Desoto Gathering Co. v. Ramsey
| Decision Date | 28 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. CV–15–65,CV–15–65 |
| Citation | 480 S.W.3d 144 |
| Parties | DeSoto Gathering Company, LLC, Petitioner, v. Barbara and Richard Ramsey; Cary and Richard Shirley; Virgie Parrott; Clifford and Loveta Pruitt; Allan and Tammy Peterson; Jeffrey and Kimberly Wynborny; Virginia Mills; Molly Stone; and the Honorable Troy B. Braswell, Jr., Faulkner County Circuit Court, Respondents. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
PPGMR LAW, PLLC, by: G. Alan Perkins and Kimberly D. Logue, Little Rock, for petitioner.
Deal, Cooper & Holton PLLC, by: Timothy R. Holton and John R. Holton, for respondents.
Petitioner DeSoto Gathering Co., LLC ("DeSoto"), has filed a petition for a writ of prohibition requesting that this court prohibit the Faulkner County Circuit Court from conducting further proceedings on a complaint filed by the respondents.1 Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1–2(a)(3) (2015), we have jurisdiction of cases involving extraordinary writs. We deny DeSoto's petition for writ of prohibition.
On April 24, 2014, the Ramseys filed suit against DeSoto in the Faulkner County Circuit Court. According to the facts stated in the Ramseys' complaint, DeSoto is an Arkansas corporation with its principal place of business in Conway, Faulkner County. Five of the respondents live in White County approximately 1250 feet from a natural-gas compressor station owned and operated by DeSoto, and the other eight respondents live in Van Buren County similarly near a compressor station owned and operated by DeSoto. The Ramseys alleged that these compressor stations emit more than 185 tons of pollutants per year into the air and cause significant noise levels and vibrations. Specifically, the Ramseys alleged strict liability and negligence and sought discomfort damages and personal injuries resulting from the stations' noise, pollution, and vibrations. The Ramseys requested $3 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.
On June 9, 2014, DeSoto filed a motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), arguing that venue was not proper in Faulkner County. In its motion, DeSoto contended that, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16–60–101 (Repl.2005), property-based causes of action were required to be filed where the real property was located. DeSoto also asserted that if the circuit court characterized the Ramseys' suit as a personal-injury action, then, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16–60–112(a), venue would be proper where the injury occurred. Thus, DeSoto reasoned that, because the compressor stations were located in White County and Van Buren County and because the respondents' allegations sounded in trespass, nuisance, or personal injury, then venue was not proper in Faulkner County. On July 15, 2014, the Ramseys filed their response, arguing that DeSoto was judicially estopped from asserting lack of venue because of "a pattern of inconsistent pleadings [filed in the federal and state courts] which have been filed in an effort to manipulate jurisdiction and to gain an unfair advantage." On December 2, 2014, the circuit court entered an order denying DeSoto's motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue. Subsequently, DeSoto filed a petition for writ of prohibition requesting that this court issue the writ to prevent the circuit court from proceeding for lack of proper venue.
DeSoto now requests that this court issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the Ramseys from proceeding in the Faulkner County Circuit Court. The Ramseys counter that the extraordinary writ is not warranted in this case because the circuit court had jurisdiction to determine venue and that denying DeSoto's motion to dismiss was within the circuit court's discretion.2
Historically, the writ of prohibition has been narrowly defined. One of the common law writs,3 it provides relief that bars, or prohibits, a lower court from proceeding with a matter.4 A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and "is only proper when the trial court has no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, is clearly warranted, and there are no disputed facts." McGlothlin v. Kemp, 314 Ark. 495, 497, 863 S.W.2d 313, 313 (1993) (citing Lupo v. Lineberger, 313 Ark. 315, 317, 855 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1993) (emphasis added)). As part of our superintending authority over circuit courts, we have the authority to issue the writ. Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 4.
