Department of Welfare of City of New York v. Siebel

• Decision Date: 08 July 1959
• Citation: 190 N.Y.S.2d 683,6 N.Y.2d 536,161 N.E.2d 1
• Parties: , 161 N.E.2d 1 DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE OF CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. Margaret J. SIEBEL, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 683

190 N.Y.S.2d 683

6 N.Y.2d 536, 161 N.E.2d 1

DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE OF CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. Margaret J. SIEBEL, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 8, 1959.

Charles H. Tenney, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Edward A. Doberman and Seymour B. Quel, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Robert V. Rafter, New York City, for respondent.

CONWAY, Chief Judge.

This case presents the question whether a stepmother may be compelled to contribute to the expense incurred by the City of New York because of the maintenance of her stepson, who is a public charge having been committed to a school for delinquents, it appearing (a) that the stepmother had knowledge of the child's existence at the time of her marriage to the child's father and (b) that the father had been ordered to contribute to the child's support but the amount so ordered to be paid was insufficient to reimburse the city in full.

The essential facts are undisputed. The respondent and her husband, Joseph Siebel, were married on August 7, 1953. The boy, also named Joseph Siebel, was born on March 27, 1943, so that he was 10 years and 4 months old at the time of the marriage. On or about November 1, 1957 (the boy was then 14 years and 8 months old), the boy was adjudicated delinquent by the Children's Court Division of the Domestic Relations Court, Queens County, and committed to the care and custody of Cedar Knolls School, Hawthorne, New York, at a cost of $49 a week to the City of New York.

The present proceeding was instituted by petition of the appellant Department of Welfare of the City of New York dated December 3, 1957. The prayer for relief was that 'in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 482, Laws of 1933, as amended by Chapter 671, Laws of 1940, (Section 56-a), process of this Court be issued requiring the said Margaret Jeffrey Siebel to appear before this Court to be examined as to her ability to contribute in whole or in part toward the support of said child while in the care and custody of said association, agency, society or institution (Cedar Knolls School) * * *.'

After the filing of the petition a summons was issued by an administrative officer of the court, directing the respondent to appear before the court to be examined as to her ability to support her nearly 15-year-old stepchild. On January 7, 1958 the respondent was examined by the court and an order was that day entered requiring the respondent to pay the sum of $20 per month toward the support of the stepchild, retroactive to November 1, 1957.

The father of the child was also required to pay $22.50 per week for the child's support, commencing January 1, 1958. On appeal by the respondent, the Appellate Division reversed, two Justices dissenting.

On this appeal the Department of Welfare argues that (1) the order of support was authorized by the applicable statutes which, when read together, evince a legislative intent that contribution towards the expense incurred by the City of New York in maintaining a child in an institution may be compelled simultaneously from more than one person legally chargeable for the child's support, including a stepmother, at least where the father is unable to pay the full cost, (2) even if relatives are liable for support in a particular order of succession obtaining less than full contribution from a father, said to be primarily liable, does not exhaust power to proceed against a stepmother, even if only secondarily liable, for the whole or part of the balance, and (3) there is no merit to contentions that under the statutes prior recourse must be had to grandparents before resorting to stepparents, or that 'step parent' does not include 'step mother', or that the Domestic Relations Court Act does not afford procedural due process.

The respondent, on her part, contends that (a) section 56-a should be strictly construed and that here a stepmother's liability is precluded since the parent has been held liable under a support order; (b) article 4 of title III of the Domestic Relations Court Act is unconstitutional; (c) the statute does not contemplate charging a stepmother with support of a stepchild; (d) the liability of a stepparent is quaternary (fourth in line); and (e) none of the allegations contained in the petition has been proven.

Section 56-a of the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York, pursuant to which this proceeding was instituted, reads in pertinent part:

'Duties of city department of welfare and city department of health with respect to compelling support.

'1. Upon the remand or commitment of a child to a public or private institution other than a shelter maintained and conducted by a society for the prevention of cruelty to children, the department of welfare of the City of New York shall investigate the ability of the parent of the child, or other person legally chargeable, to contribute in whole or in part to the expense incurred by the city of New York on account of the maintenance of such child.

'2. If in the opinion of the department of welfare such parent or legal custodian is able to contribute in whole or in part the commissioner of welfare shall thereupon institute a proceeding in the family court of the domestic relations court of the city of New York to compel such parent or other person legally chargeable to contribute such portion of such expense on account of the maintenance of such child as shall be proper and just and the domestic relations court of the city of New York is vested with jurisdiction in the premises.

'3. * * *.' (Emphasis added.)

Section 92 of the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York, entitled 'Powers', provides, in part that:

'In the exercise of its jurisdiction the court shall have power * * *

'(5) To order support of a stepchild by the persons legally chargeable therewith up to the age of seventeen years, subject to the limitations of subdivision five of section one hundred and one. * * *' (Emphasis added.)

It will be observed that section 56-a provides merely that the Department of Welfare may institute a proceeding to compel support from the child's parent 'or other person legally chargeable' with the child's support and that section 92 provides merely that the court has jurisdiction '(t)o order support to a stepchild by the persons legally chargeable therewith * * *.' Nowhere do either of those sections enumerate the persons who are 'legally chargeable' with the support of a stepchild. For that, one must look to section 101 of the Act. That section reads:

§ 101. Legal liability for support.

'1. A husband is hereby declared to be chargeable with the support of his wife and children and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, may be required to pay for their support a fair and reasonable sum according to his means, as may be determined by the court. * * *

'2. Where the father of a child is dead or is incapable of supporting his child or cannot be found within the state, the mother of such child is hereby declared to be chargeable with its support and if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, may be required to pay for its support a fair and reasonable sum according to her means, as may be determined by the court.

'3. Where the father of a child included in a petition for support is dead, or where the court, in its judgment, is unable to secure adequate support for such child from its parents, and the child's grandparents are of sufficient means to support it, said grandparents are hereby declared to be chargeable with the support of such grandchild and may be required to pay a fair and reasonable sum according to their means, as may be determined by the court.

'4. * * *

'5. The step parent of a child is hereby declared legally chargeable with the support of a step child likely to become a public charge provided it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that such step parent had knowledge of the child's existence at the time of said step parent's marriage.

'6. * * *'.

The foregoing statutes may be summarized as follows:

(1) The father is primarily and unconditionally liable for the support of his child;

(2) The mother is liable, but conditionally, the conditions being (a) that the father of the child is dead, or (b) is incapable of supporting his child, or (c) is out of the State;

(3) The grandparents are liable, but conditionally, the conditions being (a) that the father is dead, or (b) that the court is unable to secure adequate support for the child from its parents.

In the case of each of the above persons, the liability for support is enforcible if the person is possessed of sufficient means.

(4) A stepparent is legally chargeable with the support of a stepchild, but conditionally, the conditions being (a) that the child is likely to become a public charge and (b) that the stepparent have had a knowledge of the child's existence at the time of said stepparent's marriage.

The first of the two conditions precedent to a stepparent's liability for support exists here, viz., that the child is 'likely to become a public charge'. The child here is in a home for delinquents and is being supported by the City of New York. What is more, the respondent does not contend that the first condition does not obtain. The second condition, viz., that the stepparent have had knowledge of the child's existence at the time of said stepparent's marriage also exists here (respondent herself so testified). The two conditions being present, respondent makes the argument that the term 'step parent' means 'step father' and that even if 'step parent' is read to include a 'step mother' she is not liable for support here since a stepparent's liability is fourth in line and does not come into being at all until there is proof of the inability of the blood relatives (i. e., the mother and the grandparents of the child) to pay.

In support of her argument that 'step parent' means ...