Deronde v. Regents of University of California

• Decision Date: 11 February 1981
• Docket Number: S.F. 24145
• Citation: 625 P.2d 220,28 Cal.3d 875,172 Cal.Rptr. 677
• Parties: , 625 P.2d 220 Glen DeRONDE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 677

172 Cal.Rptr. 677

28 Cal.3d 875, 625 P.2d 220

Glen DeRONDE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

S.F. 24145.

Supreme Court of California.

Feb. 11, 1981.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 11, 1981.

Glen DeRonde, in pro. per.

John A. DeRonde, Jr., for plaintiff and appellant.

Donald L. Reidhaar, John F. Lundberg, Gary Morrison, Lawrence B. Garcia, Harry C. White, Jr., and Patrick K. Moore, Berkeley, for defendants and appellants.

Cecily B. Nyomarkay, San Pedro, Ralph W. Hilton, David B. Seals, Jerold A. Prod, Lawrence B. Bolton, Richard H. Koppes, Patsy K. Crawford, Sacramento, Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, Margaret C. Crosby, Berkeley, Alan L. Schlosser, San Francisco, Amitai Schwartz, Berkeley, Jerry Budin, Los Angeles, John Martinez, Gary Ransom, Sacramento, Jeanne E. Raya, San Gabriel, Iris Brest, John J. Schwartz, Stanford, Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Napoleon B. Williams, Jr., New York City, John H. Erickson, Alice M. Beasley, Henry S. Hewitt, Erickson, Beasley & Hewitt, San Francisco, Mark N. Aaronson, Ronald T. Vera, Susan E. Brown, Peter D. Roos, Marsha L. Morrow, Long & Levit, San Francisco, Michael Wong, Penny N. Nakatsu, San Francisco, Stanley Mark, Bill Lann Lee, New York City, David G. Robertson, Linda L. McCall, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, Edward H. Steinman, Santa Clara, and Wayne McCormack, Washington, D. C., as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and appellants.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

Were the admissions procedures permitting consideration of "ethnic minority status" as a factor in the 1975 selection of the first year class at King Hall, the University of California at Davis School of Law, violative of the equal protection guarantees afforded nonminorities under the federal or state Constitutions? We conclude that they were not.

Plaintiff Glen DeRonde, a white male, was one of 2,238 applicants seeking enrollment in King Hall in 1975. On the basis of criteria hereinafter described, 406 applicants were extended offers of admission. In July 1975, DeRonde, an unsuccessful applicant, sought mandamus in the Yolo County Superior Court against the Regents of the University of California and the Dean of King Hall (collectively described herein as the University), to compel his admission to King Hall and to recover damages for his exclusion. He attacked the University's selection procedures alleging that they were unconstitutional because of the preferences extended to minority applicants.

In February 1976 the trial court filed its notice of an intended decision holding that because DeRonde would have been unsuccessful even had the challenged procedures not been used, DeRonde was not entitled to the relief requested. Nonetheless, the court examined the merits of DeRonde's constitutional challenge, and concluded that because the University's admissions procedures were facially discriminatory they violated the equal protection clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions. The court therefore enjoined the University from utilizing any admission criteria based on an applicant's race, color or ethnic origin.

Following the announcement of the intended decision, several interested persons and organizations filed motions to intervene. These motions were denied and a judgment was entered in December 1976. (Although the denial of intervention was affirmed in a separate appeal, various unsuccessful interveners have appeared herein as amici curiae.) The University filed a notice of appeal, and DeRonde has cross-appealed.

In the interim DeRonde has graduated from another law school and has been admitted to the State Bar. Although he no longer seeks entry to King Hall, we have chosen not to dismiss the case as moot. The trial court judgment, enjoining the University, as it does, from its continued use of certain of its admissions criteria, has cast a substantial cloud of uncertainty over the University's multiple and widely used procedures. The parties and amici before us have thoroughly briefed the constitutional issues and have urged us to resolve them. We have the benefit of additional instructive and controlling federal authority. There is ample precedent for appellate resolution of important issues of substantial and continuing public interest which otherwise may have been rendered moot and of no further immediate concern to the initiating parties. (E. g., Johnson v. Hamilton (1976) 15 Cal.3d 461, 465, 125 Cal.Rptr. 129, 541 P.2d 881, and cases therein cited.) We conclude that this is such a case and that the validity of "race conscious" or "race attentive" admissions programs is an important question of continuing statewide interest. Accordingly, we will resolve the issue.

