Tundidor v. Miami-Dade Cnty.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15-12597,15-12597
• Citation: 831 F.3d 1328
• Parties: Youry Tundidor, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Miami–Dade County, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

831 F.3d 1328

Youry Tundidor, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Miami–Dade County, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15-12597

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Date Filed: August 3, 2016

Carlos Felipe Llinas Negret, Law Offices of Carlos F. Llinas, Los Angeles, CA, Jason Robert Margulies, Lipcon Margulies Alsina & Winkleman, PA, David Alexander Villarreal, Law Office of Roig & Villarreal, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Michael B. Valdes, Miami–Dade County Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendants–Appellee.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and VOORHEES,^* District Judge.

WILLIAM PRYOR

, Circuit Judge:

The appeal requires us to decide whether a canal is navigable for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333

, if an artificial obstruction prevents vessels from using the canal to conduct interstate commerce. Youry Tundidor suffered injuries while aboard a vessel traveling in the Coral Park Canal, a drainage canal in Miami-Dade County. Tundidor sued the County for negligence, but the district court dismissed his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Admiralty jurisdiction extends only to waters that are navigable in interstate commerce. Because an artificial obstruction prevents vessels from traveling from the Coral Park Canal to places outside of Florida, we agree with the district court that Tundidor's injuries did not occur on navigable waters for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2013, Tundidor suffered serious injuries while he was a passenger on a pleasure boat traveling south on the Coral Park Canal. As the boat approached the Coral Park Canal Bridge, near SW 94th Avenue and SW 12th Street, the four passengers lowered their heads, and the vessel passed under the bridge. As the boat emerged on the south side of the bridge, Tundidor raised his head and hit a water pipe. The force of the impact ejected Tundidor from the boat and into the canal.

The Coral Park Canal is a drainage canal located in southwest Miami-Dade County. It joins the Tamiami (or C-4) Canal at the intersection of SW 94th Avenue and SW 8th Street, which forms a low-lying bridge over the canal at the intersection. The Tamiami Canal extends eastward past the Miami International Airport and connects to the Miami River. The Miami River leads to the Biscayne Bay and the Atlantic Ocean.

Along the Tamiami Canal, between the Coral Park Canal and the Miami River, a series of low-lying bridges, water pipes, and railroad tracks partially obstruct the waterway. None of the bridges are bascule bridges, which can open to allow vessels to pass. Many of these bridges are supported by submerged structural columns, narrowing the area a vessel has to pass.

After this series of obstructions, toward the eastern end of the Tamiami Canal sits a water control structure labeled S-25B, which prevents overdrainage and saltwater intrusion. The structure has mechanical gates that open only underwater. The structure prevents navigation from the western side of the water control structure to the Miami River. A sign next to the structure states, “DANGER—NO BOATING BEYOND THIS POINT.”

Tundidor sued Miami-Dade County, the owner and operator of the main water line, in the district court for negligence. He invoked federal admiralty jurisdiction on the ground that the accident occurred on a navigable waterway. The County moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The County raised a factual challenge to jurisdiction; that is, the County argued that the Coral Park Canal does not have a navigable connection to the Miami River, the Biscayne Bay, or the Atlantic Ocean. The district court granted the motion to dismiss.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, “[w]e review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc. , 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009)

.

III. DISCUSSION

Federal district courts have “original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of ... [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)

. In a tort case, a complaint must satisfy two elements to invoke admiralty jurisdiction: “(1) there must be a significant relationship between the alleged wrong and traditional maritime activity (the nexus requirement) and (2) the tort must have occurred on navigable waters (the location requirement).” Aqua Log, Inc. v. Lost & Abandoned Pre

–

Cut Logs & Rafts of Logs , 709 F.3d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir. 2013). The County contends that Tundidor's complaint fails to satisfy the location requirement.

The Supreme Court of the United States long ago defined “navigable waters” in The Daniel Ball , 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1870)

, as waters that are capable for use in commerce:

Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.

