Johnson v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 27 October 1975
• Citation: 125 Cal.Rptr. 129,15 Cal.3d 461
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 541 P.2d 881 Wayne Clarke JOHNSON et al., Petitioners, v. Elaine HAMILTON, as City Clerk, etc., Respondent. L.A. 30401.

Page 129

125 Cal.Rptr. 129

15 Cal.3d 461, 541 P.2d 881

Wayne Clarke JOHNSON et al., Petitioners, v. Elaine HAMILTON, as City Clerk, etc., Respondent.

L.A. 30401.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Oct. 27, 1975.

Goettlieb, Gottlieb & Stein, Arthur J. Gottlieb, and Karl Manheim, Long Beach, for petitioners.

Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, as amicus curiae, for petitioners.

Leonard Putnam, City Atty., and Arthur Y. Honda, Deputy City Atty., for respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

This case invites our inquiry into an area that has been well illuminated by several recent opinions of this court. The issue presented is the constitutionality of two provisions of the Charter of the City of Long Beach which impose residence requirements upon candidates for city office. We have concluded that the provisions are invalid as violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Petitioner was a candidate for City Councilman of Long Beach at a primary nominating election held March 18, 1975, and, if successful, would have been a candidate at the general municipal election held on May 13, 1975. On December 9, 1974, the respondent City Clerk of Long Beach informed petitioner that petitioner failed to satisfy two provisions of the city charter, namely, (1) section 29, requiring a one-year residence in the city preceding the election or appointment to any board or commission of the city, and (2) section 30, requiring, as to a candidate for councilman, a six month's residence in the district from which he is nominated, prior to filing his declaration of candidacy. By January 22, 1975, the last day on which candidates could file for the office of councilman, petitioner would have been a district resident for five and one-half months, and by May 13, 1975, general municipal election day, he would have been a city resident for nine months. He thus failed to meet the requirements of either section 29 or 30.

Declarations of candidacy for the office in question were required to be filed between January 7 and January 22, 1975. In order to expedite adjudication of the controversy petitioner sought, and was denied, a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. On January 14, 1975, we issued an alternative writ of mandate directing respondent city clerk either to accept petitioner's nominating papers or to show cause why she had not done so. On January 22, 1975, respondent in her return to the alternative writ informed us that she had accepted petitioner's nominating papers and would place his name on the ballot if the papers were found to be in order.

We are informed that petitioner was defeated at the March 18 primary election, thereby raising the issue of mootness. Respondent, however, requested that we retain the case and decide the issue on the merits in view of the importance of the question presented and its effect upon future candidates and elections. We have frequently held that a case is not mooted from the fact alone that the issue in the case is of no further immediate interest to the person raising it. (Gordon v. Justice Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 323, 326, fn. 1, 115 Cal.Rptr. 632, 525 P.2d 72; Zeilenga v. Nelson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 716, 719--720, 94 Cal.Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d 578.) For example, in In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23, 89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 37, 473 P.2d 737, 741, we noted that: '(I)f a pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot.'

Furthermore, petitioner in his second cause of action purports to represent a Class of persons who are similarly barred from candidacy by reason of the subject charter provisions. Although the underlying controversy may be moot as to petitioner, others similarly situated may be affected and the issues as to them may not be moot. (See Sosna v. Iowa (1975) 419 U.S. 393, 401, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (class action attack on one-year residence requirement for obtaining divorce).)

Finally, the Courts of Appeal have reached conflicting results in regard to the validity of a one-year residence requirement for candidates (Smith v. Evans (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 154, 116 Cal.Rptr. 684 and Gage v. Allison (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 85, 99 Cal.Rptr. 95), thereby necessitating resolution of this important issue.

Finding the issue ripe for review and for the foregoing reasons, we address the issue of durational residence requirements for political office.

Petitioner's constitutional challenge is broad. He argues that candidates disqualified from the ballot for their failure to meet the durational residence requirements are deprived of equal protection of the laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, and that three important and fundamental rights are thereby necessarily impaired, namely, the rights to run for public office, to vote, and to travel. He urges that section 29 (the city) and section 30 (the district) of the charter impose conditions which 'unfairly and indiscriminately exclude qualified and capable candidates' without any justification which is either reasonable or compelling.

In consideration of constitutional attacks of the kind herein presented courts have utilized a two-level test in applying equal protection standards. Ordinarily, a legislative classification will be upheld if it bears a 'rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.' (Weber v. City Council (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950, 958--959, 109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 558, 513 P.2d 601, 606; Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784--785, 87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487, vacated on other grounds, 403 U.S. 915, 91 S.Ct. 2224, 29 L.Ed.2d 692.) In cases involving 'suspect classifications' or touching upon 'fundamental interests,' however, courts have 'adopted an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. . . . Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a Compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are Necessary to further its purpose.' (Westbrook v. Mihaly, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 784--785, 87 Cal.Rptr. at p. 852, 471 P.2d at p. 500. Weber v. City Council, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 959, 109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601; Thompson v. Mellon (1973) 9 Cal.3d 96, 99, fn. 2, 107 Cal.Rptr. 20, 507 P.2d 628.)

Several recent federal Supreme Court decisions on the point suggest that candidacy for public office may not be a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that legislative restrictions upon it need not necessarily invoke strict scrutiny. (See American Party of Texas v. White (1974) 415 U.S. 767, 780, fn. 11, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 39 L.Ed.2d 744; Storer v. Brown (1974) 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714; Lubin v. Panish (1974) 415 U.S. 709, 719, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702; Bullock v. Carter (1972) 405 U.S. 134, 142--144, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92.) Thus, in Bullock, in which the high court applied equal protection standards to a Texas filing fee system, the court observed that it '. . . has not heretofore attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review' (Id. at pp. 142--143, 92 S.Ct. at p. 855), and that even the existence of barriers to candidate access to the ballot, which limit the voter's choice of candidates, '. . . does not of itself compel close scrutiny.' (Id. at p. 143, 92 S.Ct. at p. 856.) The Bullock court reasoned, however, that the Texas filing fee system '. . . falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their economic status' (Id. at p. 144, 92 S.Ct. at p. 856), thus resulting in an appreciable Financial impact upon the exercise of the franchise and thereby invoking the strict scrutiny test. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966) 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169; Lubin v. Panish, supra, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702, involving California's filing fee system.)

Similarly, in American Party and Storer, strict scrutiny was employed to determine the validity of ballot restrictions upon independent candidates since these restrictions placed 'unequal burdens on minority groups' thereby limiting their 'First Amendment freedoms.' (American Party of Texas v. White, supra, 415 U.S. 780, fn. 11, 94 S.Ct. 1296.) In the matter before us, unlike American Party, Storer, Lubin or Bullock, the durational residence requirement has no unequal impact upon poor or minority candidates or voters but by its nature falls with equal force upon every candidate.

On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court has employed a strict scrutiny test in several recent cases invalidating residence requirements within somewhat different contexts: Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974) 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (one-year county residence requirement for the receipt of indigent medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (one-year state and 90-day county residence requirement for voters); and Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (one-year residence requirement for receiving welfare benefits). In its most recent decision, however, the majority of the high court appear to have adopted a 'reasonable justification' test despite Justice Marshall's insistence in dissent that since the 'constitutional' right to travel was affected, a 'compelling governmental interest' approach was required. (Sosna v. Iowa, supra, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (upholding a one-year state residence requirement for filing for divorce).)

Other recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court disclose considerable difference of opinion with respect to the appropriate test to be used in measuring the validity of statutes challenged on equal protection grounds. (Compare the majority...