Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Detroit

• Decision Date: 05 April 1993
• Docket Number: Docket No. 128335
• Citation: 199 Mich.App. 129,501 N.W.2d 202
• Parties: DETROIT FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, Robert J. Haig, Mark D. Lafferty, John Chakan, Jeffrey R. Van Every, and Albert Richardson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, Mayor of the City of Detroit, Budget Director of the City of Detroit, and Commissioner of the City of Detroit, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 202

501 N.W.2d 202

199 Mich.App. 129

DETROIT FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, Robert J. Haig, Mark D Lafferty, John Chakan, Jeffrey R. Van Every, and Albert Richardson Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, Mayor of the City of Detroit, Budget Director of the City of Detroit, and Commissioner of the City of Detroit, Defendants-Appellees Cross-Appellants.

Docket No. 128335.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 15, 1992, at Detroit.

Decided April 5, 1993, at 9:50 a.m.

Released for Publication June 24, 1993.

Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O'Hare, Helveston & Waldman, P.C. by Theodore Sachs, Mark Brewer, and Reginald M. Turner, Jr., Detroit, for plaintiffs.

Donald Pailen, Corp. Counsel, Abigail Elias, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Terri L. Hayles, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, for defendants.

Before TAYLOR, P.J., and BRENNAN and MARILYN J. KELLY, JJ.

TAYLOR, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiffs union and union officers appeal as of right the Wayne Circuit Court's grant of summary disposition to defendants. Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's ruling that the executive branch of the government of the City of Detroit may properly refuse to expend monies appropriated by the city council for a particular use. Defendants cross appeal, contending that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs had standing to bring suit in the first instance. We affirm.

The operative facts are not in dispute. After defendant mayor submitted his written proposal for the city's budget for fiscal year 1989-90, the city council amended the budget, including an addition of $750,000 for a new fire department squad. Upon returning the budget to the mayor for his reconsideration, the mayor vetoed $500,000 of the $750,000 appropriated for a new fire squad. A majority vote of the council (8-1) overrode the mayoral veto and reinstated the entire $750,000 appropriation. However, the mayor never used the appropriation. ¹

Plaintiffs, who represent the city's fire fighters, sought a writ of mandamus compelling defendants to spend the money. Both sides moved for summary disposition. The trial court ruled that plaintiffs did in fact have standing. However, the trial court granted defendants summary disposition on the ground that the mayor need not confer with the city council in deciding not to expend appropriated monies, and therefore declined to issue a writ of mandamus.

The first issue, of course, is whether plaintiffs had standing to bring suit in the first instance. After reviewing this question de novo, Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich. 75, 80, 467 N.W.2d 21 (1991), we hold that plaintiffs did not have standing.

Standing is a legal term denoting the existence of a party's interest in the outcome of litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy. However, evidence that a party will engage in full and vigorous advocacy, standing alone, is insufficient to establish standing. Dodak v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 554, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). No one may rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court "unless one has in an individual or representative capacity some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." Bowie v. Arder, 441 Mich. 23, 42-43, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992). To have standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a legally protected interest that is in jeopardy of being adversely affected, and must allege a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the dispute to ensure that the controversy sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversarial setting that is capable of judicial resolution. Trout Unlimited v. City of White Cloud, 195 Mich.App. 343, 348, 489 N.W.2d 188 (1992). Generally, a plaintiff shows such a personal stake in a lawsuit by demonstrating that he has been injured or represents someone who has been injured, id.; Kaminskas v. Detroit, 68 Mich.App. 499, 243 N.W.2d 25 (1976), and also that his substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large, Dodak, supra, 441 Mich. p. 554, 495 N.W.2d 539.

In the present case, defendants do not argue that they have standing because of their status as city employees or taxpayers. Rather, they argue that they have standing because they (or their members) risk physical and emotional injury because there is an insufficient number of fire fighters, a situation that expenditure of the appropriation would have alleviated. We conclude that plaintiffs have suffered damages no different than the public at large. We are aware that plaintiffs' expert testified that plaintiffs' fire fighters are more likely to be injured unless more fire fighters are hired. However, this rather obvious statement of probabilities does not constitute a real or concrete injury separating them from the general public.

