Detoledo v. County of Suffolk, CIV.A.03-CV-10834RGS.

• Decision Date: 26 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.03-CV-10834RGS.,CIV.A.03-CV-10834RGS.
• Citation: 379 F.Supp.2d 138
• Parties: Antonia DETOLEDO and Liana Williams v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, LT. Angelo Rao, Sgt. Janet Sinclair, and Deputy Sylvia Thomas
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

379 F.Supp.2d 138

Antonia DETOLEDO and Liana Williams v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, LT. Angelo Rao, Sgt. Janet Sinclair, and Deputy Sylvia Thomas

No. CIV.A.03-CV-10834RGS.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

July 26, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Susan M. Bourque, Parker Scheer Attorneys, Boston, MA, for Antonia Detoledo, Liana Williams, Plaintiffs.

Kathleen M. Cawley, Suffolk County Sheriff's Department, Boston, MA, for Suffolk County, Angelo Rao, Janet Sinclair, Owen Julius, Sylvia Thomas, Defendants.

Eric J. Parker, Parker Scheer LLP, Boston, MA, for Antonia Detoledo, Liana Williams, Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STEARNS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Antonia DeToledo and Liana Williams allege to have been unlawfully arrested, detained, and in Williams' case, subjected to an illegal strip search on July 26, 1998, during a visit to the South Bay House of Corrections (South Bay). Defendants Captain Angelo Rao,¹ Sergeant Janet Sinclair, and Deputy Sylvia Thomas are South Bay corrections officers employed by defendant Suffolk County. The Complaint was originally filed on June 13, 2001, in Suffolk Superior Court, where it resided for two years before being removed to the United States District Court. The Complaint seeks to establish personal liability on the part of the individual defendants for violation of the plaintiffs' civil rights and vicarious liability on the part of Suffolk County under G.L. c. 258 (the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act) for defendants' alleged negligence. The defendants deny that any right secured by federal or state law was violated. The individual defendants move for summary judgment on all claims.²

BACKGROUND

In the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the facts are as follows. On Friday evening, July 24, 1998, Liana Williams sought to visit her fiance, Michael Etheridge, then a detainee at South Bay. When Sergeant Elaine Ruplis, the visitors' supervisor, ran a routine computer check, she discovered that Williams was the subject of an outstanding warrant. Investigating further, Ruplis learned from Donald Lewis, a records officer, that the warrant had been recalled. Lewis printed out the recall notice and gave it to Ruplis. Ruplis, however, neglected to enter the correction into South Bay's computer system.³

On July 26, 1998, Williams returned to South Bay to visit Etheridge. When she arrived at the visitor's area, Antonia DeToledo was already present. The two women did not know one another. While processing Williams, Officer Robert Rowland came upon the warrant listing. He immediately notified Captain Rao, the shift commander. Rao asked Sergeant Sinclair to retrieve a copy of the warrant. While doing so, Sinclair discovered the recall notice that Lewis had given to Ruplis. Sinclair delivered the notice and a copy of the warrant to Rao.⁴

Rao reviewed the paperwork and mistakenly determined that the warrant was active. In his deposition, Rao testified that he did not have his prescription glasses with him and was unable to read the warrant.⁵ Rowland told Rao that Williams had asked for the key to the ladies' room and had left her driver's license as a deposit. Rowland gave the driver's license to Rao. Williams, however, had not gone to the ladies' room but had given the key to her stepson so that he could visit the men's room.⁶

