Dew v. Ashley County

• Decision Date: 27 November 1939
• Docket Number: 4-5677
• Citation: 133 S.W.2d 652,199 Ark. 361
• Parties: DEW v. ASHLEY COUNTY
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

133 S.W.2d 652

199 Ark. 361

DEW v. ASHLEY COUNTY

4-5677

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 27, 1939

Appeal from Ashley Circuit Court; DuVal L. Purkins, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Y W. Etheridge, for appellant.

John M. Golden, for appellee.

OPINION

BAKER J.

We accept appellant's statement substantially as set forth in his abstract and brief, showing the issues upon this appeal. The agreed statement of facts signed by the parties or their counsel shows that there was paid to L. W. Dew, the assessor of Ashley county, $ 900 for the year 1937, and the same amount for 1938, as being half of his salary paid by the state of Arkansas, and that he paid this amount of money into the treasury of Ashley county. It also appears that he was paid $ 1,800, which was the salary of the county assessor in that county, for each of the said years. He filed a claim in the county court for $ 900 for the year of 1937 and a like amount for the year of 1938, and these claims were disallowed. He appealed and the agreed statement of facts filed by the parties was prepared for the trial in the circuit court. It became the sole evidence. It was also agreed therein that except for the salary act, initiated in that county, the salary of the tax assessor would be $ 3,000 per annum. Section 13637, Pope's Digest.

More succinctly stated it is now contended by appellant that the act of the Legislature fixing salaries is a general law and that being such the Initiative and Referendum Amendment No. 7 to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas could not legally authorize the county to pass any local act, or, if so, that it was changed or repealed, at least, by the act which fixed the salary of the assessor of Ashley county at $ 3,000; that under the state act the appellant is entitled to $ 1,500 from the state, instead of $ 900, but that he is asking now that he be permitted to have only the $ 900 paid by the state to him and which he, in obedience to the initiated salary act, paid over to the treasurer of the county under protest. Counsel says: "It is clear that the county has the right to set the salaries of local officials as far as they are such; and the question is whether or not the county may set the salary of the assessor not only for the work done as a local official but also for the work done by him as an official of the State of Arkansas."

We comprehend appellant's viewpoint in this regard, but we wholly fail to agree as to its persuasive force or effect, when we consider the proposition having due regard to the power of the county under Constitutional Amendment No. 7 to fix or determine salaries of county officers.

We shall not enter upon a discussion as to the right or power of counties to fix or determine such salaries. That has been settled upon many occasions. Dozier v. Ragsdale, 186 Ark. 654, 55 S.W.2d 779; Tindall v. Searan, 192 Ark. 173, 90 S.W.2d 476; Phillips v. Rothrock, 194 Ark. 945, 110 S.W.2d 26.

There is little left for discussion now except the present status of the assessor. It is argued that he is both a state and county officer, so recognized as a state officer by the state by the legislative act which provides for the payment of one-half his salary. Act 316 of 1935 and Act 75 of 1937, are cited by appellant as authority therefor.

In recent years many changes have been made in providing compensation for officials, without changing to any extent or to any degree the duty or power or status of such officials. Many people still remember when all officials were paid fees by those whom they served and for the particular services rendered. The fee system has been eliminated in many counties in so far as compensation for the officer is concerned, though, in many instances, it has been preserved as a means of measuring the value of the services rendered to the individual citizen. Under this later system the theory is that when this service is rendered by the county through its duly elected officer, such fee shall be collected and be paid over to the treasurer, for the benefit of the county, the fee system being regarded merely as above stated, as the measure of compensation to be paid by him who has been served in the particular governmental function. But even if such fee system, as provided for at this time, and for the purposes above set out were completely abolished, and if services were rendered free by officers duly elected appellant's position here would not be changed in the least. The fact that the state, by appropriation tenders and pays over $ 900 a year for half the assessor's salary in no respect whatever changes the nature of the office of county tax assessor. It is true that his assessment is for the benefit of the state, perhaps to the same extent that it is to the benefit of the county, and it is perhaps beyond question that the appropriation for the payment of such salaries is an equitable...