Detillion v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2004 Ohio 949 (Ohio App. 1/27/2004)
| Decision Date | 27 January 2004 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 03CA2729. |
| Citation | 2004 Ohio 949 |
| Parties | Randy L. Detillion, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Paige J. McMahon, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellant Randy L. Detillion.1
Jill S. Patterson and Ronald A. Rispo, Cleveland, Ohio for appellee Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company.
Thomas L. Davis, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee Pacific Employers Insurance Company.2
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} Randy Detillion ("Detillion") appeals the decision of the Ross County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company ("Lumbermens") and Pacific Employers Insurance Company ("Pacific"). Detillion contends that he is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the terms of the various insurance policies issued by Lumbermens and Pacific to his employer, Thomson Consumer Electronics, pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660. Because we find that Illinois or Indiana law is applicable here, and neither jurisdiction has recognized the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Scott-Pontzer, we disagree. Additionally, we find that even if we were to apply Ohio law, Detillion could not prevail due to the Ohio Supreme Court's recent decision in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis (2003), 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶2} On August 24, 1999, Detillion was a passenger in an automobile, driven by Rebecca Stauffer ("Stauffer"), when it was struck by another vehicle, driven by Angel Morrison ("Tortfeasor"). The accident occurred in Chillicothe, Ross County, Ohio. Detillion alleges that he sustained bodily injuries as a result of the accident. At the time of the accident, Detillion was an employee of Thomson Consumer Electronics ("Thomson"), although he admits that he was not acting in the scope of employment at the time of the accident.
{¶3} Detillion received the full policy limit of $ 12,500.00 from the Tortfeasor's insurer in settlement of his claims against her. Detillion then filed suit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), Stauffer's insurer, and John Doe, who Detillion believed to be an insurance company issuing policies of motor vehicle insurance to Thomson, his employer at the time of the accident. Detillion later amended the complaint to identify Pacific and Lumbermens as the previously unknown John Doe Defendants.
{¶4} Thomson was the named insured under three separate insurance policies, to wit: a business auto policy ("business auto policy") and commercial general liability policy ("CGL") issued by Pacific; and, a commercial umbrella policy ("umbrella policy") issued by Lumbermens. Detillion argues that these policies are motor vehicle policies within the meaning of former R.C. 3937.18, and, because there is no written rejection of such coverage by his employer, uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage ("UM/UIM coverage") arose as a matter of law.
{¶5} After filing their answers in response to Detillion's complaint, both Pacific and Lumbermens filed motions for summary judgment alleging that Ohio law did not apply to the interpretation of the various insurance policies.
{¶6} With regard to the business auto policy, Pacific also advanced arguments that: 1) Detillion's settlement and release with the Tortfeasor breached the policy conditions; 2) the policy only covered employees acting in the scope of their employment; 3) the "drive other car" endorsement precluded coverage; 4) Detillion was not occupying a covered auto at the time of the accident; and, 5) any claim Detillion might have was subject to a $250,000.00 deductible.
{¶7} Pacific further argued that there was no UM/UIM coverage under the CGL policy because: 1) it was not a motor vehicle policy pursuant to former R.C. 3937.18; 2) the policy provided coverage for specific types of employees in specific circumstances, and, therefore, did not present any ambiguity with regard to who was an insured; and, 3) the policy was self-insuring in nature, such that former R.C. 3937.18 did not apply.
{¶8} In addition to the argument that Ohio law did not apply, Lumbermens advanced arguments that: 1) the umbrella policy it issued to Thomson was not applicable to Detillion because the terms of the policy require exhaustion of the underlying insurance policies before any coverage is available; 2) Detillion did not qualify as an insured under the Lumbermens umbrella policy, in that the policy specifically defined "who is an insured" to include employees acting in the scope of employment while performing duties related to the conduct of business; 3) the arguments advanced in Pacific's motion for summary judgment with regard to lack of coverage pursuant to the underlying policies were equally applicable to the umbrella policy.
{¶9} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pacific and Lumbermens, finding they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because negotiation and performance of the insurance policies occurred in either Indiana or Illinois, but not Ohio, and therefore, Ohio law did not govern the dispute. In doing so, the trial court noted that the business auto policy did not provide uninsured motorist coverage in Ohio, nor did it reference any vehicles in Ohio. Therefore, the trial court inferred that the parties to the contract anticipated that the principle risk would not occur in Ohio. Because the trial court concluded Ohio law did not govern the dispute, and Detillion advanced no legal basis for recovery under the business auto policy other than Scott-Pontzer, a unique creature of Ohio law, the trial court concluded that Detillion did not meet the definition of an insured under the Pacific business auto policy.
{¶10} With regard to the Pacific CGL policy, the trial court concluded that the policy's coverage for "[p]arking an auto on, or on the ways next to, premises you own or rent, provided the `auto' is not owned by or rented or loaned to you or the insured," provided only incidental automobile liability coverage. Therefore, the trial court determined that the CGL policy is not an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy such that the insurer was required to provide UM/UIM coverage. Additionally, the trial court found that the CGL policy defined an insured to include employees only for acts within the scope of their employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of the business. Because Detillion admitted he was not acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, the trial court concluded that Detillion was not an insured under the policy.
{¶11} Finally, with regard to the Lumbermens umbrella policy, the trial court found that the parties did not dispute that the policy provided only excess coverage to the underlying policies issued by Pacific. Having determined that Detillion was not an insured entitled to recover from the underlying policies, the trial court concluded that Detillion could not recover from Lumbermens under the umbrella policy. The trial court also noted that even if the umbrella policy did provide primary coverage, Detillion did not qualify as an insured pursuant to the terms of the policy.
{¶12} Detillion filed a timely notice of appeal raising the following assignments of error: and In its brief, Lumbermens raises the following cross-assignment of error: "Appellant Randy Detillion is not entitled to coverage under the Lumbermens commercial umbrella policy since he failed to satisfy the policy's preconditions to coverage."3
{¶13} Summary judgment is appropriate when the court finds that the following factors have been established: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his or her favor. Civ.R. 56. See Bostic v. Connor (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66; Morehead v. Conley (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411. Morehead v. Conley, 75 Ohio App.3d at 411-12. See, also, Schwartz v. Bank One, Portsmouth, N.A. (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 806, 809.
{¶14} The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists falls upon the party requesting summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 294, citing Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988) 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115. The moving party bears this burden even for issues for which the nonmoving party may bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. Morehead v. Conley, 75 Ohio App.3d at 413.
{¶15} We interpret insurance contracts using the identical standards of interpretation we apply to other written contracts. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 665. We must give the language of an insurance policy its plain and ordinary meaning. Jirousek v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 62, 64. When we decide whether a claimant is an insured...
To continue reading
Request your trial