Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner

• Decision Date: 15 March 1963
• Citation: 29 Cal.Rptr. 312
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Evelyn KIRCHNER, Administratrix of the Estate of Ellinor Green Vance, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 20576.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 312

29 Cal.Rptr. 312

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HYGIENE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Evelyn KIRCHNER, Administratrix of the Estate of Ellinor Green Vance, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 20576.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

March 15, 1963.

For Opinion on Hearing, see 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.

Dinkelspiel & Dinkelspiel, Redwood City, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., of California, John Carl Porter, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant Evelyn Kirchner, administratrix of the estate of Ellinor Green Vance, appeals from a judgment on the pleadings entered against her and in favor of the plaintiff Department of Mental Hygiene of the State of California for the sum of $7,554.22 and costs for the care, support, maintenance and medical attention of Auguste Schaeche, mother of defendant's intestate, in a state institution for the mentally ill.

Plaintiff's complaint filed April 19, 1961, alleges in substance: That on January 15, 1953, Mrs. Schaeche was duly adjudged mentally ill and committed to Agnews State Hospital where ever since said date she has been, and now is, a patient; that Ellinor Vance was Mrs. Schaeche's daughter and as such responsible for her care and maintenance at the above hospital; that pursuant to section 6651 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the Director of Mental Hygiene determined the rate for the care and maintenance of Mrs. Schaeche and said charges were made continuously for every month said incompetent was a patient; that for the period August 25, 1956, through August 24, 1960, there became due and owing the plaintiff department for the care and maintenance of said incompetent the sum of $7,554.22, no part of which has been paid; that the daughter died on August 25, 1960, and the defendant is the duly appointed, qualified and acting administratrix of her estate; that on November 3, 1960, the plaintiff filed in the daughter's estate, its creditor's claim for $7,554.22 for the care and maintenance for the above period of time, which claim was rejected by the defendant administratrix on January 25, 1961; and that the above amount of $7,554.22 is due, owing and unpaid.

Defendant's answer directly controverts only two paragraphs of the complaint: that alleging the daughter's legal responsibility for the care and attention furnished the mother at Agnews State Hospital and the final paragraph alleging the outstanding indebtedness from the dauther's administratrix, defendant herein. In the answer, therefore, defendant denies that the decedent was legally responsible for such care and maintenance and denies that she, as administratrix, is indebted to the plaintiff in any amount. Defendant by failure to deny them admits the remaining allegations of the complaint. ¹ However the answer also sets forth two further and separate defenses in substance as follows: That on October 9, 1956, Ellinor Vance was appointed and qualified as the guardian of the estate of Auguste Schaeche, an incompetent person; that on October 23, 1956, on petition of the plaintiff department filed in such guardianship proceeding, the court made its order giving the department an equitable lien on the estate of the incompetent for $6,425 for accrued charges for care, maintenance and medical attention for the period ending September 30, 1958, and for such other sums as may become due in the future; that after the death of Ellinor Vance on August 25, 1960, and on January 16, 1961, the defendant Evelyn Kirchner was appointed guardian of the estate of Auguste Schaeche; that said defendant as such guardian thereafter sold certain real property of the guardianship estate for the net amount of $10,903.35, which amount is on deposit at a local title company; that defendant as guardian of the estate of said incompetent ² requested of the plaintiff department an itemized statement of the amount due for the care and maintenance of the incompetent so that such amount could be presented to the court and paid, but that the plaintiff refused and continues to refuse to render such statement; that because of such refusal 'plaintiff should be estopped' from asserting its claim against the estate of Ellinor Vance; that, additionally, the plaintiff's rights have been adjudicated by the order made in the guardianship proceeding on October 23, 1958.

Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that there was no defense to its action. Defendant filed a similar motion on the ground that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. The court below granted plaintiff's motion and denied defendant's motion. This appeal followed.

