Desmarais v. Taft

• Citation: 210 Mass. 560,97 N.E. 96
• Parties: DESMARAIS v. TAFT.
• Decision Date: 04 January 1912
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

210 Mass. 560

97 N.E. 96

DESMARAIS v. TAFT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

January 4, 1912

COUNSEL

J. E. Sullivan and D. F. O'Connell, for appellant.

R. B Dodge and W. J. Taft, for respondent.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

The question here presented is as to the sufficiency under the statute of frauds of the description of real estate in the following memorandum:

'$100.00

Northbridge Mass. Aug. 7, 1900.

'Received one hundred dollars from E. Desmarais in part payment for a piece of land next to Pelequin, seventy feet on the road and back to an old wall.

'Elenor Taft.'

The facts in connection with the memorandum were that the land was part of a large tract owned by the defendant, located on School street and generally known as the Elenor Taft land and not separated from it by any distinguishing mark. The Pelequin mentioned in the memorandum owned only one tract of land on this street, and that was on the west side of the large tract. There was an old wall bounding the northerly side of the large lot of the defendant. The contract price for the lot was $350. The statute of frauds (R. L. c. 74, § 1) requires a memorandum 'to contain a description of the land sufficient for purposes of identification when read in the light of all the circumstances of ownership of the property by the vendor. * * * Attending circumstances may be shown outside the writing and by parole for the purpose of interpreting and applying the memorandum.' Harrigan v. Dodge, 200 Mass. 357, 359, 86 N.E. 780, and cases cited; Bradley v. Haven, 208 Mass. 300, 94 N.E. 268. On the other hand, a description which, when applied to the physical features upon the surface of the earth and read in the light of the facts surrounding the parties at the time of its execution, fails to identify particular land as alone conforming to its terms, does not satisfy the statute of frauds. Doherty v. Hill, 144 Mass. 465, 11 N.E. 581; Miller v. Burt, 196 Mass. 395, 82 N.E. 39; Sherer v. Trowbridge, 135 Mass. 500; Madden v. Boston, 177 Mass. 350, 359, 58 N.E. 1024. Objects and circumstances, but not spoken language, can be resorted to for applying and translating the words of the memorandum into terms of land. The westerly boundary is definite in this memorandum, both as to position and length. It is adjacent to the Pelequin land, and extends from the road to the old wall. The southerly boundary is equally certain. It extends from the Pelequin corner easterly on the street seventy feet. On the rear or northerly side the boundary is the wall. The only bound not precisely defined is the easterly one, the...