Department of Transp. v. Charlotte Area Manufactured Housing, Inc.
Decision Date | 07 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. COA02-1305.,COA02-1305. |
Citation | 160 NC App. 461,586 S.E.2d 780 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff, v. CHARLOTTE AREA MANUFACTURED HOUSING, INC., Defendant. |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney Generals James M. Stanley, Jr. and Douglas W. Corkhill, for the State.
Peter E. McArdle and Raymond A. Warren, Charlotte, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant appeals from an order partially denying its motion to tax costs against the Department of Transportation (DOT) following a highway condemnation case. We affirm.
On 2 November 1998, DOT brought these two condemnation actions for the acquisition of a new highway right of way over two parcels of the defendant's land and posted bonds pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 136-103 (2001). On 3 November 1999, the defendant answered and asserted that the bonds posted by DOT were not fair compensation. The cases were consolidated for trial, and on 5 November 2001, a jury awarded substantially higher values for both parcels than DOT had deposited with the clerk of court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 136-103. On 14 December 2001, the trial court entered judgment and ordered DOT to pay the costs of the action. The defendant sought to have its expenses associated with mediation, expert witness fees, expert appraisal fees, maps, and trial exhibits included in the costs taxed against DOT. The trial court granted defendant's motion with respect to mediation expenses and reasonable and necessary expert witness fees; the trial court denied defendant's motion with respect to appraisal fees, maps, and trial exhibits. The trial court made the following findings of fact:
The trial court made the following conclusions of law:
Defendant appeals from the trial court's conclusions that it lacked the authority to tax DOT with the defendant's expenses associated with appraisal fees, maps, and trial exhibits. Defendant makes two arguments on appeal, namely, that the trial court had discretion under N.C.G.S. § 6-20 (2001) to tax as costs: (1) appraisal fees incurred by the defendant, and (2) sums expended by the defendant for maps and trial exhibits.
The defendant properly concedes that N.C.G.S. § 136-119 (2001) does not authorize the taxing of the appraisal costs incurred in the present matter. Accordingly, our analysis is confined to whether the trial court had discretion under N.C.G.S. § 6-20 to tax the sums in question.
"`[W]here an appeal presents [a] question[ ] of statutory interpretation, full review is appropriate, and [we review] a trial court's conclusions of law ... de novo.'" Coffman v. Roberson, 153 N.C.App. 618, 571 S.E.2d 255 (2002)
(quoting Edwards v. Wall, 142 N.C.App. 111, 115, 542 S.E.2d 258, 262 (2001)), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 668, 577 S.E.2d 111 (2003). Where a trial court erroneously concludes that it lacks discretion to award costs, the matter should be remanded to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion. Dixon, Odom & Co. v. Sledge, 59 N.C.App. 280, 286, 296 S.E.2d 512, 516 (1982).
Several statutes guide our resolution of the issues presented in this case. Article 28 of the General Statutes is titled "Uniform Costs and Fees in the Trial Divisions." In Article 28, N.C.G.S. § 7A-305 (d) and (e) (2001) provide:
N.C.G.S. § 7A-320 (2001) provides that "[t]he costs set forth in this Article [28] are complete and exclusive, and in lieu of any other costs and fees."
Chapter 6 is titled "Liability for Court Costs." N.C.G.S. § 6-1 (2001) refers to the definition of costs provided in N.C.G.S. § 7A-305(d): "To the party for whom judgment is given, costs shall be allowed as provided in Chapter 7A and this Chapter." N.C.G.S. § 6-20 states that "[i]n other actions [not set forth in 6-18 and 19], costs may be allowed or not, in the discretion of the court, unless otherwise provided by law."
In an opinion written by former Justice (later Chief Justice) Susie Sharpe, the North Carolina Supreme Court clearly indicated that a court may only tax costs pursuant to enabling legislation:
City properly concedes that respondents, to whom judgement was given, are entitled to recover their actual costs reasonably incurred and specifically authorized by statutes. Clearly, however, such reimbursement is the limit of their entitlement.
City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 691, 190 S.E.2d 179, 185 (1972) (quoting Costin v. Baxter, 29 N.C. 111, 112 (1846), Clerk's...
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