Deroy v. Carnival Corp., No. 18-12619

• Decision Date: 30 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-12619
• Parties: Carmela DEROY, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

963 F.3d 1302

Carmela DEROY, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 18-12619

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 30, 2020

Michael Benjamin Murphey, Lawlor White & Murphey, LLP, FORT LAUDERDALE, FL, Philip D. Parrish, Philip D. Parrish, PA, MIAMI, FL, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Curtis J. Mase, Cameron Wayne Eubanks, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Scott P. Mebane, Mase Mebane & Briggs, PA, MIAMI, FL, for Defendant - Appellant.

Jeffrey R. White, American Association for Justice, WASHINGTON, DC, for Amicus Curiae.

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:

Fans of movies set in medieval times know that the narrow slits in otherwise seemingly impenetrable castle walls allowed castle defenders to launch arrows at approaching castle attackers.¹ This architectural feature was designed to protect the archer while still allowing the archer to defend the castle.² It is known as a "loophole."³

But arrows were not the only thing that could fit through castle-wall loopholes. Sometimes children and small adults could as well.⁴ And they could use them to escape the thick castle walls.⁵

It's not clear that the figurative usage of the term "loophole" derives from a reference to the architectural feature. But the parallels between the two usages are nonetheless obvious. Figuratively, "loophole" has come to mean "[a]n outlet or means of escape[;] [o]ften applied to an ambiguity or omission in a statute, etc., which affords opportunity for evading its intention." Loop-hole , Oxford English Dictionary, https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.lib.ntust.edu.tw/view/Entry/110180 (last visited June 29, 2020).

Here, Plaintiff-Appellee Carmela DeRoy attempts to take advantage of a supposed loophole in the forum-selection clause of a contract she entered into with Defendant-Appellant Carnival Corporation when she bought a ticket for a Carnival cruise. The forum-selection clause requires all litigation to proceed in federal court if federal jurisdiction lies for the claim. DeRoy, who injured her foot on a rug while onboard the Carnival Valor , simultaneously sued Carnival in both state and federal court. In her federal suit—this case—she attempted to plead her case to avoid invoking federal jurisdiction, even though federal jurisdiction could exist over a claim seeking damages for the injuries DeRoy allegedly suffered onboard the Valor . Then DeRoy sought for the district court to dismiss this federal case for lack of jurisdiction, so she could permissibly proceed with the state suit under the forum-selection clause.

It was a creative effort. But DeRoy's proposed loophole does not exist, so she cannot escape the forum-selection clause's ironclad consequences. Under the forum-selection clause's plain language, when jurisdiction for a claim could lie in federal district court, federal court is the only option for a plaintiff. Here, DeRoy's claim for negligence at sea falls well within the walls of the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction. Even without explicitly invoking admiralty jurisdiction—and in fact intentionally attempting to plead around it—DeRoy's complaint is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) ’s provision rendering her claim an admiralty or maritime claim. Her claim is therefore subject to the forum-selection clause's federal-court-forum fortress.

For these reasons, the district court erred in dismissing the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of reviewing a district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we take the facts as the plaintiff has alleged them, unless the district court has made a contrary finding. Giardiello v. Balboa Ins. Co. , 837 F.2d 1566, 1568 n.1 (11th Cir. 1988).

Here, DeRoy asserted that in October 2016, she was a cruise passenger on the Carnival Valor ship. During her cruise, DeRoy tripped on a dip in the carpeting in one of the Valor ’s inside hallways. As a result of her fall, DeRoy broke her right foot and suffered other damages.

On February 20, 2018, DeRoy simultaneously filed two complaints against Carnival Corporation: one in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and one in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida.⁶ Each complaint contains a single negligence claim against Carnival.

DeRoy's ticket contract with Carnival contained a forum-selection clause that required her to bring any claim in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida if it was jurisdictionally possible to do so:

[I]t is agreed by and between the Guest and Carnival that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract or the Guest's cruise, including travel to and from the vessel, shall be litigated, if at all, before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami, or as to those lawsuits to which the Federal Courts of the United States lack subject matter jurisdiction, before a court located in Miami-Dade County, Florida, U.S.A. to the exclusion of the Courts of any other county, state or country.

In accordance with this provision, as we have noted, DeRoy filed the suit pending here.

Yet DeRoy devoted the majority of her complaint to attempting to establish that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction—whether diversity, federal-question, or admiralty jurisdiction—to adjudicate her claims. In furtherance of this tactic, DeRoy noted that both she and Carnival were citizens of Florida, so no diversity jurisdiction existed. She next pointed out that since she brought a negligence claim only, federal-question jurisdiction was lacking. And then she asserted that she had elected to bring her in personam negligence action at law —not in admiralty. So, DeRoy concluded, admiralty jurisdiction did not exist, since admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to in personam claims brought at law .

For these reasons, DeRoy contended, the federal district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and was required to dismiss her suit. Indeed, DeRoy invited the district court to "dismiss this case sua sponte because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this lawsuit." And the primary relief she sought in her negligence claim consisted of "[d]ismissal of this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction," with damages as only an alternative request.⁷

Carnival responded with a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. In its motion, Carnival asserted that DeRoy undoubtedly could have invoked admiralty jurisdiction, since 28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides that "[t]he district courts have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States," over "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are entitled."⁸ And it noted that, to the extent the saving-to-suitors clause of § 1333 guaranteed DeRoy the right to a jury trial under the Florida constitution, Carnival would not object to a jury trial as DeRoy requested in her complaint.⁹

In her response to Carnival's motion, DeRoy clarified that she was not challenging the enforceability of the forum-selection clause, nor was she claiming that the saving-to-suitors clause in § 1333 gave her an inalienable right to litigate in state court, nor was she arguing that she would be deprived of her right to a jury trial under the Florida constitution. Rather, DeRoy claimed, she was simply exploiting a hole in Carnival's contract that no one had previously thought of: since, in DeRoy's view, the forum-selection clause allowed lawsuits where the federal courts had no jurisdiction to proceed in state court, DeRoy pleaded her case in a way intended to evade the federal district court's jurisdiction—specifically, by refusing to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.

The district court found DeRoy's position convincing and entered an order dismissing the complaint on May 22, 2018. In reaching this conclusion, the district court determined that the saving-to-suitors clause in § 1333 allowed DeRoy to evade the court's admiralty jurisdiction. In the district court's view, DeRoy, as the master of her own complaint, had deliberately avoided invoking admiralty jurisdiction. It did not matter, the district court said, that DeRoy could have brought her claim in admiralty because she affirmatively brought her claim at law. As a result, the district court determined, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over DeRoy's claim as she pleaded it. And the forum-selection clause did not remedy the jurisdictional problem, the district court reasoned, because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be created through consent. Nevertheless, the district court recognized that had DeRoy brought her claim in admiralty, the court would have enjoyed subject-matter jurisdiction.

Carnival now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tundidor v. Miami-Dade Cty. , 831 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2016). In reviewing a facial challenge to a complaint, we consider only the allegations in the complaint, accepting them as true for this purpose.

McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cty. , 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007). Finally, we review de novo the interpretation of a contract. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard , 861 F.3d 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 2017).

III. DISCUSSION

This case comes before us in a peculiar procedural posture, with DeRoy's tacit invocation of federal jurisdiction—by filing her complaint in the district court—coupled with DeRoy's explicit disavowal of federal jurisdiction in her allegations and claim for relief.¹⁰ But regardless of what a complaint may say about a court's jurisdiction to entertain it, as we explain below, we look beyond the labels to the...