After first examining the law school's admissions procedures we apply both the constitutional principles and analyses contained in appropriate federal and state authorities.

I. THE UNIVERSITY'S 1975 ADMISSIONS PROCEDURES

The record discloses that in selecting candidates for admission to King Hall in 1975 the University relied principally on a formula which combined an applicant's previous academic grade point average (GPA) with his or her score on the standardized law school admissions test (LSAT). This formula yielded a predicted first year average (PFYA) which, it was hoped, measured, at least roughly, the applicant's potential for law study.

Believing, however, that the foregoing formula tended to ignore other significant and relevant selection factors, the University considered several additional background elements to supplement or mitigate a lower PFYA. These factors included (1) growth, maturity and commitment to law study (as shown by prior employment, extracurricular and community activities, advanced degrees or studies, and personal statements and recommendations), (2) factors which, while no longer present, had affected previous academic grades (such as temporary physical handicaps or disruptive changes in school or environment), (3) wide discrepancies between grades and test scores where there was indicated evidence of substantial ability and motivation, (4) rigor of undergraduate studies, (5) economic disadvantage, and (6) "ethnic minority status" contributing to diversity.

It is the consideration by the University of the final factor, "ethnic minority status," which is the principal target of DeRonde's attack. Trial testimony established that "ethnic minority status" was defined by the University as including Asians, blacks, Chicanos, native Americans and Filipinos. This grouping generally corresponds to the ethnic categories defined by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in its public reports. The record reflects that the University's reasons for considering minority status were primarily twofold: First, an appreciable minority representation in the student body will contribute a valuable cultural diversity for both faculty and students and, second, a minority representation in the legal pool from which future professional and community leaders, public and private, are drawn will strengthen and preserve minority participation in the democratic process at all levels. In short, it was believed that the individual and group learning experience is enriched with broadly beneficial consequences both to the profession and to the public at large. We carefully emphasize that although minority status was included as one of several pertinent selection factors, the University did not employ any quota system or reserve a fixed number of positions for any minority applicants in its entering class.

Just as a relatively low PFYA might be increased by utilization of any of the foregoing factors, alternatively, a relatively high PFYA could be reduced by considering (1) the applicant's prior schools attended, (2) the difficulty of his or her prior course of study, (3) variations in an applicant's multiple LSAT scores, (4) the absence of any factors indicating maturity or motivation, and (5) the applicant's advanced age.

As a consequence of this formulation, in 1975, the 406 students to whom the University offered admission included 135 minority applicants, and more than 1,800 applicants including DeRonde were rejected. DeRonde's 3.47 GPA and 575 LSAT score produced a 2.70 PFYA. The PFYAs of successful applicants ranged from 2.24 to 3.43. Sixty-nine minority applicants were accepted with PFYAs lower than DeRonde's. On the other hand, the more than 800 unsuccessful applicants who had higher PFYAs than DeRonde included 35 minority applicants. It was on the basis of these latter statistics that the lower court found that DeRonde would have been rejected for admission even if the University had not employed an admissions procedure which gave consideration to "ethnic minority status."

We examine the constitutional issues.

II. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Our analysis of the federal constitutional questions is both aided and controlled by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in University of California Regents v. Bakke (1978) 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750. In that case, Bakke, a disappointed white male applicant for admission to the School of Medicine at the University of California at Davis, challenged on equal protection grounds an admissions policy which reserved to disadvantaged minority (Asian, American Indian, Black, and Chicano) students 16 of the 100 available seats. Although a majority of the high court invalidated this fixed quota system, multiple opinions were filed.

Four justices (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C. J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.) found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue, concluding as they did that the Davis quota system violated the general antidiscrimination provisions of title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act. (See 438 U.S. at pp. 408, 421, 98 S.Ct. at pp. 2808, 2815.) Four other justices (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,...