Jirousek v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
| Decision Date | 30 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 70-169,70-169 |
| Citation | 271 N.E.2d 866,27 Ohio St.2d 62,56 O.O.2d 34 |
| Parties | , 56 O.O.2d 34 JIROUSEK, Appellee, v. The PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Where an insured dies as the result of an accident incurred while he is operating a motorcycle, his beneficiary is not entitled to supplemental benefits from an insurer under a contract authorizing such benefits if accidental death is sustained (a) while driving or riding in a private automobile of pleasure car design or (b) as a result of being struck by a motor vehicle while not himself driving or riding in a motor vehicle.
Plaintiff, Ruth Jirousek, filed an action in the Garfield Heights Municipal Court against The Prudential Insurance Company of America to recover $5,000 as beneficiary under a non-occupational vehicle accident provision contained in an insurance policy on the life of her deceased son. The facts were stipulated, and, where pertinent, are stated below.
In June 1968, while operating a motorcycle, the insured sustained injuries in an accident and died several days later. The defendant has paid to plaintiff, as beneficiary of her son's policy, both the initial $5,000 face amount of life insurance coverage, plus a second $5,000 required by a 'double indemnity' clause payable in event of accidental death.
Defendant has refused, however, to pay a third $5,000 provided for in the 'triple indemnity' clause, which is before us in this case for evaluation. This questioned provision would require such payment if the death of the insured has been sustained either '* * * (a) while driving or riding in a private automobile of pleasure car design (including station wagon or similar body types) not in use for commercial or occupational purposes by the insured, or (b) as a result of being struck by a motor vehicle while not himself or herself driving or riding in a motor vehicle. * * *'
The trial court, considering primarily condition (a), refused to classify decedent's motorcycle as 'a private automobile of pleasure car design,' and therefore denied recovery.
The Court of Appeals reversed, allowing recovery under condition (b), by construing the deceased to have been '* * * not himself * * * in a motor vehicle * * *' when the accident occurred. (Emphasis is that of the appellate court.)
McCafferty, Perelman & Holtz, and A. Albert Perelman, Cleveland, for appellee.
Johnson & Umstead, George J. Umstead, and John G. Salmon, Cleveland, for appellant.
The sole question involved in this appeal is whether the insured, who admittedly died of injuries received in an accident while operating his motorcycle, can qualify under either conditions (a) or (b) of the supplemental 'Non-Occupational Vehicle Accident' provision. The opinion of this court is that he cannot.
In the trial court, the claim was made by plaintiff that the decedent's motorcycle should be classified as a vehicle included in the language '* * * private automobile of pleasure car design. * * *'
In both brief and oral argument, plaintiff has attempted to establish that the word 'automobile' should be understood to include motorcycle. While we agree with plaintiff's hypothesis that an automobile is a motor vehicle and that a motorcycle is a motor vehicle, we cannot accept his conclusion that this renders the words 'automobile' and 'motorcycle' synonymous, or that the term 'automobile' includes a motorcycle. Each word has its own meaning in every day usage, and the purchaser of insurance, as well as the scrivener of the provision, would understand the limited aspects of both 'automobile' and 'motorcycle,' and the broader meaning of 'motor vehicle.'
Insured was, therefore, not operating a vehicle of the type required to allow recovery under condition (a) of the supplemental coverage. If there is coverage, then it must fall within condition (b), which requires that the accident occur (1) 'as a result of being struck by a motor vehicle,' and (2) 'while not himself or herself driving or riding in a motor vehicle.'
In the present situation, the insured was admittedly operating his motorcycle at the time of the accident. Eliminating alternatives, the controlling phrase applicable to the facts, 'while not himself * * * driving * * * a motor...
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