Rao proceeded to the restroom area of the lobby. As a woman emerged from the ladies' room, Rao compared her likeness to the picture on Williams' driver's license. Rao testified that while the similarities were not obvious (the hairstyles were different), he thought that the picture might be dated. The woman was in fact DeToledo. Rowland testified that he knew that the wrong woman had been singled out "but opted not to say anything until the officers entered the Booking Area ... to avoid a scene in front of the other visitors." DeToledo, whose native language is Portugese and who speaks only limited English, was confronted by Rao and other uniformed officers. DeToledo testified that she was so shaken by the confrontation that she does not recall any conversation. Both Rao and Rowland testified that when DeToledo was asked if she was Liana Williams, she nodded affirmatively. The question was repeated and DeToledo answered "yes." When the officers informed her of the arrest warrant, DeToledo indicated that she did not understand what they were saying. She was handcuffed and escorted towards the booking area.⁷ The procession came to halt a minute or two later when Rowland told Rao about the mistake in identity. Before the handcuffs could be removed, DeToledo began to have difficulty breathing. Medical personnel were summoned and an ambulance transported DeToledo to the Boston Medical Center.

Rao meanwhile located Williams in the lobby where she was standing with her six-month old baby and her stepson. Rao told Williams that she was being arrested on an outstanding warrant. Williams protested repeatedly that the warrant had been recalled and that documentary proof that the warrant was invalid could be found in her visitor's locker. Rao refused Williams' requests to retrieve the documents.

Williams asked the officers to summon a friend to take custody of her children. She also asked that they not handcuff her in the children's presence. The officers complied with both requests and handcuffed Williams only after she had passed through the metal detector leading to the sallyport. Once inside, Williams was taken to a "shake down" room where either Sinclair or Deputy Thomas conducted a strip and visual body cavity search.⁸ Before and during the strip search, Williams told Thomas and Sinclair that she had proof that the warrant had been recalled. Williams was forced to remove all of her clothing, bend over and separate her buttocks, and open her mouth for visual inspection.

After the search, Williams was confined for several hours in a holding cell. At approximately 9:00 p.m., she was shackled and transported to the Nashua Street Jail. Upon arrival at Nashua Street, the admitting officer, after examining the papers, told the transportation officers that the warrant was invalid. Williams was returned to South Bay at approximately 11:00 p.m. She eventually arranged for a friend to meet her and drive her home.

Almost three years later, Williams and DeToledo filed this joint lawsuit against Suffolk County and "John Doe" in the Suffolk Superior Court. After a period of discovery, plaintiffs amended the Complaint to add the individual defendants and claims under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants thereafter removed the case to the federal district court.

The Amended Complaint is framed in twenty counts. Plaintiffs eventually agreed to voluntarily dismiss defendant Owen Julius (Counts XIII through XVI). DeToledo also dismissed her civil rights claims against Sinclair and Thomas (Counts XVII and XIX). The remaining counts allege federal and state civil rights violations on the part of Rao (both plaintiffs, Counts V through VIII) and Sinclair and Thomas (Williams only, Counts X, XII, XVIII, and XX). DeToledo and Williams also assert claims under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act against Suffolk County (Counts I through IV).

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The movant has the "`initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions' of the record showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact." See Bates v. Mackay, 321 F.Supp.2d 173, 178 (D.Mass.2004), quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The Civil Rights Claims

DeToledo asserts against Rao a Fourteenth Amendment due process-deprivation of liberty claim (the brief detention that occurred when Rao mistook her for Williams) and a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim (the application of handcuffs).⁹ Williams alleges identical claims against Rao, as well as an excessive force claim (the strip search) against Sinclair and Thomas.¹⁰ Government officials may be held liable under § 1983 for a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law if their conduct amounts to a reckless or callous indifference to an individual's constitutional rights. Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 21 (1st Cir.1989). "We have emphasized time and again that `[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government,'... whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, ... or in the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective...." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). To be actionable under the Due Process Clause, misconduct by state actors must exceed a high threshold of allowance for human shortcomings in managing the intricate processes of government. "[T]he Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part of state officials; liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.... It is, on the contrary, behavior at the other end of the culpability spectrum that would most probably support a substantive due process claim; conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level." Id., at 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708. See also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-348, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (a merely negligent deprivation of life, liberty, or property, "simply does...