Department of Public Welfare v. Town of Billerica

• Decision Date: 04 January 1966
• Citation: 350 Mass. 56,213 N.E.2d 392
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE v. TOWN OF BILLERICA.

Page 392

213 N.E.2d 392

350 Mass. 56

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE v. TOWN OF BILLERICA.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 27, 1965.

Decided Jan. 4, 1966.

David Berman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

No argument or brief for respondent.

Before SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

This petition for a writ of mandamus against the town (see G.L. c. 40, § 2; ¹ see also c. 223, §§ 36, and 37, as amended through St.1962, c. 750, § 71), alleges that, after notice and hearing, the department by decision (a copy of which was attached to the petition) has ordered the town to provide assistance under G.L. c. 118D to one John Hart; that the time for review of the decision under G.L. c. 30A has expired; and that no review has been sought. ² The department's decision required the town to grant '[d]isability [a]ssistance retroactive to October 7, 1963 * * * for hospitalization * * * [from] October 7 to October 22, 1963, and * * * for nursing home care beginning October 22, 1963,' plus other sums amounting to $13.80 per month. Against the amounts to be paid by the town, Hart's social security receipts of $107.80 per month were to be a credit. The town (without waiving its demurrer and plea in abatement) admitted in an answer all the allegations of the petition. The trial judge sustained the demurrer and plea in abatement, each of which asserts that the proceeding should have been brought 'against the individual members of the [town's] [b]oard of [p]ublic [w]elfare' rather than against the town. The department appealed. ³

The department's decision thus ordered (in addition to the payment of sums already accrued and due) the continuing payment by the town of monthly amounts at stated rates. The sums to be paid were liquidated in amount, except that the period during which future payments would continue necessarily remained uncertain at the time of the decision of December 22, 1964, and, so far as the record shows, still remains uncertain. That decision, however, determined Hart's claim for assistance on the merits (cf. O'CONNOR V. DEPUTY COMMR. AND COMPTROLLER, 348 MASS. 569, 570 , 204 N.E.2D 705^A). Until altered (because of change of circumstances or otherwise, see e. g. G.L. c. 118D, § 6), the decision is final. The record suggests no reason why the town, through its board of public welfare, should not either have complied promptly with that decision or have sought review under G.L. c. 30A. Cf. Town of Natick v. Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 341 Mass. 618, 619, 171 N.E.2d 273.

Because of the continuing nature of the payments, and the absence of any other adequate direct remedy available to the department, charged as it was with supervising the administration of c. 118D (see fn. 2), mandamus is appropriate to afford complete, effective, simple, and expeditious relief. The department should not be relegated to indirect enforcement of its decision by attempting to cause a series of actions at law against the town to be brought by the relief recipient. See Police Commr. of City of Boston v. City of Boston, 279 Mass. 577, 583, 181 N.E. 790. Cf. County Commrs. of Essex County v. Mayor of Newburyport, 252 Mass. 407, 410-411, 147 N.E. 901; Seney v. Board of Health of Northampton, 314 Mass. 272, 274-277, 50 N.E.2d 3.

Writs of mandamus have been ordered to issue in cases in which a municipal corporation and its responsible officers have been parties. See Attorney Gen. v. City of Boston, 123 Mass. 460, 471-472; Aspinwall v. City of Boston, 191 Mass. 441, 448, 78 N.E. 103; Police Commr. of Boston v. City of Boston, 239 Mass. 401, 407-410, 132 N.E. 181. See also Commonwealth v. Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, 338, 343-349, 52 N.E.2d 566 (bill in equity). Cf. Streeter v. City of Worcester, 177 Mass. 29, 58 N.E. 277. In appropriate cases elsewhere, mandamus also has been used to enforce the payment of judgments upon which towns and other municipal corporations were liable. See e. g. People ex rel. Wanless v. City of Chicago, 378 Ill. 453, 458-460, 38 N.E.2d 743, 138 A.L.R. 1298. See also Commissioners of Santa Fe County v. New Mexico ex rel. Coler, 215 U.S. 296, 303, 30 S.Ct. 111, 54 L.Ed. 202 et seq. (individual officers also parties); McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.) §§ 51.35-51.37. Cf. Laycock v. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 12, 142 F.2d 789, 791, 155 A.L.R. 460 (5th Cir.). Doubtless such authorities suggested proceeding to enforce the department's decision directly against the town. The town, of course, is an appropriate party, for it is the town which will be financially affected by enforcement of...