Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Foi Com'n

• Citation: 930 A.2d 739,103 Conn.App. 571
• Decision Date: 04 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 27850.,27850.
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

930 A.2d 739

103 Conn.App. 571

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 27850.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 25, 2007.

Decided September 4, 2007.

Lynn D. Wittenbrink, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Mary E. Schwind, director of adjudication, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen M. Murphy, general counsel, for the appellee (named defendant).

McLACHLAN, GRUENDEL and BERDON, Js.

GRUENDEL, J.

The doctrine of mootness holds that before a claimed controversy is entitled to adjudication on the merits, it must be demonstrated that an actual controversy exists. In this appeal, we are asked to decide what role, if any, that doctrine plays in proceedings before the defendant freedom of information commission (commission).¹ The plaintiff, the department of public safety, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its appeal from the decision of the commission, which granted the request of a newspaper reporter to inspect certain police records. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The court's memorandum of decision reveals the following undisputed facts. "On January 5, 2004, a newspaper reporter for the New Haven Register, Michelle Tuccitto . . . requested records from the plaintiff . . . regarding an investigation into a triple homicide; however, Tuccitto was told that disclosure of the records would be prejudicial to the pending prosecution, by compromising the jury selection process and tainting witness recollection, and her request was promptly denied by a letter dated January 6, 2004.... Following the denial of her request, Tuccitto filed a formal complaint with the ... commission on January 16, 2004.... On May 11, 2004, a hearing was held before a hearing officer for the commission.... The hearing officer issued a proposed final decision dated September 7, 2004, adverse to the [plaintiff]; the decision recommended that `[t] he [plaintiff] shall forthwith provide [Tuccitto and the New Haven Register] with access to inspect the requested records, other than signed statements of witnesses.' . . . Following the issuance of the hearing officer's proposed final decision [but before the commission's hearing thereon], Tuccitto sent a letter to the commission dated October 9, 2004, stating that `the state police on [October 6, 2004] provided [her] with copies of the information [she] requested. Therefore, the commission hearing scheduled ... on [her] complaint and any further action are no longer necessary.' ...

"On October 27, 2004, at a regular meeting of the commission [at which] a representative of the [plaintiff] was present, but Tuccitto and the New Haven Register were not, the commission entertained the objection of the [plaintiff] to the entry of a final decision by the commission.... Specifically, the [plaintiff] argued that since the parties had resolved the matter, there was no contested case before the commission, and therefore the commission was without jurisdiction or simply unauthorized by the General Statutes to enter a final order.... Nevertheless, the presiding officer of the commission stated: `I find that we do have jurisdiction. There was a contested hearing, there was a finding at the contested hearing, and the purpose of the session today is to accept, reject or modify that report. No new evidence comes before us for the purposes of this hearing. It becomes part of the archives here and part of the precedential material that other persons may consider in the future, and so I'm ruling against [the plaintiff] on jurisdiction.' . . . The commission voted to accept the proposed final order of the hearing officer . . . By a letter dated November 3, 2004, the commission sent notice to the parties of the final decision."² (Citations omitted.) From that judgment, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ 1-206(d) and 4-183(a). By memorandum of decision filed June 26, 2006, the court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, and this appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court applied an improper standard to its administrative appeal. Our review of that question of law is plenary. See Hartford Courant Co. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 261 Conn. 86, 96-97, 801 A.2d 759 (2002).

In its complaint, the plaintiff averred that the commission lacked jurisdiction to render a final decision "as there was no contested case before the [c]ommission for it to rule upon ...." In its memorandum of decision, the court acknowledged that "[w]hile `contested case' status has been established as a prerequisite for Superior Court subject matter jurisdiction ... the [plaintiff] now asks that this same requirement be placed on proceedings before the commission." (Citation omitted.) In resolving that issue, the court applied the deferential standard of review generally governing administrative appeals.³ We agree with the plaintiff that application of that standard was improper.

The plaintiff's appeal involved a question of first impression, namely, whether the commission is statutorily authorized to issue a final decision on a matter when, following a hearing thereon, it is informed by the plaintiff that the matter no longer is contested. In essence, the plaintiff claimed that the matter was moot, thereby depriving the commission of jurisdiction. The commission concedes that legal question has not been subject to judicial scrutiny previously. Therefore, its determination is not entitled to any deference. See Raymond v. Freedom of Information Commission, 75 Conn.App. 142, 149, 815 A.2d 226 (2003). "[I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 274 Conn. 119, 127, 874 A.2d 776 (2005); see also National Labor Relations Board v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965). "[A] determination regarding [an agency's] subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 98 Conn. App. 646, 650, 911 A.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, 916 A.2d 51(2007). Accordingly, the plaintiff's administrative appeal properly is reviewed under the plenary standard.

II

The plaintiff claims that the commission lacked jurisdiction to issue a final decision once Tuccitto notified the commission that the plaintiff had provided her with copies of the requested records and she requested that no further action be taken thereon. "Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.... A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy.... This concept, however, is not limited to courts. Administrative agencies ... are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and their jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the validity of the statutes vesting them with power. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Figueroa v. C & S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996). As our Supreme Court has explained, "certain jurisdictional facts are essential to establish the statutory jurisdiction of tribunals of limited authority. The existence of these facts is fundamental to the power to entertain and adjudicate a proceeding on the merits. In short, such facts condition the power to act." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stern v. Medical Examining Board, 208 Conn. 492, 502, 545 A.2d 1080 (1988). Resolution of the plaintiff's claim, therefore, requires an examination of the relevant statutory provisions governing the commission.

The commission is entirely a creature of statute. See General Statutes § 1-205. It operates within the confines of the Freedom of Information Act (act); General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.; and the complementary rules of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. General Statutes § 1-206(b)(1) provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person denied the right to inspect or copy records ... of a public agency ... may appeal therefrom to the [commission], by filing a notice of appeal with said commission.... Said commission shall, after due notice to the parties, hear and decide the appeal within one year after the filing of the notice of appeal...." Likewise, General Statutes § 4-180(a) provides that "[e]ach agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter pending before it and, in all contested cases, shall render a final decision within ninety days following the close of evidence or the due date for the filing of briefs whichever is later, in such proceedings." (Emphasis added.)

The General Assembly has defined a "contested case" as "a proceeding ... in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by state statute or regulation to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held ...."⁴ General Statutes § 4-166(2). Our Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the "test for determining contested case status has been well established and requires an inquiry into three criteria, to wit: (1) whether a legal right, duty or privilege is at issue, (2) and is statutorily required to be determined by the agency, (3) through an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held." Herman v. Division of Special Revenue, 193 Conn. 379, 382, 477 A.2d 119 (1984); see also Fairfield v. Connecticut Siting Council, 238 Conn. 361, 369, 679 A.2d 354 (1996); Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 226 Conn. 792, 800-801, 629 A.2d 367 (1993).

A

The first question to be resolved is whether the commission was statutorily...