

Page 718

28 Cal.Rptr. 718

59 Cal.2d 247, 379 P.2d 22

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William A. HAWLEY, Defendant and Appellant.

S. F. 21219.

Supreme Court of California

Feb. 28, 1963.

Emory L. Morris, San Mateo, Kenneth C. Gillis, Oakland, and Webster Street, Monterey, for defendant and appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Harold B. Haas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lawrence E. Doxsee, and Elizabeth Palmer, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a summary judgment for the sum of $8060.55 entered against him in an action by the Department of Mental Hygiene of the State of California to recover the alleged cost of care, support and maintenance of his son John Powell Hawley in a state institution for the insane for the period of January 1956 through October 1960. For reasons which will appear, we have concluded that such costs may not lawfully be charged against defendant, and that the judgment should be reversed.

Defendant's son, hereinafter called John, was born in August 1936. In November 1952 he was certified to be mentally ill and admitted to Camarillo State Hospital. In March 1955 he was granted a leave of absence from Camarillo and secured gainful employment. On December 9, 1955, after having been held to answer and committed without bail, he was charged by information with the murder (in October 1955) of his mother, Iris Hawley. On December 14, 1955, John was arraigned in the superior court and his counsel at that time stated that the accused wished to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and further informed the court that 'there is a serious question as to his present * * * sanity * * *.' The minutes show that the sole plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was entered. The court thereupon appointed three psychiatrists to examine John, and continued the matter to February 2, 1956.

On the appointed date the court received the reports of the psychiatrists, found John 'legally insane at present' and pursuant to the provisions of sections 1368 et seq. of the Penal Code, ¹ committed him to Atascadero State Hospital 'for treatment, to remain there until certified by staff and Superintendent of hospital that defendant is no longer insane, as indicated, at which time defendant is to be returned to this court. Further proceedings suspended until such time.' No finding was made with respect to the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity; it is unnecessary in this civil action to consider whether, due to the circumstances attending its entry, it would stand as a valid plea in the event that defendant should recover his sanity and move to vacate it. Until and unless vacated it purports to admit commission of the act which, but for M'Naughton type insanity, would effect the crime charged. (Pen.Code, § 1016; ² People v. Brock (1962) 57 Cal.2d 644, 648(1), 21 Cal.Rptr. 560, 371 P.2d 296; People v. Walker (1948) 33 Cal.2d 250, 264(9), 201 P.2d 6.) In any event, the fact of the matricide by John is unquestioned.

In October 1959 John addressed a letter to the court requesting that he be permitted to stand trial, but the superintendent of the hospital reported that 'although he understands the charges against him, he would be unable to assist rationally in his defense.' John was still held at Atascadero when this action was filed in February 1961 seeking recovery from John's father for the costs of maintaining him there. Defendant answered the complaint, and each party thereafter moved for summary judgment. The motion of plaintiff was granted, that of defendant was denied, and judgment was entered accordingly. This appeal by defendant father followed.

In support of the judgment against the father plaintiff relies upon section 6650 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. As noted in the margin ³ that section was amended in 1945 by addition of the provisions which purport to impose upon the designated relatives liability for the care, support and maintenance of mentally ill persons committed pursuant to either section 1026, or section 1368 et seq. of the Penal Code. Defendant father contends that the costs of support and maintenance of one detained under such circumstances may not validly be imposed upon members of the family of the accused. This position is sound.

