Department of Public Works and Bldgs. v. Lanter
Decision Date | 22 January 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 32455,32455 |
Citation | 413 Ill. 581,110 N.E.2d 179 |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Parties | DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND BUILDINGS v. LANTER et al. |
Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, John T. Coburn and A. Zola Groves, Chicago, of counsel) for appellant.
M. J. Brown, Hillsboro, Carl H. Preihs, Pana, Kinder & Dey, Litchfield and Frank R. Sullivan, Springfield, for appellees.
The county court of Montgomery County sustained the motions of certain defendants to dismiss the petition by which the Department of Public Works and Buildings sought to acquire by eminent domain, for highway purposes, certain parcels of land, and easements of ingress, egress, crossing, light, air and view to and from other parcels of land. The Department appeals. The motions to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the county court, attacked the constitutionality of the Illinois Freeways Act of 1943, and questioned the legal sufficiency of the petition to condemn.
Considering first the question of the jurisdiction of the county court in eminent domain proceedings, that jurisdiction originates in section 18 of article VI of the constitution, S.H.A., which provides that county courts shall have jurisdiction of certain matters specifically enumerated 'and such other jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law.' The Eminent Domain Act, a general law, authorizes the filing of a petition in 'the circuit or county court of the county where the said property or any part thereof is situated, * * *.' (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1951, chap. 47, par. 2.) The Department of Public Works and Buildings is authorized by section 4 of the Freeways Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 121, par. 337) to acquire property and property rights by purchase or condemnation in the manner 'authorized by law'. By various statutes the Department is authorized to acquire property under the Eminent Domain Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 121, par. 299; chap. 127, par. 52a; chap. 105, par. 466; Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 408 Ill. 41, 95 N.E.2d 903.
Defendants' attack upon the jurisdiction of the county court first focuses attention upon that portion of section 2 of the Eminent Domain Act which authorizes a condemnor 'to apply to the circuit or county court of the county where the said property or any part thereof is situated, * * * by filing with the clerk a petition, * * *.' Looking only at that language, and ignoring the rest of the statute, they contend that while there is authority to file a petition to condemn in the county court, that court is not authorized by the statute to 'hear and determine eminent domain cases.' To dispose of this contention, it is necessary only to direct attention to the subsequent sections of the Eminent Domain Act which explicitly spell out the procedure for hearing and determining the issues presented by a petition to condemn, and to the specific reference in section 12 to appeals in all cases 'in either the circuit or county court'. Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 47, pars. 1-16, 12.
Defendants next argue that the Eminent Domain Act, to the extent that it vests jurisdiction in county courts to hear eminent domain proceedings, violates section 13 of article IV of the constitution because its title, 'An Act to provide for the exercise of the right of eminent domain' does not expressly mention a grant of jurisdiction to the county court to hear such cases. It is settled, however, that the title of a statute need not be an index, People ex rel. Greening v. Green, 382 Ill. 577, 47 N.E.2d 465; People ex rel. Hall v. Pearson, 314 Ill. 392, 145 N.E. 644, and that if the title is general, any number of provisions may be contained in the act, no matter how diverse, so long as they are not inconsistent with the general subject of the act and are in furtherance of that subject. Baim v. Fleck, 406 Ill. 193, 92 N.E.2d 770; People ex rel. Soble v. Gill, 358 Ill. 261, 193 N.E. 192; People ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 290 Ill. 327, 125 N.E. 310. Certainly, it cannot be said that a specification of the courts which have jurisdiction of proceedings for the condemnation of property is foreign or unrelated to an act which governs the exercise of the power of eminent domain. We conclude therefore that jurisdiction to entertain this proceeding was properly vested in the county court.
Defendants next attack the constitutionality of the Freeways Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 121, pars. 334-343.) That statute defines a freeway as 'a public highway or street especially designed for through traffic and to, from or over which owners of or persons having interest in abutting property or other persons have no right or easement, or only limited right or easement, of access, crossing, light, air or view by reason of the fact that said property abuts upon such highway or street, or for any other reason.' (Section 1.) It authorizes the Department to designate and establish any existing or proposed highway under its jurisdiction as a freeway 'when the safety and convenience of highway traffic will be promoted and the public interest subserved thereby'. (Section 2.) When an existing highway is established as a freeway (Section 3.) The Department is given similar authority when a proposed highway is established as a freeway. (Section 4.) In addition, the Department is authorized to lay out and construct local service drives providing for access to freeways, to agree with other authorities as to the elimination of highway crossings, and to give or withhold consent to new roads opening into, connecting with, or crossing over freeways. (Sections 6, 7, 8.)
The principal attack upon the constitutionality of the Freeways Act is based upon the contention that its provisions concerning the establishment of freeways and the acquisition and regulation of rights of access are incomplete, vague, and indefinite, and constitute an unlawful delegation of arbitrary powers to the Department.
Similar questions have been considered by this court in connection with earlier highway legislation. Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327, 123 N.E. 566, involved the 1917 Hard Road Bond Issue Act. That act provided for a State-wide system of hard roads. It specified only the points of termini, in some cases separated by hundreds of miles, and committed all other matters to the Department. The court rejected the contention of invalidity because of improper delegation of legislative power, saying: 288 Ill. at page 340-341, 123 N.E. at page 572.
People ex rel. Curren v. Schommer, 392 Ill. 17, 63 N.E.2d 744, 167 A.L.R. 1347, involved the validity of the Illinois Superhighway Act which contemplates a system of toll roads, known as superhighways, and provides that the system be planned, built, operated, and maintained by a commission of five members. The commission is empowered to acquire and convey personal and real property, including rights of way, franchises and easements, and to issue and sell bonds for the purpose of financing the planning and construction of the superhighway system. In a quo warranto proceeding brought against the members of the commission, it was contended that the Superhighway Act gives untrammeled discretion to the commission in the building and laying out of the superhighways. In rejecting that contention, we stated 392 Ill. at page 24, 63 N.E.2d at page 748:
The delegation of authority here involved is no broader than...
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