Department of Revenue v. Jarvenpaa

• Decision Date: 23 February 1989
• Citation: 534 N.E.2d 286,404 Mass. 177
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al. 1 v. Wayne I. JARVENPAA.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 286

534 N.E.2d 286

404 Mass. 177

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al. ¹ v. Wayne I. JARVENPAA.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Franklin.

Argued Nov. 9, 1988.

Decided Feb. 23, 1989.

Jane S. Schacter, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Rosanna Cavallaro, Asst. Atty. Gen., with her), for Dept. of Revenue.

Charlotte S. Guyer, Northampton, for child.

Jack D. Curtiss, Greenfield, for defendant.

Jon Laramore, for Mothers United for Support of Children through Legislative Enactment & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

In 1986, in a comprehensive act, the Legislature made substantial changes in the law concerning child support in the Commonwealth. St.1986, c. 310. That act, among other things, inserted an entirely new chapter in the General Laws concerning the rights of children born out of wedlock. G.L. c. 209C (1986 ed.), inserted by St.1986, c. 310, § 16.

In this proceeding, brought to establish the defendant's obligation to support an illegitimate child (the minor plaintiff), the defendant challenges the constitutionality of two provisions of the 1986 act. He contended in the trial court that this proceeding is barred because in 1984, on a paternity complaint under G.L. c. 273, a jury determined that he was not the father of the minor plaintiff. He argued successfully that the provision in G.L. C. 209C, § 22(d), stating that such an earlier adjudication is not a bar to a G.L. c. 209C proceeding, cannot lawfully be applied to him. Second, if this proceeding may properly go forward, the defendant, who has filed a claim of a jury trial, argues that, under the Constitution of the Commonwealth he is entitled to a trial by jury and that the provision in G.L. c. 209C, § 12, stating that trials in actions under G.L. c. 209C "shall be by the court without a jury," is unconstitutional.

A judge of the District Court Department allowed the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. Although he filed no explanation of his action, it is reasonably clear that the judge concluded that this proceeding was foreclosed by the earlier paternity determination in the defendant's favor. We transferred the plaintiffs' appeals to this court from the Appeals Court. After deciding that (1) the plaintiffs' appeals were properly entered in the Appeals Court, we conclude that (2) the minor plaintiff is not barred from maintaining this action, but that the Department of Revenue (department) is barred and that (3) the defendant has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a jury trial in this proceeding.

The summary judgment motion was heard on a "stipulation of fact" presented on "the issue of the effect of a previous verdict of not guilty on a criminal complaint for paternity" under G.L. c. 273, § 12 (as appearing in St.1981, c. 325, and repealed by St.1986, c. 310, § 25). The minor plaintiff was born February 10, 1982. His mother and the defendant have never been married to one another. She claims that the defendant is the father of the child.

On December 30, 1983, the defendant was arraigned on a criminal complaint charging him with paternity of the minor plaintiff. The complaint was issued at the request of a representative of the Department of Public Welfare, subrogee to the mother's rights. Blood samples were taken for human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tests and for blood grouping tests. The test results showed that the defendant was not excluded as the father and that there was "a 99.47% probability that Wayne I. Jarvenpaa is the father of [the minor plaintiff]." After a pretrial hearing on the Commonwealth's motion seeking a determination that the test results would be admitted at the defendant's trial, a District Court judge ruled that because of G.L. c. 273, § 12A, the evidence was not admissible. ² The motion judge denied the Commonwealth's motion for a report of the question of the admissibility of inculpatory HLA test results, and the Commonwealth did not attempt to appeal from the ruling excluding the evidence.

On May 15, 1984, the defendant was tried on the criminal complaint before a six-person jury. He, the mother, and other witnesses testified. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty and specifically found that the defendant was not the father of the minor plaintiff.

On October 9, 1986, a representative of the Department of Public Welfare, on behalf of the mother, filed the civil complaint that commenced this proceeding. The complaint seeks a determination that the defendant is the minor's father, an order for suitable future support and health insurance for the child, and restitution of confinement expenses and of expenses since the child's birth. On November 4, 1987, the District Court judge allowed the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the action.

1. We discuss first the question whether the plaintiffs' appeal is properly here. No party claims that it is not. The department's brief notes the problem, and, because it is a jurisdictional question, we should deal with it first.