First, a writ of prohibition is appropriate when the circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction. White v. Palo, 2011 Ark. 126, 380 S.W.3d 405. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties. Conner v. Simes, 355 Ark. 422, 139 S.W.3d 476 (2003). Second, a writ of prohibition is appropriate when there is no other remedy, such as an appeal, available. White, 2011 Ark. 126, 380 S.W.3d 405. We have stated that prohibition is a proper remedy when the jurisdiction of the circuit court depends on a legal, rather than a factual, question. Coonrod v. Seay, 367 Ark. 437, 241 S.W.3d 252 (2006). However, a legal question alone does not require this court to issue a writ of prohibition. This court confines its review to the pleadings in the case. Id.
Further, a writ of prohibition challenging an exercise of jurisdiction, even if erroneous and an abuse of discretion, is an improper usage of the writ. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 2013 Ark. 322, 429 S.W.3d 215. Writs of prohibition are prerogative writs, extremely narrow in scope and operation, and they are to be used with great caution and forbearance. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Mills, 371 Ark. 317, 265 S.W.3d 760 (2007). Prohibition should issue only in cases of extreme necessity. Ulmer v. Cir. Ct. of Polk Cty., 366 Ark. 212, 234 S.W.3d 290 (2006). Recently, this court stated that a writ of prohibition cannot be invoked to correct an order already entered. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2013 Ark. 322, 429 S.W.3d 215. Id. at 5, 429 S.W.3d at 218. In short, the writ of prohibition is preventive in its purpose, not corrective.
As a general rule, a petition for a writ of prohibition is not the proper remedy for the failure of a circuit court to grant a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc. v. Southall, 281 Ark. 141, 661 S.W.2d 383 (1983). In recent cases, this court has declined to exercise the discretionary writ when a circuit court has denied a motion to dismiss for improper venue. For example, in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, 371 Ark. 317, 265 S.W.3d 760, the White County Circuit Court denied a motion to dismiss, and we denied the writ because the first prong of the test for a writ of prohibition—whether a circuit court is wholly without jurisdiction—was not satisfied. Because the pleadings demonstrated a statutory basis for venue in White County, the circuit court was not wholly without jurisdiction. Further, the second prong of the test—whether no other remedy, such as an appeal, is available—was not satisfied because the petitioner possessed another remedy. Simply put, the petitioner could have raised the venue issue by appealing the circuit court's final order. Id.
Likewise, the writ of prohibition has also been properly denied when a motion to dismiss was granted by the circuit court. In Evans v. Blankenship, 374 Ark. 104, 286 S.W.3d 137 (2008), the Washington County Circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and transferred the matter to Jefferson County because it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. Again, in denying the writ, this court, citing Manila Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. Wagner, 357 Ark. 20, 159 S.W.3d 285 (2004), stated that "prohibition is never issued to prohibit a trial court from erroneously exercising its jurisdiction." Id. at 107, 286 S.W.3d at 140.
Admittedly, this court has granted a writ of prohibition in cases in which improper venue was at issue. See Centerpoint Energy, Inc. v. Miller Cty. Cir. Ct., 372 Ark. 343, 276 S.W.3d 231 (2008) ; Premium Aircraft Parts, LLC v. Cir. Ct. of Carroll Cty., 347 Ark. 977, 69 S.W.3d 849 (2002). However, as we have previously explained, when we grant a writ for improper venue, we grant the writ because of the circuit court's lack of jurisdiction. See Evans, 374 Ark. 104, 286 S.W.3d 137. Not every case of improper venue implicates jurisdiction. Venue and jurisdiction are frequently confused. Id. This court has treated the venue issue as the equivalent of "jurisdiction over the person," perhaps because of history rather than logic. See David Newbern, John Watkins & D.P. Marshall Jr., Arkansas Civil Practice & Procedure § 9:1 (citing Prairie Implement Co., Inc. v. Cir. Ct. of S. Dist. of Prairie Cty., 311 Ark. 200, 844 S.W.2d 299 (1992) ). We granted the writ in Premium, where the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Carroll County Chancery Court alleging misappropriated trade secrets against the defendants who were located in Sebastian County. After the circuit court denied their motion to dismiss, the defendants sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the plaintiff could not bring the action in Carroll County, the county of the plaintiffs residence. Concluding that the Carroll County Chancery Court was wholly without jurisdiction under the applicable venue statutes, we agreed and granted the writ. Id.
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