Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Court

Citation6 Cal.Rptr.2d 714,5 Cal.App.4th 155
Decision Date06 April 1992
Docket NumberNo. C012461,C012461
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesDEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Sacramento County, Respondent. Cecil GREENE et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Christopher W. Waddell, Chief Counsel, Tamara J. Pierson, Deputy Chief Counsel, Edmund K. Brehl, Roy J. Chastain, Joan Branin, Paul M. Starkey, Warren Curtis Stracener, K. William Curtis, Labor Relations Counsel, Sacramento, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Dennis F. Moss, D. Robert Schuman, Deputy Controller, Richard J. Chivaro, Sr. Staff Counsel, Gary P. Reynolds, Chief Counsel, Howard Schwartz, Asst. Chief Counsel, Darrell Steinberg, Sacramento, Richard Romanski, Lisa E. Aguiar, Williams, Kelly, Romanski, Polverari & Skelton, Redwood City, Ron Yank, Gary M. Messing, Richard M. Pattison, Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, Sacramento, for real parties in interest.

Stewart Weinberg, Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, San Francisco, for intervenors on behalf of real parties in interest.

John W. Spittler, Sacramento, for Public Employment Relations Bd.

PUGLIA, Presiding Justice.

Petitioners, Department of Personnel Administration and its Director, David Tirapelle, seek a writ of mandate compelling respondent superior court to set aside its judgment issuing a peremptory writ of mandate. The writ issued by respondent court compels petitioners and Controller Gray Davis to desist and refrain from reducing the wages of state employees in recognized bargaining units, and from changing the health care premium contribution formula for those employees. At issue is whether, after bargaining to impasse with state employee unions, petitioners may impose their last, best offer on wages and health care premium contribution formulas. We shall conclude as a matter of statutory construction that the Legislature delegated to petitioners authority after impasse to impose their last, best offer with regard to health care premium contributions but not with regard to wages. We shall therefore issue a writ of mandate to vindicate the authority delegated to petitioners with regard to health care premium contributions and deny the petition in all other respects.

I

The State of California faced an unprecedented budgetary crisis at the outset of fiscal year 1991-1992, with expenditures projected to exceed revenues by more than $14 billion. Although the Legislature and the Governor addressed the budget shortfall in a number of ways in the Budget Act of 1991 (the "Act"; Stats.1991, ch. 118), the Act does not direct a pay cut for state employees. Rather, it requires a $351 million reduction of employee compensation, and orders the Director of Finance to allocate the necessary reductions to each item of appropriation in the Act, with three exceptions. 1 The Governor also reduced the funds provided by the Legislature for employee compensation and benefit increases. (Stats.1991, ch. 118, § 2, pp. 473-477, Items 9800-001-001, 9800-001-494, 9800-001-988 & 9800-011-001; Governor's Objections to Budget Act of 1991, Stats.1991, ch. 118, pp. 17-18.) 2 The Governor gave his reasons for the reductions and approved the Act on July 16, 1991. (Stats.1991, ch. 118 (Assem.Bill 222], p. 1.)

In this setting, negotiations continued for new collective bargaining agreements between petitioner Department of Personnel Administration (DPA) and various unions representing state employees. For purposes of this proceeding, the parties do not dispute that by autumn 1991, DPA and many of the unions had reached impasse, after negotiating and participating in mediation in good faith.

On November 5, 1991, DPA sent letters to two of the employee unions which are real parties in interest herein, California Association of Professional Scientists (CAPS) and California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP), informing them of actions DPA intended to take, effective November 12, 1991, as a result of the negotiations impasse. The letter to CAPS indicated DPA would implement terms and conditions of employment as follows: "1. Where a Government Code or DPA Rule exists, the State will adhere to the provisions of the Code or Rules. In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, these Code and Rule Sections must be followed regardless of whether the benefit is lesser or greater than the corresponding language of the expired contract, or the State's last offer.... [p] 2. Where no Government Code or DPA Rule is controlling, the State will maintain the status quo on all terms and conditions of employment specified in the expired [memorandum of understanding], except for the following conditions specified in our final offer: [p] Salaries [p] Effective November 12, 1991, salaries will be reduced five (5) percent as described in the State's offer of June 24, 1991. A pay letter will be issued to effectuate this change. [p] Health Benefits [p] Effective December 1, 1991, the State employer's contribution rates will be: $157.--employee; $292.--employee plus one dependent; and, $367.--employee plus two or more dependents. These rates, as well as the rural subsidy rates, are as described in the State's last offer of August 12, 1991. [Note: Any increase in employee costs will be deducted from the November pay warrant.]" The letter to CAHP was substantially the same.