Id. at 563

. As a leading treatise explains, the test of navigability for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction has two requirements: the waters must be navigable in fact and have an “interstate nexus.” See 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3-3 (5th ed. 2015).

In Aqua Log

, we rejected the proposition that “admiralty jurisdiction should extend only to those waterways with present or planned commercial activity.” 709 F.3d at 1059. We held that “a waterway is navigable for admiralty-jurisdiction purposes if, in its present state, it is capable of supporting commercial activity.” Id. at 1056. But we did not decide whether a waterway with artificial obstructions that prevent commerce can satisfy this test.

Although the Miami River is a navigable waterway, see Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes , 23 F.3d 345, 346 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994)

, the Coral Park Canal is not navigable because the S-25B water control structure prevents vessels on the canal from traveling outside the State of Florida. The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n determining the boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction, we look to the purpose of the grant.”

Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc. , 500 U.S. 603, 608, 111 S.Ct. 2071, 114 L.Ed.2d 649 (1991)

. “A body of water that is confined within a state and does not form part of an interstate waterway is not an admiralty concern.” Alford v. Appalachian Power Co. , 951 F.2d 30, 32 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing The Robert W. Parsons , 191 U.S. 17, 26, 24 S.Ct. 8, 48 L.Ed. 73 (1903) ). The S-25B water control structure obstructs the commercial highway. Because the Coral Park Canal cannot support interstate commerce, it cannot satisfy the location requirement of admiralty jurisdiction.

Every circuit court to consider the issue has ruled that when artificial obstructions on a waterway block interstate commercial travel, the waterway cannot support admiralty jurisdiction. See LeBlanc v. Cleveland , 198 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 1999)

; Alford , 951 F.2d at 33–34 (4th Cir.) ; Livingston v. United States , 627 F.2d 165, 169–70 (8th Cir. 1980) ; Chapman v. United States , 575 F.2d 147, 149–51 (7th Cir. 1978) ; Adams v. Montana Power Co. , 528 F.2d 437, 440–41 (9th Cir. 1975). For example, in Adams, the Ninth Circuit held that a 25-mile stretch of the Missouri River in Montana enclosed on both sides by dams was not a navigable water. 528 F.2d at 439. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “if the damming of a water-way has the practical effect of eliminating commercial maritime activity, no federal interest is served by the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over the events transpiring on that body of water, whether or not it was originally navigable.” Id. at 440. We agree with that reasoning.

Tundidor argues that the test for navigable waters is one of historical navigability. He argues that the Coral Park Canal is navigable because it has a navigable connection to the Tamiami Canal, which historically served as a navigable waterway supporting commercial activity. Tundidor misunderstands the controlling precedents.

Tundidor argues that the use of the term “ordinary condition” in The Daniel Ball , 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563

, establishes a test of historical navigability, but the Supreme Court later explained that “ ‘[n]atural or ordinary conditions' refers to volume of water, the gradients and the regularity of the flow,” United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. , 311 U.S. 377, 407, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1940) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Oregon , 295 U.S. 1, 55 S.Ct. 610, 79 L.Ed. 1267 (1935) ). As the Second Circuit has explained, “[U]nder the Daniel Ball test, an otherwise unnavigable river may not be rendered navigable simply because, in extraordinary conditions, its waters rise high enough to support forms of transportation normally impossible.” LeBlanc , 198 F.3d at 357. The Daniel Ball did not address whether a body of water “remains navigable for admiralty jurisdiction purposes when it is made impassable by an artificial obstruction.” Id.

Tundidor also argues that we adopted a test of historical navigability in Aqua Log

because we noted that “[h]istorically, commercial vessels used both the Flint River and Spring Creek for transportation,” 709 F.3d at 1057, but the parties in Aqua Log agreed that the Flint River and Spring Creek were, at the time of our decision,...