People v. Samuel

• Decision Date: 15 June 1981
• Docket Number: Cr. 21684
• Citation: 174 Cal.Rptr. 684,29 Cal.3d 489,629 P.2d 485
• Parties: , 629 P.2d 485 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David T. SAMUEL, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 684

174 Cal.Rptr. 684

29 Cal.3d 489, 629 P.2d 485

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David T. SAMUEL, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 21684.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

June 15, 1981.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Janice L. Feinstein, Deputy Public Defender, for defendant and appellant.

Frank L. Williams, Jr., Public Defender, Orange, and William J. Kopeny, Deputy Public Defender, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jay M. Bloom and Jesus Rodriguez, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Cecil Hicks, Dist. Atty., Orange, Michael R. Capizzi, Asst. Dist. Atty., and John D. Conley, Deputy Dist. Atty., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

It is a fundamental canon of criminal law, and a foundation of due process, that "A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while such person is mentally incompetent." (Pen.Code, § 1367; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815; People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 282, 61 Cal.Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228; People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 516-517, 58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942.) We have heretofore defined the threshold requirement of substantial evidence of mental incompetence that entitles a defendant to a hearing to determine such competence under Penal Code section 1368. (People v. Beivelman (1968) 70 Cal.2d 60, 70-72, 73 Cal.Rptr. 521, 447 P.2d 913; People v. Laudermilk, supra; People v. Pennington, supra.)

Having easily crossed that threshold in this case, defendant asks us to determine whether the evidence actually presented at his section 1368 hearing is sufficient to support the ensuing jury verdict of competence. Because the record overwhelmingly demonstrates defendant's incompetence and is devoid of substantial evidence to the contrary, that verdict cannot stand and the judgment of conviction must be set aside.

I.

Although we decide the appeal on the ground of sufficiency of the evidence, it is appropriate to comment briefly on the primary controversy over proceedings at the section 1368 hearing.

While defendant was in custody following his arrest, he was repeatedly questioned about the crime and ultimately confessed as a result of interrogation techniques seemingly violative of the Miranda rule as we adapted it to state constitutional principles in People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 244-246, 145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108. The parties have vigorously debated whether the prosecutor's use of that confession at the section 1368 hearing violated defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. But whether or not that privilege is normally operative at such hearings, on the facts of this case defendant could not complain of the use of the confession.

In preparing for the competence hearing, defense counsel furnished one of the expert psychiatric witnesses with a transcript of the confession. He then called that witness at the hearing to give his opinion of defendant's competence. While the witness had the confession available to assist in forming his opinion of the defendant's competence, he testified he gave it little or no consideration. On cross-examination, the prosecutor read or paraphrased portions of the confession and asked the witness if they were consistent with the other reports of the crime he had received, an if so, why they did not alter his opinion.

This court held in People v. Morse (1969) 70 Cal.2d 711, 724-726, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607, that even at the trial itself, if the defendant puts his mental capacity in issue he cannot complain if his attorney hands over an illegally obtained confession to an expert witness who considers that confession in forming an opinion of the defendant's mental condition. Although the recent cases of People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272, and People v. Rucher (1980) 26 Cal.3d 368, 162 Cal.Rptr. 13, 605 P.2d 843, impliedly cast doubt on the vitality of the Morse rule in criminal trials, the principle applies here because of two distinguishing features of the section 1368 hearing.

First, a section 1368 hearing is held only after there has been a prima facie showing of mental incompetence. Of necessity, therefore, defendant's attorney must play a greater role in making fundamental choices for him, and cannot be expected to seek approval of strategic decisions made in the course of obtaining and presenting proof of incompetence. (People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 115, fn. 4., 60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586.) The privilege against self-incrimination is in certain other circumstances within the control of the accused: his voluntary and intelligent waiver of the privilege must be sought and obtained before a plea of guilt may be accepted (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243-244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-1713, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 130-131, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449), and he is ordinarily entitled to waive the privilege regardless of his attorney's wishes (People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215, 85 Cal.Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710). But in Robles we noted that the accused had been validly adjudged competent before asserting his right to testify over counsel's objection. (Id. at p. 215, fn. 1, 85 Cal.Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710.) In so doing, we tacitly recognized the obvious: if counsel represents a defendant as to whose competence the judge has declared a doubt sufficient to require a section 1368 hearing, he should not be compelled to entrust key decisions about fundamental matters to his client's apparently defective judgment. In fact, in People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 555, 297 P.2d 999, we held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow a defendant whose competence was in question to withdraw a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, thereby in effect pleading guilty, contrary to the advice of his attorney.

Furthermore, in People v. Hill, supra, we held that as a matter of tactics counsel may, without consulting defendant, waive defendant's statutory right to demand that a jury decide his competence (67 Cal.2d at pp. 114-115, 60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586). Because serious doubt had arisen in this case regarding defendant's competence, counsel would have acted irresponsibly had he left to defendant the task of deciding which information the psychiatrists should review in preparation for the competence hearing. ¹ If counsel makes use of a purportedly illegally obtained confession as the defense attorney did in this case, the prosecution must be allowed to use the incriminating statement at the hearing for the limited purpose of cross-examining the expert witness who obtained it as a possible aid in forming his opinion of defendant's incompetence. ²

Second, the sole purpose of the section 1368 hearing is to determine defendant's competence, not his guilt. Hence, when the jury at the section 1368 hearing is properly instructed regarding the limited purpose of that hearing, and when that jury will not also decide the question of guilt at trial, the danger of prejudice in the determination of guilt discussed in Disbrow and Rucker does not arise. ³ We conclude that in this setting and under these circumstances the principle of People v. Morse still applies.

II.

On October 15, 1977, the defendant herein, 21-year-old David Samuel, was arrested and charged with the first degree murder of a gas station attendant during a robbery attempt. Before trial, it became evident to his attorney that Samuel was mentally ill, and he requested a hearing to determine his client's competence to stand trial. The judge granted the request, an action appropriate when the defendant has produced substantial evidence of incompetence or the judge harbors a doubt about defendant's competence. (Pen. Code, § 1368; People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 516-519, 58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942.)

At the hearing, which occurred in August 1978, ⁴ the defense presented an impressive array of evidence demonstrating Samuel's present inability either to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to rationally assist in the preparation and presentation of his defense. (See People v. Laudermilk, supra, 67 Cal.2d 272, 282, 61 Cal.Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228, and cases cited.) In all, five court-appointed psychiatrists, three psychologists, a medical doctor, a nurse, and three psychiatric technicians testified on Samuel's behalf. In addition, four psychiatric reports were admitted into evidence. Without exception, each witness and every report concluded that throughout the period during which the declarant observed the defendant, the latter was incompetent to stand trial. In response, the prosecution offered no expert testimony whatever and only two lay witnesses, neither of whom contradicted any of the defense testimony.

Of course, the jury is not required to accept at face value a unanimity of expert opinion: "To hold otherwise would be in effect to substitute a trial by 'experts' for a trial by jury...." (People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 811, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959.) "The chief value of an expert's testimony in this field, as in all other fields, rests upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned and the reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his conclusion." (People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 141, 70 Cal.Rptr. 193, 443 P.2d 777, quoting from Carter v. United States (D.C. Cir.1957) 252 F.2d 608, 617.) Nevertheless, the following review of the undisputed facts upon which the defense witnesses relied and the reasoning by which they arrived at their conclusions demonstrates the overwhelming strength of defendant's case.

When he was eight or nine years old, Samuel began...