Bates v. Mackay
| Decision Date | 10 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.03-10629-REK.,CIV.A.03-10629-REK. |
| Citation | 321 F.Supp.2d 173 |
| Parties | Dana BATES, Plaintiff v. James J. MACKAY and Town of Saugus, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
John J. Cloherty, III, Pierce, Davis, Fahey & Perritano, LLP, Boston, MA, for James J. Mackay, Defendant.
Terence E. Coles, James J. Mackay, Harold L. Lichten, Pyle, Rome & Lichten, P.C., Boston, MA, for Dana Bates, Plaintiff.
John J. Davis, Pierce, Davis & Perritano, LLP, Boston, MA, for Town of Saugus, James J. Mackay, Defendants.
Pending for decision are matters related to the following filings:
(1) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Undisputed Facts (Docket No. 13, filed February 19, 2004) and Memorandum in Support (Docket No. 14, filed February 19, 2004);
(2) Defendants' Opposition to Summary Judgment and Defendant MacKay's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 16, filed March 22, 2004) and Memorandum in Support (Docket No. 17, filed March 22, 2004);
(3) Defendants' Statement of Material Facts in Dispute (Docket No. 18, filed March 22, 2004);
(4) Affidavit of James J. MacKay (Docket No. 19, filed March 22, 2004); and
(5) Plaintiff's Opposition to MacKay's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 20, filed April 12, 2004).
The plaintiff, Dana Bates, is a detective in the Town of Saugus Police Department, and is the president of the Saugus Police Relief Association ("SPRA"). The SPRA is an organization composed of current and past town police officers; it provides disability and death benefits to its members.
A series of disturbances in late 2002 and early 2003 at nightclubs in Saugus received substantial local media attention. These events were also the subject of discussion at meetings of the Saugus Board of Selectmen. According to Bates, the increased violence was a result, in part, of decreased police presence; the nightclubs had recently curtailed their practice of hiring police officers to provide security. In response, in late February, 2003, Detective Bates wrote a letter to the editors of three local newspapers. The letter read as follows:
Letter to the editor:
I am the president of the Saugus Police Relief Association. The S.P.R.A. pays disability and death benefits to all the men and woman [sic] of the Saugus Police Department. Although Saugus is a small community when you compare it to the cities and towns which are around us we have had two police officers killed in the line of duty.
We now find ourselves in a serious situation involving some of the nightclubs in town. Years ago many clubs would hire police officers so that the 5 p.m. to 1 a.m. and the 1 a.m. to 9 a.m. divisions would not have to send all the officers to assist in quelling a disturbance. The officers who were there all night could monitor the size of the crowd and not allow any rowdy persons and or persons who were drinking inside the club. We would work hand in hand with the club mangers [sic] to provide a safe environment for those coming to Saugus for the night. That safe environment has changed. We have had several major disturbances where officers have been assaulted. Recently two Saugus Officers had to draw their service weapons because they were in fear of their lives because of an unruly crowd at one of the clubs.
Some of these clubs will tell you they have a security staff. Many times the security staff is part of the problem. If they commit an assault and battery they are subject to arrest. Now we have the problem of all night parties. Although some clubs may monitor the patrons closely what type of person come [sic] out at 3 a.m. to party. Most of these patrons have been drinking all night.
I think the final straw came for me when a club manger [sic] recently refused to open the door for the police to inspect the establishment. This is in clear violation of the law and shows a total lack of respect for the men and women of the Saugus Police Department.
I would hope that the Board of Selectman [sic] would set up a meeting with a panel of members of the Saugus Police Department to address this issue. Hopefully this problem can be resolved and the Town of Saugus can once again be a safe town for its citizens and a safer place to work for its police officers.
Yours Truly,
Detective Dana Bates
President S.P.R.A.
Docket No. 14, ex. E.
On March 4, 2003, defendant Police Chief James J. MacKay issued a letter of reprimand to Bates. The letter stated:
Dear Officer Bates:
You are hereby given a written letter of reprimand for violating the Department's Rules and Regulations as they pertain to the dissemination of official police information to the media.
The Department's Executive Officer has been designated as the Public Relations Officer; he exclusively deals with the media on all Police Department matters. The letter you sent to the Editor of the Lynn Item violates this longstanding order.
A copy of this reprimand will be placed in your personnel file.
Docket No. 14, ex. G.
Bates asserts that his discipline, and the police department regulations, violate his First Amendment right to speak freely about matters of public concern. He filed suit in this court on April 4, 2003, seeking injunctive relief and damages. Bates now moves for summary judgment. Defendant MacKay cross-moves for summary judgment, claiming he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Summary judgment should be granted only where the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, determines that no genuine dispute of material fact exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The movant has the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions" of the record showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Then the non-moving party must demonstrate that "every essential element of its claim or defense is at least trialworthy." Price v. General Motors Corp., 931 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir.1991) (italics in original).
A dispute is genuine if it "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir.1997). Facts are "material" if they possess "the capacity to sway the outcome of litigation under the applicable law." Id. The facts in genuine dispute must be significantly probative in order for summary judgment to be denied; "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation will not suffice." Id.
Moreover, "[t]he standards are the same where, as here, both parties have moved for summary judgment." Bienkowski v. Northeastern Univ., 285 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir.2002) ().
It is commonly observed that a public employee does not relinquish the right under the First Amendment to comment on matters of public interest simply because of his or her employment by the government. E.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Nevertheless, the interests of a state in regulating the speech of its employees "differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. In particular, a government entity has an important interest in promoting the efficient performance of its duties. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 912 (1st Cir.1993). The federal courts have developed an extensive body of case law to guide the determination in a given factual setting as to which party's interest should prevail.
In a situation in which a government employee alleges that the government unlawfully squelched the employee's speech, a court must engage in a three-part First Amendment inquiry. First, a court must decide whether the speech involves a matter of public concern. Second, it must weigh the First Amendment interests of the plaintiff and the public against the government's interest in functioning efficiently. Third, it must decide whether the protected speech was a substantial or motivating favor in the defendant's action. Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir.2004).
The threshold inquiry is whether Bates' speech may be characterized as concerning a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684.
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.
Id. The defendants argue that Bates' speech was not a matter of public concern.
"Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684. It is not always necessary, however, to examine the form and context of the expression.
Where a public employee speaks out on a topic which is clearly a legitimate matter of inherent concern to the electorate, the court may eschew further inquiry into the employee's motives as revealed by the ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Detoledo v. County of Suffolk, CIV.A.03-CV-10834RGS.
...motion, and identifying those portions' of the record showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact." See Bates v. Mackay, 321 F.Supp.2d 173, 178 (D.Mass.2004), quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 The Civil Rights Claims DeToledo a......
-
Brady v. Tamburini
...officers do not have a First Amendment right "to speak in an official capacity on behalf of the police department." Bates v. Mackay , 321 F. Supp. 2d 173, 182 (D. Mass. 2004) (citing Kotwica v. Tucson , 801 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1986) ). Indeed, the designation of a department spokesper......
-
Mailloux v. Town of Littleton
...1, 12 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684). 70. Bennett, 230 F.Supp.2d at 223. 71. Bates v. Mackay, 321 F.Supp.2d 173, 179 (D.Mass.2004) (noting also that a letter relating to the internal operating procedures of the police department would not be of public c......