Department of Revenue v. Mason M.

• Decision Date: 07 April 2003
• Citation: 439 Mass. 665,790 NE 2d 671
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. MASON M.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

439 Mass. 665

790 NE 2d 671

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. MASON M.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

April 7, 2003.

July 1, 2003.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

Mark I. Zarrow for the defendant.

John E. Bowman, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the plaintiff.

Pauline Quirion & Peter G. Coulombe, for Greater Boston Legal Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

SPINA, J.

On January 6, 2000, the Department of Revenue child support enforcement division (department), filed, on behalf of Maryanne R. (mother) and the Department of Transitional Assistance, a complaint against Mason M. (father) to establish the paternity of Erin, a nonmarital child.² The father subsequently stipulated to paternity and was ordered by a judge of the Probate and Family Court to pay child support in the amount of $272.60 a week (child support judgment). The department filed a timely appeal, challenging the judge's application of the Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines (guidelines). The appeal was stayed by a single justice of the Appeals Court based on the department's representation that it intended to file a complaint for modification alleging a substantial change in the household income of the father. On February 2, 2001, the department filed its complaint for modification of the child support judgment. The father filed a motion for summary judgment, which was allowed, and the complaint for modification was dismissed without prejudice. The department filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal, and the appeal was consolidated with the department's appeal from the child support judgment. The case was transferred, sua sponte, from the Appeals Court. We now vacate the child support judgment, reverse the judgment of dismissal of the complaint for modification, and remand the case to the Probate and Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.³

1. Background. Erin was born on June 15, 1999, and lives with her mother, who is not married. A financial statement submitted by the mother in conjunction with the paternity complaint showed that she was unemployed, that her sole source of income was $112 a week ($5,824 annually) in public assistance for the benefit of Erin, that her total weekly expenses were $144, and that her only asset was $460 in a retirement plan with her prior employer.⁴

Erin's father is a physician and is married. The financial statement that he submitted in conjunction with the paternity complaint showed that his gross income from employment was $2,007.85 a week ($104,408.20 annually),⁵ that his total weekly expenses were $1,777.75, and that the aggregate value of his assets was $376,726. The father's wife (wife) is also a physician, and they have two children, one of whom is older than Erin and the other of whom is younger. Around the time that the paternity complaint was filed, the wife stopped working because of the impending birth of the second marital child.

Following the trial on the paternity complaint, the mother was granted sole legal and physical custody of Erin, and the father did not request visitation. In his findings of fact, the judge stated that the amount of support that would result from strict application of the guidelines was $389.42 a week.⁶ However, the judge opined that this amount of child support would be unjust or inappropriate because the father was also responsible for the support of his wife and two marital children, and for the maintenance of the marital household. The judge stated that an order of child support commensurate with the guidelines would at least double the mother's weekly income, but would render the father unable to pay his basic weekly expenses, a consequence that would have a significant negative impact on the father and his preexisting family. Based on these considerations, the judge concluded that $272.60 a week would be appropriate for the maintenance and support of Erin.⁷ The judge opined that his approach to the guidelines was in Erin's best interests because $272.60 a week exceeded the mother's needs, as set forth on her financial statement, by $128.50 a week.

In considering the department's subsequent complaint for modification, the judge concluded that there had not been a substantial change in circumstances since entry of the child support judgment to warrant modification. The judge found, based on the pleadings and a new financial statement that the father submitted, that the father's income had only increased by $30.62 per week. The judge stated that the real basis for the department's modification complaint was the fact that the wife had returned to work as a physician following maternity leave. While the father derived some economic benefit from his wife's resumption of employment, the judge opined that such circumstance did not necessarily mean that substantial money or assets had become available for the support of Erin.⁸ The judge also concluded that modification would not further Erin's best interests. He opined that, based on a new financial statement that the mother submitted, Erin's needs had remained relatively unchanged and were clearly being met.

2. Child support order. The department first points out that Erin's support order for $272.60 a week was 30 per cent less than the "minimum presumptive level of support" of $389.42 a week, based on the application of the guidelines. The department argues that because the father's annual gross income was considerably above $75,000, his income in excess of that amount was more than enough to provide for the support of his two marital children. Consequently, the department contends that the reduction in Erin's support order to $272.60 resulted from the judge's misapplication of the guidelines and was not consistent with Erin's best interests. We agree.

Two important public policies are furthered by the Massachusetts child support scheme: (1) providing for the best interests of children, and (2) ensuring that the taxpayers are secondary to the parents in meeting the financial needs of dependent children. See G. L. c. 119A, § 1; G. L. c. 209C, § 9 (c). See also L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 432 Mass. 438, 445 (2000) ("both State and Federal law are explicit in providing for the broadest possible support of minor children by their parents"); Boulter-Hedley v. Boulter, 429 Mass. 808, 813 (1999). General Laws c. 209C, inserted by St. 1986, c. 310, § 16, was enacted by the Legislature to give children born out of wedlock "the same rights and protections of the law as all other children." Section 9 (a) of this statute provides that, if a court finds a parent chargeable with the support of a child, the court shall make an order in accordance with subsection (c) requiring the parent to make payments toward the current support and maintenance of the child. Pursuant to G. L. c. 209C, § 9 (c), in determining the amount of such support, the court shall follow the guidelines, which set forth a mathematical formula for computing the child support obligations of a noncustodial parent, unless the court makes certain specified findings.⁹ See Crowe v. Fong, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 673, 677 (1998). The guidelines were promulgated with several fundamental social policies in mind, including (1) to "encourage joint parental responsibility for child support in proportion to, or as a percentage of income"; (2) to "meet the child's survival needs in the first instance, but to the extent either parent enjoys a higher standard of living to entitle the child to enjoy that higher standard"; (3) to "protect a subsistence level of income of parents at the low end of the income range whether or not they are on public assistance"; and (4) to "take into account the non-monetary contributions of both the custodial and non-custodial parents." Child Support Guidelines, preamble. "The protection of minor children, most especially those who may be stigmatized by their `illegitimate' status ... has been a hallmark of legislative action and of the jurisprudence of this court." L.W.K. v. E.R.C., supra at 447-448.

As pertains to this case, the guidelines specifically state that they are not meant to apply where the gross income of the noncustodial parent exceeds $75,000. See Child Support Guidelines II-C. This language has been interpreted to mean that it is the amount by which a noncustodial parent's income exceeds the threshold income level of $75,000 to which the guidelines need not be applied. See Richards v. Mason, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 573 n.9 (2002); Pearson v. Pearson, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 159-160 (2001). The guidelines dictate that "[i]n cases where income exceeds [$75,000], the court should consider the award of support at the [$75,000] level as a minimum presumptive level of support to be awarded. Additional amounts of child support may be awarded at the judge's discretion." Child Support Guidelines II-C. See Pearson v. Pearson, supra. In other words, a noncustodial parent who earns more than $75,000 in gross annual income is required to pay, in the first instance, a "minimum presumptive level of support" based on a $75,000 level of annual income. A judge may then make an upward adjustment to the amount of child support warranted in a particular situation to reflect the fact that the noncustodial parent's income exceeds $75,000. Id. at 160.

Here, the judge found that the father's gross weekly income was $2,007.85 ($104,408.20 annually), and he correctly calculated that the amount of Erin's child support resulting from strict application of the guidelines would be $389.42 a week, the "minimum presumptive level of support" based on the designated $75,000 level of annual income. However, the judge then reduced Erin's weekly support to $272.60, based on a finding that the father was also responsible for the support of two marital children. The judge fashioned a "hypothetical" support order for these marital children, the amount of which was...