'The plaintiff, by his motion for judgment on the pleadings, may recover judgment without the introduction of any evidence if his complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and if the answer * * * neither raises any material issue nor states a defense--that is, where the answer expressly or substantially admits or does not sufficiently deny all the material allegations of the complaint, and sets up no new matter sufficient to bar or defeat the action.' (39 Cal.Jur.2d, Pleading, § 307, pp. 420-421; see Adjustment Corp. v. Hollywood Hardware etc. Co. (1939), 35 Cal.App.2d 566, 569-570, 96 P.2d 161). On such a motion the allegations of the answer must be taken as true and the plaintiff admits, for the purpose of the motion, the untruth of his own allegations, so far as they have been controverted by the answer. (Osborne v. Abels (1939), 30 Cal.App.2d 729, 731, 87 P.2d 404).

The material allegations of the complaint before us not controverted by the defendant establish that the incompetent Auguste Schaeche was a patient at Agnews State Hospital and that charges for her care and maintenance, at rates determined according to statute, are owing and unpaid to the department in the total amount of $7,554.22. Briefly summarized, the answer simply denies that the daughter of the incompetent was legally responsible for such indebtedness and further denies the allegation (conclusionary in form) that such amount is due, owing and unpaid from the daughter's administratrix. The answer in addition asserts that the daughter was an adult and that the mother's own guardianship estate had adequate funds to pay the indebtedness, which funds were themselves secured to plaintiff by an equitable lien. Thus the answer raises no factual issues requiring a trial but merely the legal claim of the defendant that the decedent daughter was not liable for the above charges. Plaintiff's motion for a judgment on the pleadings was therefore an appropriate remedy to determine the basic controversy. (See Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hirsch Merc. Co. (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d 175, 176, 181, 148 P.2d 110).

Defendant contends here that (1) the estate of an adult child is not liable to the Department of Mental Hygiene for the care and maintenance of an incompetent mother in a state institution where the mother has adequate funds of her own to pay the charges therefor; and (2) the department was required to proceed against the mother's property on which it had an equitable lien. Neither contention has merit.

Section 6650 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, ³ in effect during the four-year period here involved, provides in relevant part: 'The husband, wife, father, mother, or children of a mentally ill person or inebriate, the estates of such persons, and the guardian and administrator of the estate of such mentally ill person or inebriate, shall cause him to be properly and suitably cared for and maintained, * * *. The husband, wife, father, mother, or children of a mentally ill person or inebriate, and the administrators of their estates, and the estate of such mentally ill person or inebriate, shall be liable for his care, support, and maintenance in a state institution of which he is an inmate. The liability of such persons and estates shall be a joint and several liability, * * *.' (Emphasis added.)

The above statute imposes on the persons therein named an unconditional liability for the support and maintenance of a mentally ill relative in a state institution. (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery (1958), 50 Cal.2d 742, 749-751, 329 P.2d 689; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Rosse (1960), 187 Cal.App.2d 283, 286, 9 Cal.Rptr. 589; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Shane (1956), 142 Cal.App.2d Supp. 881, 883, 299 P.2d 747.) ⁴ It is clear that it imposes such liability on a daughter of a mentally ill person and on such daughter's estate.

Defendant argues that Ellinor Vance, being an adult daughter, had no 'primary duty' to support her mother, Mrs. Schaeche, and that if any liability is to be imposed on the daughter or the daughter's estate 'it must be shown that not only the mother had no funds but that the daughter had the ability to pay.'

The liability created by section 6650 is unconditionally imposed and not dependent on ability to pay. (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, supra, 50 Cal.2d 742, 749-751, 329 P.2d 689; Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Mannina (1959), 168 Cal.App.2d 215, 217, 335 P.2d 694, 337 P.2d 219.) Nor is it made dependent upon the existence of a 'primary duty' to furnish support. The above statute makes no mention of such expression. It clearly imposes liability, as defendant concedes, on the estate of the mentally ill person. It also expressly provides that the liability of the persons and estates named in the statute 'shall be a joint and several liability.' The law is settled that where an obligation is joint and several, any or all of the persons obligated may be compelled to pay the indebtedness. A person thus liable may be sued alone without joining any others also liable. In the case at bench, therefore, it was permissible for the Department of Mental Hygiene to enforce the statutory liability against the...