FLORIDA DHRS v. SAP
Decision Date | 27 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. SC00-105.,SC00-105. |
Citation | 835 So.2d 1091 |
Parties | FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Petitioner, v. S.A.P., Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, and Charlie McCoy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
Jay C. Howell of Anderson & Howell, Jacksonville, FL, for Respondent.
Thomas E. Warner, Solicitor General, and T. Kent Wetherell, II, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, FL, for the State of Florida, Amicus Curiae.
We have for review S.A.P. v. State Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 704 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), wherein the district court certified the following question in an unpublished order:
Can the doctrine of fraudulent concealment apply to toll the statute of limitations in a negligence action?
We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer as explained herein.
The facts concerning S.A.P.'s 1995 negligence claim against Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS" or the "department") are set forth in the district court decision under review, which provides in relevant part:
The court held that the four-year limitation in section 768.28(12), Florida Statutes (1993),1 was "tolled" by HRS's conduct and ordered S.A.P.'s complaint reinstated:
S.A.P. argues, and we agree, that because her complaint sufficiently alleged factual bases for tolling the statute [of limitations], it cannot be said that the defense of the statute of limitations affirmatively appears on the face of the complaint. Accordingly, it was error to dismiss her complaint with prejudice and we reverse.
S.A.P., 704 So.2d at 584. The district court certified the above question.
S.A.P. contends that, in light of HRS's allegedly fraudulent acts and its "active concealment" of those acts, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should bar the department from asserting a statute of limitations defense. We agree.
Because this case is before us on the trial court's dismissal of S.A.P.'s second amended complaint, we must take all the factual allegations in her complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences from those facts in her favor.2 Our standard of review is de novo.3 Several significant dates appear on the face of her complaint: S.A.P.'s abuse was first officially observed in 1979; HRS's internal investigation report documenting the abuse was released on December 21, 1992; S.A.P. reached the age of majority on August 8, 1994; and the present action was filed in January 1995.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which provides that a sovereign cannot be sued without its own permission, has been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence for centuries and is based on the principle that "the King can do no wrong."4 The doctrine was a part of the English common law when the State of Florida was founded and has been adopted and codified by the Florida Legislature.5
Article X, section 13, Florida Constitution, however, provides that the Legislature can abrogate the State's sovereign immunity:
SECTION 13. Suits against the state.—Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating.
Art. X, § 13, Fla. Const. Pursuant to this provision, the Legislature enacted section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1973), which at the time the present action was filed in 1995 provided as follows:
§ 768.28, Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added).
One of the key limitations specified in the act is spelled out in section 768.28(13) in the form of a four-year restriction placed on the filing of all tort claims under section 768.28:
(13) Every claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions for damages for a negligent or wrongful act or omission pursuant to this section shall be forever barred unless the civil action is commenced by filing a complaint in the court of appropriate jurisdiction within 4 years after such claim accrues; except that an action for contribution must be commenced within the limitations provided in s. 768.31(4), and an action for damages arising from medical malpractice must be commenced within the limitations for such an action in s. 95.11(4).
§ 768.28(13), Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added). The Court has held that this restriction constitutes a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose.6
This Court in Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071 (Fla.2001), addressed the question of whether the tolling proscription in section 95.051 applies to equitable estoppel.7 There, Major League Baseball alleged that Morsani's tort claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that Morsani could not assert the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the doctrine was excluded by section 95.051. This Court disagreed, concluded that the doctrines of tolling and equitable estoppel "are as different as apples and oranges," and held that the tolling proscription in section 95.051 is inapplicable to equitable estoppel. In reaching this decision, the Court examined the principles underlying the statutes of limitation and equitable estoppel.
Statutes of limitation, which impose a strict time limit on the filing of legal actions, were nonexistent at common law and instead are a creature of modern statutory law:
Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1074-75 (Fla.2001) (footnotes omitted). Time limitations on legal actions in Florida ordinarily are governed by the statutes of limitation set forth in chapter 95,8 but as noted above, time limitations on chapter 768 actions are controlled by section 768.28(13).
The preclusive effect of the statutes of limitation can be deflected by various legal theories, including the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Court described the contours of this doctrine:
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