CAPS and CAHP responded to DPA's notification of its intent to impose its final offer by filing a petition for writ of mandate and request for a stay in respondent superior court on November 8, 1991. That day, respondent court issued an alternative writ and a stay, ordering petitioners not to reduce the salaries or health care contributions for state employee members of CAPS and CAHP until respondent issued a final decision on the petition.

In addition to the two unions, the petition in the superior court named as petitioners Senators Cecil Greene and Lucy Killea, and Assemblyman Xavier Becerra. Subsequently, Senator Ralph Dills was named as a petitioner in the first amended petition in the superior court. 3 Later, a number of other unions representing state employees joined in the proceeding as real parties in interest and intervenors. 4 In addition, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) filed a "Statement of Jurisdiction," in the superior court proceeding asserting PERB lacks exclusive initial jurisdiction over this dispute. 5

After a hearing, respondent superior court indicated it would issue a writ of mandate. The court explained that Government Code section 19826, subdivision (b) expressly precludes DPA from unilaterally reducing employee wages. 6 The court reasoned the Legislature in section 19826, subdivision (b) delegated to DPA limited authority to set salaries, retaining a portion of this authority in the event of an intractable dispute or impasse between DPA and an employee union. Moreover, the court concluded, in the absence of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between DPA and an employee union (see § 3517.5), the formula for state contributions to employee health care premiums in section 22825.1, applies so as to preclude DPA from decreasing employee health care premium contribution rates. Finally, the court determined the issues presented are not within the exclusive initial jurisdiction of PERB because the ultimate question goes to the nature of the delegation of authority from the legislative branch to the executive branch, a question peculiarly within the purview of the judicial branch.

On November 27, 1991, respondent superior court entered judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandate. The writ issued that day, commanding DPA, its director and the Controller "... to desist and refrain from reducing the wages of State employees in recognized bargaining units, and desist and refrain from modifying the health care premium payment formula for said employees."

DPA filed the instant petition for extraordinary relief on December 13, 1991. On January 9, 1992, we issued an alternative writ of mandate and notified the parties that any written return was to be filed on or before January 29, 1992, and any replication within 10 days thereafter. We also denied DPA's request for a stay. On January 14, 1992, we directed the parties to address in their briefing the question, assuming PERB had exclusive initial jurisdiction, whether any exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies so as to excuse the failure to file unfair practice charges with PERB.

II

By issuing an alternative writ of mandate, we have concluded there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Langford v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 21, 27, 233 Cal.Rptr. 387, 729 P.2d 822; Code Civ.Proc., § 1086.) " '[T]he issues presented are of great public importance and must be resolved promptly[,]' " and we shall therefore exercise our original mandamus jurisdiction. (California Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest (1974) 12 Cal.3d 593, 598, 116 Cal.Rptr. 361, 526 P.2d 513, quoting County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593; see also Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 690, 699-700, 166 Cal.Rptr. 331, 613 P.2d 579; Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfare (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 576, 581, 71 Cal.Rptr. 739.)

III

At the threshold is the question whether respondent superior court improperly assumed jurisdiction over a matter which is committed to PERB's exclusive initial jurisdiction. DPA contends PERB has exclusive jurisdiction because DPA's action in implementing its last, best offer arguably is either protected or prohibited as an unlawful practice under the statutes regulating state employer-employee labor relations. DPA points out that resolution of the underlying questions regarding DPA's authority after impasse to impose its last, best offer on wages and health contribution...

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