Desmond, Matter of
| Decision Date | 04 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. C3-85-2215,C3-85-2215 |
| Citation | 381 N.W.2d 57 |
| Parties | In the Matter of John DESMOND. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The constitutionality of indeterminate commitment of mentally retarded patients is certified to the supreme court. The trial court properly denied appellant's motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem.
Patrick W. Kelly, Minneapolis, for appellant Desmond.
Thomas L. Johnson, Hennepin Co. Atty., John R. Owen, Asst. Co. Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent Hennepin County.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Mary L. Stanislav, Julie K. Harris, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, for intervenor.
Heard, considered and decided by WOZNIAK, P.J. and SEDGWICK and FORSBERG, JJ.
Appellant was committed to Faribault State Hospital as a mentally retarded person in April, 1985. A review hearing was held on October 31, 1985. Counsel for appellant sought a specific period for continued commitment, arguing indeterminate commitment is unconstitutional. In the alternative, appellant sought appointment of a guardian ad litem. The motions were denied on November 19 and commitment for an indeterminate period was ordered on November 20. Appellant seeks review of both orders, and the attorney general intervened to defend the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.13, subd. 2 (1984). We affirm the trial court and certify this case to the supreme court.
Appellant is a 42 year old profoundly retarded man. He has been a ward of the State since 1984. Desmond does not speak and has epilepsy. Medical records indicate that he is aggressive towards staff and other residents and frequently engages in behavior injurious to himself. He requires constant supervision, but can feed himself and wash his hands with prompting.
At the time of Desmond's six-month review hearing, see Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.12, counsel moved for a finding that Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.13, subd. 2, requiring indeterminate commitment of mentally retarded persons, is unconstitutional. Counsel asked the trial court to specify a limited term for continued commitment or to appoint a guardian ad litem to monitor Desmond's condition if he was committed indeterminately. The motions were denied and indeterminate commitment was ordered.
1. Does indeterminate commitment of a mentally retarded patient violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection?
2. Does indeterminate commitment of a mentally retarded patient violate constitutional guarantees of due process?
3. Did the trial court err by denying appellant's motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem?
Appellant argues the indeterminate commitment of mentally retarded patients pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.13, subd. 2 deprives him of equal protection, since chemically dependent and mentally ill patients may not be committed for more than one year without the filing of a new petition for commitment. Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.13, subds. 1 and 3. We recently considered this argument and concluded indeterminate commitment is constitutional, since the disparate treatment is rationally related to legitimate government purposes. In re Harhut, 374 N.W.2d 798, 800-01 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). Harhut was certified to our supreme court and briefs have been filed. In light of our recent decision and the pendency of the supreme court's decision on this issue, we decline to address appellant's equal protection claim at this time.
Appellant next argues due process requires annual judicial reviews of his commitment. In evaluating a procedural due process claim, this court must weigh the private interest affected, the likelihood of erroneous deprivation of liberty with the present system and the value of additional procedures in reducing that likelihood, and the State's interest, including the potential burden of additional procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
There is no question that appellant and other patients have "a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily[.]" Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2503, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979). Numerous administrative and statutory safeguards already in effect in Minnesota protect mentally retarded patients at the state hospitals from unnecessarily prolonged institutionalization.
As conceded by appellant, the initial commitment process for retarded persons is identical to that for chemically dependent and mentally ill proposed patients. See Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.07-.09. The initial commitment period for all three groups is six months. Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.09, subd. 5. A treatment report must be submitted to the committing court during the initial commitment period. Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.12, subd. 1. A review hearing before the committing court and written findings of fact and conclusions of law are required for continued commitment. Id., subds. 4 and 7. Until the time continued commitment is ordered, the treatment of these three classes of patients is identical.
After continued commitment is ordered, the physical and mental condition of the mentally retarded patient must be reviewed at least annually. Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.03, subd. 5. The patient has a right to treatment and a written program plan, which must be reviewed at least quarterly. Id. subd. 7. All patients continue to be represented by counsel after commitment. Id., subd. 9; In re Hefler, 378 N.W.2d 808 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). Counsel must monitor reports concerning the patient and take action accordingly. Minn.R.Civ. Commitment 3, comment A(7). The patient may, at any time, petition the committing court for review of his need for continued institutionalization or for other relief. Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.17, subd. 1. The committing county must provide case management services to the patient, including screening for waivered services. Minn.R. 9525.0060 (1983).
The trial court concluded these procedures were adequate to protect appellant's right and we agree. Appellant failed to establish that current procedural safeguards pose a substantial risk of unnecessary continued commitment of mentally retarded patients. Additionally, there is no indication that requiring annual adversary hearings before the committing court will reduce the risk that retarded patients will be committed to the state hospital longer than needed. In fact, "[c]ommon human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real[.]" Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 609, 99 S.Ct. at 2508. There is little reason to suppose adversary hearings would be any more effective in determining the appropriateness of continued commitment for mentally retarded patients. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that the present statutory scheme does not violate appellant's constitutional right to due process.
Appellant asserts the trial court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem to monitor his needs and condition violated his right to due process. The trial court noted counsel's continuing representation of appellant and the availability of the ...
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Harhut, Matter of
...also imply a due process challenge to section 253B.13. Subsequent cases have directly raised the due process issue. See In re Desmond, 381 N.W.2d 57 (Minn.Ct.App.1986); In re Frederickson, 376 N.W.2d 736 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). We shall address in this case the constitutionality of section 253B......
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Desmond, Matter of
...WAHL, Justice. John Desmond, a mentally retarded adult committed to Faribault State Hospital, appeals a decision of the court of appeals 381 N.W.2d 57, affirming a trial court order continuing his commitment indeterminately and holding the statutory provision for indeterminate commitment of......