Dept. of Children & Family v. Chapman, 2D07-4978.
| Decision Date | 15 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D07-4978.,2D07-4978. |
| Citation | 9 So.3d 676 |
| Parties | DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Mark CHAPMAN, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gregory Chapman, Deceased, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Barbara Chapman, Deceased; Kathy Ruff; William Ruff; and Melissa Lagotte, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Scot E. Samis of Abbey, Adams, Byelick, Kienan, Mueller, Marone & Samis, L.L.P., St. Petersburg, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Joseph D. Magri of Merkle & Magri, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General; Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General; and Charles B. Upton, II, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae the State of Florida.
The Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) appeals the judgments entered in favor of two families who each claim that a substance abuse counselor licensed by DCF seriously harmed their child. The Chapmans claim that their ten-year-old son committed suicide because of the professional negligence and outrageous misconduct of the counselor, Robert Taylor. The Ruffs claim that their sixteen-year-old daughter suffered mental injuries and severe symptoms of parental alienation due to Mr. Taylor's misconduct. There is no dispute among the parties that Mr. Taylor's actions were deplorable and legally actionable and that he should be liable to these families for his extraordinary misconduct.
DCF licensed Mr. Taylor to treat adults with substance abuse problems in 1995. However, DCF did not employ Mr. Taylor or refer the Chapmans or the Ruffs to him for his counseling services. The families maintain that DCF was negligent when licensing him because he submitted false academic credentials and had a prior criminal record in Florida that DCF did not find in its background check. The families maintain that DCF's negligence continued throughout the 1990s because it failed to adequately investigate complaints about Mr. Taylor, including claims that he was improperly treating minors without a license. The jury found in favor of the families and returned a large verdict against DCF. For purposes of this opinion, we assume that DCF was negligent in licensing Mr. Taylor and that its proper handling of his license would have prevented the suicide of the Chapman's son and the psychological injuries suffered by everyone in the Ruff household.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether DCF's statutory duty to license and monitor the activities of substance abuse counselors creates a duty in tort owing to a counselor's client when a counselor, whom DCF never should have licensed or whose license DCF should have suspended, harms a client who has no relationship with DCF greater than that of any other citizen. We conclude that the role of DCF in this situation involves a governmental regulatory duty to the general public and does not create a duty of care in tort to individual members of the general public. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments on appeal and remand for entry of judgment in favor of DCF. Because the case law from the Florida Supreme Court is open to legitimate debate about the status of the "general duty" doctrine, we certify a question of great public importance at the conclusion of this opinion.
Chapter 397 of the Florida Statutes is entitled and addresses "Substance Abuse Services." This body of law is generally administered by DCF. See § 397.311(8) Fla. Stat. (2008).1 The statutes mandate that DCF fulfill a long list of "duties of the department." See § 397.321. These duties include "[assuming] responsibility for licensing and regulating licensable service components delivering substance abuse services on behalf of service providers." § 397.321(6).
Any person who wishes to act as a substance abuse service provider must apply to the State, through DCF as the administrating agency, and receive a license. See §§ 397.401, .403. Licenses are often issued on a probationary basis and then transformed into regular licenses. § 397.409. Obviously, employees of DCF evaluate the applicants and monitor the licensees, especially during the probationary period. Service providers are subject to background checks, the nature of which has varied considerably since 1994. See § 397.451.
Nothing in chapter 397 creates any express cause of action for the benefit of individual members of the public. "Clients" have statutory rights, especially in connection with their relationship with a "service provider," but these rights appear to create no express legal rights as to DCF that would control the outcome of this case. See § 397.501. Indeed, the statutory provision on clients' rights ends with a limitation of liability and immunity subsection that provides some protection to service providers against civil claims brought by clients. See § 397.501(10). That subsection does not appear to address the issue in this case.
The above-described statutes first became pertinent to this case in 1994 when DCF discovered that Robert Taylor was acting as a substance abuse counselor without a license. Tony Edwards, an employee of DCF who was in charge of licensing counselors in District Six, contacted Mr. Taylor. In December 1994, after some delay, Mr. Taylor came into the DCF offices with his application. Because Mr. Taylor said that he did not intend to treat minors, Mr. Edwards did not perform the more extensive background check required prior to the issuance of such a license. Mr. Taylor sought a "master-level" license, which required completion of a master's degree from a recognized university. On his application, Mr. Taylor listed a degree from National-Louis University. That school is a recognized university, but Mr. Taylor did not actually graduate from National-Louis University. Mr. Edwards testified that he tried without success to determine whether Mr. Taylor obtained that degree, but he obviously issued a probationary license without confirming this fact or discovering that the application was fraudulent.
In fact, Mr. Taylor not only did not have a master's degree, he was a convicted felon in Florida. His record included a criminal episode where he defrauded a family by posing as an adoption specialist promising to obtain a baby for the family in exchange for payment. DCF apparently did not become aware of this criminal record until years later.
Despite his promise not to treat minors, Mr. Taylor treated scores of minors. He counseled young girls to go into exotic dancing, stole money from clients, and allegedly caused a client, who was a physician's daughter, to overdose and almost die.
After Mr. Taylor received his license, DCF received several complaints against him, including complaints from licensed doctors, primarily about financial issues. In the fall of 1997, DCF received written reports from a physician that Mr. Taylor was treating juvenile clients. At least in hindsight, it is hard to comprehend how DCF allowed Mr. Taylor to keep his license for this period of time.
The Ruffs took their daughter to Mr. Taylor in December 1997. At the time, she had a very poor relationship with her parents, and Mr. Taylor was one of three counselors that the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office suggested to the Ruff family. She treated with him until June 1998. Without unnecessarily revealing private details, this court can fairly say that Mr. Taylor tried to bilk money from the Ruff family, told various lies to different family members in order to create animosity among them, and tried to use the animosity to his advantage. The experience caused great harm to all members of the family.
The Chapmans took their ten-year-old son to see Mr. Taylor in 1998. He had an attention deficit disorder, had been acting out, and had symptoms that worsened over time. The Chapmans ran a scuba diving business. One of their customers was a deputy sheriff who checked with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office and received Mr. Taylor's name from them to give to the Chapmans. Again, without unnecessarily discussing private details, the treatment ended on May 10, 1998, when this young boy committed suicide. A psychiatrist testified, without opposition, that the faulty treatment by this con artist was the cause of the child's suicide.
Mr. Taylor was prosecuted for his unlicensed activities and is now serving a long prison sentence.2 The two families brought a single, consolidated civil action against DCF and the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the sheriff's office in 2003. The trial court denied DCF's motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial in August 2007. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs totaling nearly $6 million. However, the trial court reduced the judgment to $400,000 in light of the statutory limitations on damages against a state agency. See § 768.28(5), Fla. Stat. (1997).3 DCF then filed this appeal.
Article X, section 13, of the Florida Constitution provides that "[p]rovision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating." This provision implicitly recognizes that sovereign immunity was the prevailing common law in Florida at the time the constitution was written. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748-49, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (); Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. S.A.P., 835 So.2d 1091, 1094 (Fla.2002). The constitution contemplated that the...
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