Desiano v. Envision Foods, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | 138152,SUCV2016-00713-C |
| Parties | Ralph Desiano v. Envision Foods, Inc |
| Court | Massachusetts Superior Court |
The plaintiff, Ralph Desiano (" Desiano"), has brought this action to enforce a Florida judgment against the defendant, Envision Foods, Inc. (" Envision"). In his Verified Complaint, Desiano seeks to reach and apply any amounts due or that may become due to Envision from the reach and apply defendant, Cosi, Inc. (" Cosi") under G.L.c. 214, § 3(6).[1] Presented for decision are Envision's Motion to Dismiss the Verified Complaint pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and (6), and Desiano's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P 56(c).[2] For the reasons which follow Envision's Motion to Dismiss shall be DENIED and Desiano's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment shall be ALLOWED.
Desiano is a Florida resident. Envision is a dissolved Florida corporation, with no contacts (past or present) with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Reach and apply defendant Cosi is a Massachusetts corporation.
On January 3, 2013, the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County Florida awarded Desiano a $195, 130.55 judgment against Envision (the " Florida judgment"), the validity of which is not contested. In accordance with Florida law, Desiano filed a judgment lien against Envision with the Florida Department of State on January 31, 2013.
Desiano filed the present action on March 3, 2016, at which time the Florida judgment remained outstanding. By this action Desiano seeks to reach and apply Envision's interest in all or a portion of a $500, 000 debt owed to Envision by reach and apply defendant Cosi (the " Cosi obligation"). Envision does not dispute the existence of the Cosi obligation, which accrued several years ago in connection with an unspecified business transaction in a foreign state.[3] The Cosi obligation is Envision's sole asset.
Envision has moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Desiano has cross moved for summary judgment. Under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b), the reviewing judge may treat a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6) as a motion for summary judgment if matters outside the pleadings are presented to, and not excluded by, the Court. In the case at bar, the Court has been presented with and will consider materials extrinsic to the pleadings. Therefore, Envision's Motion to Dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and disposed of as provided for in Rule 56.
Summary judgment shall be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact, and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Cassesso v. Commissioner of Corr., 390 Mass. 419, 422, 456 N.E.2d 1123 (1983); Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553, 340 N.E.2d 877 (1976). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there is no dispute of material fact on every relevant issue. See Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 39, 825 N.E.2d 522 (2004). A party moving for summary judgment who does not bear the burden of proof at trial may demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact either by submitting affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the non-moving party's case, or by showing that the non-moving party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of its case at trial. See Flesner v. Technical Commc'ns Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991).
Resolution of the parties' competing motions in this case turns on two issues. Envision's principal argument is that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, and that the case must therefore be dismissed. Envision additionally argues that, in the event the Court declines to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, it must nevertheless deny summary judgment to the plaintiff because issues of fact remain with respect to whether Desiano's right to the Cosi obligation is subordinate to a superior interest of a third party. The Court will address each issue in turn.
Envision argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, and that such lack of jurisdiction is fatal to Desiano's reach and apply claim. Envision is correct insofar as it contends that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it.[4] However, as will be explained below, lack of personal jurisdiction does not warrant the dismissal of Desiano's reach and apply claim.
While the majority of civil actions brought in Superior Court depend for their viability on the assertion of personal jurisdiction, the Court is also empowered, in certain circumstances, to entertain actions based on quasi in rem jurisdiction.[5] In an action founded on quasi in rem jurisdiction, " the plaintiff seeks not to determine the existence of interests in the thing but rather to apply the thing to the satisfaction of a claim against the defendant[.]" See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 32 (1982). Desiano's present effort to reach and apply the Cosi obligation to the satisfaction of his Florida judgment is, therefore, premised on quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Rosenthal v. Maletz, 322 Mass. 586, 590-91, 78 N.E.2d 652 (1948) (). As with personal jurisdiction, however, the Court must find that, in the circumstances of the case presented, the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction is fundamentally fair and thus consistent with constitutional due process requirements. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209-11, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) ().
In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction is consistent with due process requirements if the factual circumstances of the case satisfy the minimum contacts standard applicable to personal jurisdiction that was initially established by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207. Under this standard, a non-resident defendant may only be subject to judgment in a foreign state if the defendant has " certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203, 207 (quoting International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316) (citation omitted)). The Court reasoned that application of the minimum contacts standard to quasi in rem actions was necessary to prevent the indirect assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants having no physical presence or other contacts within a plaintiff's preferred foreign state. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209 (). Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209 (internal quotations omitted). Frequently cited dicta in Shaffer, however, suggests that the Supreme Court views the matter of jurisdiction in post-judgment cases quite differently.
The Shaffer Court recognized that allowing postjudgment enforcement actions based solely on jurisdiction over a defendant's property is necessary to prevent defendants from evading judgments by holding their property in a state where they are not otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210 (defendants cannot move property out of state to avoid civil judgment because " [t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause . . makes the valid in personam judgment of one State enforceable in all other States"); see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of California, 436 U.S. 84, 95 n.9, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978) (). In a footnote, the Court added that, " [o]nce it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original matter ." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210 n.36 (emphasis supplied). The logic of this dictum is inescapable. What is fundamentally fair, and thus consistent with constitutional due process, in post -judgment circumstances (such as those presented in the case at bar) necessarily differs from what is fair and consistent with due process in the pre-judgment context. After all, the burden on a non-resident defendant reflected in " the practical problems resulting from litigating in [an unfamiliar] forum" and " the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question, " is significantly reduced after a judgment against such a defendant has already been rendered. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017) (citations omitted). Stated...
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