If the appeal was properly entered in the Appeals Court, we may properly consider it after transferring it here on our own motion. The question is whether the correct avenue for the department's appeal, later joined in by the minor plaintiff, was to the Appeals Court. ³ The problem arises from the fact that G.L. c. 209C provides no express direction concerning the avenue of appeal that may be pursued following entry of judgment. Chapter 209C cases may be entered in the Probate and Family Court, and any judgment entered in that court is appealable to the Appeals Court under G.L. c. 211A, § 10 (1986 ed.). This case, however, was decided in a District Court, and, as to rulings of law, it might be suggested that the normal course of appeal in a civil matter tried before a judge without a jury is to the Appellate Division. G.L. c. 231, § 108 (1986 ed.). ⁴

The Appellate Division has considered the question of where a G.L. c. 209C appeal lies and has concluded that it lacks jurisdiction of such an appeal because G.L. c. 209C actions are equitable in nature. See Brown v. McCow, Mass.App.Div.N.Dist. No. 8942, slip op. at 3 & n. 2 (1988); Aiello v. Spinale, Mass.App.Div.N.Dist. No. 8958 (1988). In deciding as it did, the Appellate Division relied on our opinion in Walker v. Board of Appeals of Harwich, 388 Mass. 42, 445 N.E.2d 141 (1983), which held that appeals in zoning cases tried in the District Courts should be presented to the Appeals Court and not to the Appellate Division. Although the statute in the Walker case ("the parties shall have all rights of appeal and exception as in other equity cases," G.L. c. 40A, § 17 [1986 ed.] ), is somewhat clearer on the matter of legislative intent concerning appeals than is G.L. c. 209C, the principle that appeals in cases involving equitable considerations should go to the Appeals Court, in the absence of some other statutory direction, fairly applies here. Id. at 49-50, 445 N.E.2d 141. The remedies available in G.L. c. 209C proceedings are equitable in nature. See G.L. c. 209C, §§ 1, 9, 15, 19, and 20.

Practical considerations also support our conclusion that all appeals in G.L. c. 209C cases should go to the same court. Uniformity of treatment of litigants and the development of a consistent body of law will be encouraged by placing all G.L. c. 209C appeals in one court. In the absence of any express legislative direction, we conclude that the principles expressed in our Walker opinion and the practical desirability of having all G.L. c. 209C appeals heard in one court call for a determination that G.L. c. 209C appeals go to the Appeals Court.

2. We come then to consider the question whether the present action is barred because the jury in the earlier paternity proceeding under a statute since repealed (G.L. c. 273, § 12), found the defendant not guilty on a complaint charging him with being the father of the minor plaintiff.

The Legislature intended that an action such as this could be maintained in spite of a verdict in an earlier proceeding under G.L. c. 273, § 12, in favor of an alleged father. "No proceeding hereunder shall be barred by a prior finding or adjudication under any repealed sections of [G.L. c. 273] or by the fact that a child was born prior to the effective date of this chapter." G.L. c. 209C, § 22(d ). The defendant argues that the language in § 22(d ) concerning prior adjudications was designed only to preserve prior determinations that a man was the father of a child and has no bearing on a prior not guilty determination. The argument lacks a logical basis and is contrary to the apparent meaning of the words used in § 22(d ).

We conclude that the Legislature intended to permit readjudication of the question of paternity under G.L. c. 209C where, under G.L. c. 273, § 12, proof of the alleged paternity of the defendant had not succeeded. Section 22(d ) makes irrelevant all questions concerning the application to this kind of case of common law principles of claim and issue preclusion based on findings and rulings in earlier litigation. Claim and issue preclusion are not founded on constitutional principles, but are matters of public policy. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948); Hooper v. United States, 326 F.2d 982, 985, 164 Ct.Cl. 151, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 977, 84 S.Ct. 1882, 12 L.Ed.2d 746 (1964); 18 C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller & E.H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4403, at 11 (1981 & Supp.1988). The Legislature has mandated that there shall be no claim or issue preclusion arising from any adjudication under G.L. c. 273, § 12. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 20(1)(c) (1982); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 363-364 (7th Cir.1987). The remaining question, then, is whether there is any constitutional prohibition...