This increased likelihood of physical injury is not unlike the general public's increased likelihood of physical injury due to the lack of fire fighters. That is, it is more likely that a fire fighter who fights two hundred fires annually will be hurt than the same fire fighter who fights one hundred fires annually if only because that fire fighter is more often put at risk. But people occupying buildings that catch on fire are more likely to be injured when there are fewer fire fighters available to put out the fires. Both segments of society are at greater risk when there is a dearth of fire fighters.

Private individuals and organizations do not have standing to redress grievances on behalf of the public. Nevertheless, in seeking to enforce the city charter and code, plaintiffs seek to enforce that which is intended to promote responsible budgeting and to avoid deficit spending. In this regard, the intended effects of the city charter and code are identical to those of the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act (UBAA), M.C.L. § 141.421 et seq.; M.S.A. § 5.3228(21) et seq., under which this Court has previously held that those challenging the mayor's actions had no standing to sue. Rayford v. Detroit, 132 Mich.App. 248, 257, 347 N.W.2d 210 (1984). Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs have no standing to sue under the city charter and code, which may be read in harmony with the UBAA. Detroit City Council v. Stecher, 430 Mich. 74, 89-90, 421 N.W.2d 544 (1988).

We agree, however, with the trial court's conclusion that the mayor was not required to spend the money appropriated for hiring additional fire fighters. ² An appropriation is not a mandate to spend. Under the UBAA, "appropriation" is defined as an authorization, not a requirement, to incur obligations and to expend public funds. M.C.L. § 141.422a(3); M.S.A. § 5.3228(22a)(3). ³ Under both the UBAA and the city charter, the mayor has a duty to operate the city within a balanced budget, and must control spending so as to avoid a budget deficit. ⁴ Were plaintiffs permitted to successfully challenge the mayor's discretionary decision to simply not spend, the mayor would be unable to prevent the deficit spending that is proscribed by law, a law that he is charged with upholding.

We note specifically that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those of Stecher, supra, because the appropriation in question was neither altered nor was it the subject of a transfer. Therefore, the formal procedures set forth in the UBAA ⁵ and the city charter do not come into play. Stecher, supra, p. 77, 421 N.W.2d 544.

Although the trial court's grant of summary disposition to defendants was legally correct as far as it went, the issue whether the mayor had a clear legal duty to spend should not have been given plenary consideration because plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. Thus, although in granting defendants summary disposition the trial court properly declined to issue the writ of mandamus sought by plaintiffs, the proper result was reached for, at least in part, the wrong reason. However, because the correct result was reached, we will not disturb the result on appeal. Paul v. Bogle, 193 Mich.App. 479, 492, 484 N.W.2d 728 (1992).

Affirmed.

BRENNAN, J., concurred.

MARILYN J. KELLY, Judge (dissenting).

The majority concludes that plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action and that the mayor was not required to spend the money appropriated for hiring additional fire fighters. I disagree.

I

The majority finds that plaintiffs lack standing, because their damages are no different from those of the citizenry at large. See Dodak v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 554, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993), citing Alexander v. Norton Shores, 106 Mich.App. 287, 288, 307 N.W.2d 476 (1981). They conclude that the fire fighters' increased chance of physical injury is not unlike the general public's increased chance of physical injury due to a lack of fire fighters.

Admittedly, both fire fighters and the general public are at greater risk of physical injury when there is an insufficient number of fire fighters. However, fire fighters are detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large. See Dodak, supra. The increased risk of injury to fire fighters is different in degree and in kind from that of the general public. A fire fighter is much more likely to sustain injury due to the insufficiency of fire fighters than is a member of the general public. The more fires one encounters, the greater the likelihood of injury. Also, a fire fighter may be more susceptible to injury due to errors caused by sleep deprivation.

Aside from the increased risk of physical injury, fire fighters suffer from an increased risk of serious emotional distress. An insufficiency of fire fighters harms the morale and efficiency of all existing fire fighters. Unlike the average citizen, fire fighters live every workday with the real possibility that, due to a lack of personnel, they may be seriously...