Town of Natick v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Welfare

Decision Date06 January 1961
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesTOWN OF NATICK v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE.

John W. Mahaney, Natick (Joseph D. Neylon, Somerville, with him), for petitioner.

Francis R. Dobrowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

This petition by the town of Natick, under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, is for review of a decision of the department of public welfare. The decision, on an appeal by an aggrieved recipient of old age assistance, under G.L. c. 118A, § 3, had ordered an increase in the monthly allowance which on June 1, 1958, had been reduced by the Natick board of public welfare, bureau of old age assistance. The decree in the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the department.

1. The petition was properly brought by the town 'acting through the board of public welfare.' No question is presented as to the board's authority so to act. See City of Taunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 254, 262; Worcester Bd. of Health v. Tupper, 210 Mass. 378, 383, 96 N.E. 1096; Board of Health of Wareham v. Marine By-Products Co., 329 Mass. 174, 175, 107 N.E.2d 11; Board of Health of Woburn v. Sousa, 338 Mass. 547, 548, 156 N.E.2d 52; Kent v. Water Comm'rs of Barnstable Fire Dist., 339 Mass. 160, 158 N.E.2d 140. 1 Petitions for review under c. 30A have been brought directly by local retirement boards. Boston Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 340 Mass. 109, 162 N.E.2d 821; 2 Boston Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 340 Mass. 112, 162 N.E.2d 824. 3 Before c. 30A was enacted or became applicable, some petitions for writ of certiorari were brought by local agencies. Bureau of Old Age Assistance of Natick v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 326 Mass. 121, 93 N.E.2d 267; Quincy Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 340 Mass. 56, 162 N.E.2d 802. 4 A right to bring a petition for review under c. 30A is, however, given to the municipality. Section 14 provides that review may be had by 'any person * * * aggrieved'; § 1(4) defines 'person' to include 'all political subdivisions of the commonwealth.' We do not reach the issue of the right of the board to bring a petition for review as a person aggrieved.

2. The Superior Court had jurisdiction of the petition. General Laws c. 30A, § 14, provides that '[w]here no statutory form of judicial review or appeal is provided, or where the only statutory form of review is by extraordinary writ, judicial review shall be obtained by means of a petition for review * * *.' Except for c. 30A, certiorari as the only form of judicial review would be available to the parties at interest. It is well established that certiorari lies notwithstanding provisions barring appeal by any party. Swan v. Justices of the Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 543-545, 111 N.E. 386; McLaughlin v. Mayor of Cambridge, 253 Mass. 193, 199, 148 N.E. 458; Whitney v. Judge of Dist. Court of No. Berkshire, 271 Mass. 448, 458-459, 171 N.E. 648. See Commissioner of Corps. & Tax v. Chilton Club, 318 Mass. 285, 287-288, 61 N.E.2d 335. The principle is not made inapplicable by the provision of G.L. c. 118A, § 3: 'Every decision of the department shall be final and binding upon the local board or bureau involved and shall be complied with by such local board or bureau.' This is not a statute which 'expressly precludes judicial review' within the meaning of G.L. c. 30A, § 14. In Attorney Gen. v. Bureau of Old Age Assistance of Cambridge, 324 Mass. 63, 66, 84 N.E.2d 536, 538, it was noted that the correctness of the decision in favor of an applicant for old age assistance 'may have been subject to question on a writ of certiorari.' In Bureau of Old Age Assistance of Natick v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 326 Mass. 121, 93 N.E.2d 267, a decision of the commissioner of public welfare requiring the bureau of old age assistance to give aid to an applicant not settled in the town was quashed on certiorari on the petition of the bureau. The bureau's brief asserted the right to bring the petition and the point was not discussed in the opinion. The intent of the statement in c. 118A, § 3, as to the finality of the department's decision, is, we think, to emphasize that the aggrieved applicant, on appeal, has a right to a full trial and a superseding decision. See point 3, post. Hence, the omission to specify that the decision is binding on the applicant (noted without discussion in Leigh v. Commissioner of Pub. Health & Charities of Lawrence, 310 Mass. 343, 37 N.E.2d 1017) is not evidence of an intent to give exceptional finality to the decision as against the municipality.

3. The record shows no basis for the petitioner's contention, under G.L. c. 30A, § 14(8), that '[its] substantial rights * * * have been prejudiced because the agency decision is * * * (e) Unsupported by substantial evidence.'

The department found that the aid recipient was entitled to a budgetary allowance in accordance with a provision in its Standards of Assistance (c. 118A, § 1) 5 calling for application of the 'Household Expense Plan--Full Cost of Common Expenses,' 'as she resides with a single daughter.' This conclusion was justified by the Standards which provide in part: 'Household expense arrangements are the common methods of budgeting Aid to Dependent Children and General Relief families and are also applicable in Old Age Assistance when the recipient is responsible for all or part of the maintenance costs of the household. [p] When a recipient and married children live together, the local board shall determine who is responsible for the maintenance of the household. The household expense plan shall be used only when the recipient is responsible for maintaining the household. [p] The following are the most common household expense plans: 1. Household Expense Plan--Full cost of common expenses Applicable in the following instances: Old Age Assistance recipient * * * living with single child * * *. 2. * * * [Prorated share of common expenses applicable in certain old age assistance cases where recipient is married.] 3. Household Expense Plan--Living in same home with married child. * * * If it is determined that the recipient is maintaining the household * * * the following plans are used: * * * If it is determined that the married child maintains the household the client shall be budgeted on a board basis.'

We see no basis for the petitioner's contention that the evidence required the use of the room and board basis set out in the Standards. 6 There is nothing in the Standards which expressly makes the board and room basis applicable to any case of a recipient living with an unmarried child. If there is in the Standards an implication that, where in fact the parent boards with the child, only the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • City of Revere v. Mass. Gaming Comm'n
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 10, 2017
    ...30A], if available, certiorari is the only way of reviewing decisions declared final by statute"); Natick v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare , 341 Mass. 618, 620, 171 N.E.2d 273 (1961) ("It is well established that certiorari lies notwithstanding provisions barring appeal by any party")......
  • MacKenzie v. School Committee of Ipswich
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 9, 1961
    ...415; Sullivan v. Committee on Rules of House of Representatives, 331 Mass. 135, 139, 117 N.E.2d 817; Town of Natick v. Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare, Mass., 171 N.E.2d 273. We construe the exception in c. 71, § 43A ('except as to matters of law'), as a recognition of the inevitable ri......
  • City Manager of Medford v. State Labor Relations Commission
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 8, 1968
    ...to amend his petition so that it will be brought in the name of the city (G.L. c. 40, § 2; see Natick v. Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 341 Mass. 618, 619, 171 N.E.2d 273; Building Inspector of Wayland v. Ellen M. Gifford Sheltering Home Corp., 344 Mass. 281, 286--287, 182 N.E.2d 503)......
  • School Committee of Hatfield v. Board of Ed.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 6, 1977
    ...v. Ellen M. Gifford Sheltering Home Corp., 344 Mass. 281, 286--287, 182 N.E.2d 503 (1962). Cf. Natick v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 341 Mass. 618, 619, 171 N.E.2d 273 (1961).2 The protection afforded property interests by both provisions is subject to the same analysis. See, e.g.,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT