Desmarais v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1954
• Citation: 118 N.E.2d 86,331 Mass. 199
• Parties: DESMARAIS v. STANDARD ACC. INS. CO. et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 86

118 N.E.2d 86

331 Mass. 199

DESMARAIS v. STANDARD ACC. INS. CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 1, 1954.

Decided March 5, 1954.

James A. Whipple, Jr., Boston, for plaintiff.

Russell J. Coffin, Boston, for defendant Standard Acc. Inc. Co.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS and WILLIAMS, JJ.

RONAN, Justice.

This is a bill brought under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 175, § 113, and c. 214, § 3(10), to reach and apply in satisfaction of the judgment obtained by the plaintiff the obligation of the insurance company under a policy of compulsory liability insurance as defined by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 34A, which was issued to the individual defendants and covered the truck which caused the injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed from a final decree dismissing the bill.

The plaintiff, an employee of a partnership composed of the personal defendants engaged in the business of furniture moving, had with others removed a piano to the concrete platform just outside the front entrance of a house and was standing by the piano waiting for the truck owned by the partnership and operated by one of the partners to be backed up to the platform in order to load the piano. The lowest step leading up to the platform set back a little less than 7 feet from the line of the public way. The truck, which was 22 feet long with its tailboard 3 feet wide and extended horizontally, had made an unsuccessful attempt to back up to the platform. On the second attempt, more power was applied by the operator, and after passing over a ridge of snow in the gutter, its rear wheels passed over the public sidewalk and stopped as the tailboard struck the plaintiff's leg as it reached the platform. The partnership carried no workmen's compensation insurance.

The compulsory motor vehicle insurance act, G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 90, §§ 34A-34J, with which the policy in question complied, defines in § 34A 'motor vehicle liability policy', and in so far as now material provides for indemnity for personal injury including death and consequential damages, 'arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, control or use upon the ways of the commonwealth of such motor vehicle,' to an amount of not less than $5,000 on account of an injury to or death of any one person. The words 'upon the ways of the commonwealth' mean public ways within the Commonwealth, Terrasi v. Peirce, 304 Mass. 409, 23 N.E.2d 871, or one 'laid out under the authority of statute,' within G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 1. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Brow, 327 Mass. 225, 98 N.E.2d 608.

We are not confronted with the question whether the operation or use of the truck was the direct and proximate cause of putting the highway in a condition dangerous and unsafe for travellers thereon. Caron v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 277 Mass. 156, 178 N.E. 286; Mullen v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 287 Mass. 262, 191 N.E. 394; Diggins v. Theroux, 314 Mass. 735, 51 N.E.2d 425; Perry v. Chipouras, 319 Mass. 473, 66 N.E.2d 361. Compare General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Hanley Oil Co., Inc., 321 Mass. 72, 72 N.E.2d 1, 171 A.L.R. 497, which did not involve a compulsory liability policy so called. The question here is not whether the plaintiff was injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle but rather whether he is outside the coverage of a compulsory liability policy because when struck by the truck he happened to be about 7 feet inside the property line in the performance of his duties while the major portion of the truck was then being actually operated upon the public way.

We agree that the predominant and fundamental purpose of such insurance is to provide compensation for injuries or death incurred by travellers upon the public ways resulting from the operation of motor vehicles. In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 596, 147 N.E. 681; Rose v. Franklin Surety Co., 281 Mass. 538, 540, 183 N.E. 918; Wheeler v. O'Connell, 297 Mass. 549, 553, 9 N.E.2d 544, 111 A.L.R. 1038; Service Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Aronofsky, 308 Mass. 249, 252, 31 N.E.2d 837. In Phillips v. Stone, 297 Mass. 341, 342, 8 N.E.2d 890, where the injury occurred in a private driveway, it was decided that the resulting liability did not come within the compulsory motor vehicle liability policy. See also Terrasi v. Peirce, 304 Mass. 409, 410, 23 N.E.2d 871, and cases cited. These and similar cases fix the location of the motor vehicle causing the injury, but they do not fix the place where the actual injury is sustained. There are instances where persons have been injured when struck by a stone thrown by the action of one of the tires of a truck while it was being operated on a public way, Sylvester v. Shea, 280 Mass. 508, 182 N.E. 916, or when struck by some part of a vehicle which had become detached while it was being driven along the way, Regan v. Cummings, 228 Mass. 414, 117 N.E. 800; Van Steenbergen v. Barrett, 286 Mass. 400, 190 N.E. 597. The fact that the detached part was projected onto private property and brought about the injury there did not bar recovery in Facteau v. Gould, 310 Mass. 105, 37 N.E.2d 124. In Milliman v. Coulter, 301 Mass. 320, 17 N.E.2d 162, a pedestrian standing in a private driveway a few feet in from the public way was struck by the side of an automobile travelling upon the public way. Where negligence of the operator is proved and a judgment obtained against him, we see nothing in the insurance statute that should prevent the injured person from having recourse to the policy in satisfaction of the judgment merely because when injured he was upon private property provided the cause of the injury was the operation of a motor vehicle partially at least upon a public way.

The compulsory motor vehicle insurance act is a remedial statute and has been broadly construed to carry out its beneficent purpose. O'Roak v. Lloyds Casualty Co., 285 Mass. 532, 536, 189 N.E. 571; Caccavo v. Kearney, 286 Mass. 480, 484, 190 N.E. 817. The well-settled principles covering the interpretation of an ordinary policy of insurance have been properly disregarded in determining the scope and extent of a...