In Napa State Hospital v. Yuba County (1903) 138 Cal. 378, the court after first noting (p. 381, 71 P. 450, p. 451) that sections 1367 through 1373 of the Penal Code have to do with commitment 'to the insane asylum of a person charged with crime, * * * until he shall recover, and on such recovery * * * be returned to the court for trial,' went on to declare that (pp. 381-382, pp. 451-452 of 71 P.) 'Persons charged with crime who are or become insane naturally belong to a class distinct and different from insane persons who are not so charged with crime. Under the general law, the expense of capture, detention, and prosecution of persons charged with crime is to be borne by the county. ⁴ The party, though insane, is still detained under the law to answer for his crime when he shall become sane. If he were not charged with crime, though he were insane, he might not be sent to the asylum. His insanity might be of a nature not requiring that he be restrained, or his friends, relatives, or guardian might take care of him or consign him to a private institution. If, however, he is charged with crime, he must be committed to the asylum, if found insane, whatever the nature of his insanity may be. He is thus committed that he may be held in the custody of the law to await his trial or sentence, and his commitment is a part and parcel of the administration of the criminal law. If he were not insane the defendant would, on a continuance of his case, be sent to jail or released on bail; being insane, the court, under the Penal Code provision, commits him to the asylum pending the continuance. * * * The party is held in custody, not because he is insane, but primarily because he is charged with crime.' In other words the person so held is detained for the protection of the public at large.

That one committed to a state hospital for the insane under provisions of the Penal Code is regarded by the state in a different light from one under civil commitment is further pointed up by section 6700.5, added to the Welfare and Institutions Code in 1961. This sections provides that 'Whenever, in the opinion of the Director of Mental Hygiene and with the approval of the Director of Corrections, any person who has been committed to a state hospital pursuant to provisions of the Penal Code needs care and treatment under conditions of custodial security which can be better provided within the Department of Corrections, such person may be transferred for such purposes * * * to an institution under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections * * *.' (See also § 6723 Welf. & Inst.Code; and §§ 2684, 2685, 6400, 6402, 6450 and 6550 of the Pen.Code.) ⁵ Plaintiff does not contend that any California statute attempts to cast on relatives any liability for supporting a defendant transferred to or held under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.

In discussing the commitment of a defendant to a state hospital pursuant to Penal Code, section 1026, the court in In re Slayback (1930) 209 Cal. 480, 490-491(5), 288 P. 769, pointed out that 'If it is the duty of the state to restrain one mentally afflicted, as held by the above authority (Hammon v. Hill (D.C.1915) 228 Fed. 999, 1001) and others that might be cited here, this duty becomes far more urgent and pressing when it is proven that such person is not only insane, but has developed criminal tendencies as a result of his mental derangement which has caused him to take the life of a human being under circumstances which, but for his mental state, would amount to murder. In endeavoring to perform this duty of caring for those who are mentally afflicted and of protecting the public from injury by those insane persons who have been proven to possess criminal tendencies * * *' (italics added), the Legislature enacted the pertinent sections of the Penal Code.

In re Cathey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 679, 12 Cal.Rptr. 762, 361 P.2d 426, was before us on application for habeas corpus wherein petitioner, who had been committed pursuant to section 1368 et seq. of the Penal Code and confined in a hospital under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, sought to compel his custodial transfer to the Department of Mental Hygiene. Our decision denying the writ points out (p. 691(10), p. 432 of 12 Cal.Rptr., p. 768 of 361 P.2d) that petitioner is 'not a mere mentally ill patient, committed only for treatment as such. By contrast, he is a defendant being held for multiple trials (when he recovers sanity) on various felony counts including one nonbailable charge of murder in San Luis Obispo County and a similar charge in Los Angeles. * * * (Pp. 693-694(16), pp. 769-770 of 12 Cal.Rptr., pp. 433-434 of 361 P.2d.) Petitioner is correct in his insistence that he is not serving a sentence as a convicted felon, but he is mistaken in his assumption that he is entitled to be treated exactly as he was (when) at Atascadero. He has no right to be confined under circumstances which will give him the opportunity to kill or maim his custodians, his fellow inmates or himself, or to destroy the property of the institution where he is detained. He does have a right to care and treatment, within the limits permitted by the nature of the security risk which he presents, looking toward his restoration to sanity so that he can be tried on the pending criminal charges.' (See also Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery (1958) 50 Cal.2d 742, 757-758(18), 329 P.2d 689, wherein it is commented that 'there appear to be natural and intrinsic reasons for classifying persons committed (to the Youth Authority) * * * differently from those who are mentally ill,'...